Berg v. Footer
| Decision Date | 22 March 1996 |
| Docket Number | 94-CV-1497.,No. 94-CV-1496,94-CV-1496 |
| Citation | 673 A.2d 1244 |
| Parties | R. Christian BERG and George Washington University Medical Center, Appellants, v. Marvin P. FOOTER, M.D., Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Patrick A. Malone for appellant R. Christian Berg.
Nicholas S. McConnell, with whom Mary Lynn Reed was on the brief, for appellant The George Washington University Medical Center.
D. Lee Rutland, with whom William A. Ehrmantraut was on the brief, for appellee.
Before FERREN and STEADMAN, Associate Judges, and GALLAGHER, Senior Judge.
This case presents two principal questions: (1) When all parties stipulate to a settling defendant's liability in a common law tort action (here a claim for medical malpractice) — without formal adjudication of that liability — is the settling defendant a "joint tortfeasor" for purposes of determining the allowable credit to a nonsettling defendant against whom the jury has awarded full damages for the plaintiff's injury? (2) If so, will Martello v. Hawley, 112 U.S.App. D.C. 129, 300 F.2d 721 (1962), control, limiting the nonsettling defendant to a pro rata credit, even when the amount of the settlement is more than half the jury's verdict? Or will the "one satisfaction rule" applied in Snowden v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 147 U.S.App.D.C. 204, 454 F.2d 1047 (1971), entitle the nonsettling defendant to a dollar-for-dollar (pro tanto) credit when the settlement exceeds half the verdict, in order to limit the plaintiff's recovery to no more than the jury's valuation of the claim?
We conclude that such uncontested stipulation of a settling defendant's liability will be as effective as an adjudication of liability to make the defendant a joint tortfeasor for purposes of applying the appropriate credit. We further conclude that, whenever the plaintiff settles with a joint tortfeasor, the nonsettling defendant shall receive a pro rata credit under Martello, reflecting the defendant's equitable right to contribution and no more, even when the plaintiff's recovery from all defendants will exceed the amount of the verdict and thus violate the one satisfaction rule.
The trial court correctly awarded the non-settling defendant a pro tanto credit for the amount paid by a group of settling defendants that was not a joint tortfeasor, but the court erred in also applying a pro tanto, rather than pro rata, credit for the amount paid by the settling joint tortfeasor. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for recalculation of damages payable by appellee Footer, the nonsettling defendant.
Patricia Berg died of cervical cancer in June 1990. R. Christian Berg, as Patricia Berg's personal representative, brought a negligence action against Ms. Berg's gynecologist, Marvin Footer, M.D., the George Washington University Medical Center (GWU Medical Center), and a group of defendants connected with the Cancer Cytology Medical Laboratory (the laboratory defendants). Berg alleged that the defendants' negligent medical treatment delayed the diagnosis of cervical cancer and caused Patricia Berg's premature death.
Dr. Footer performed a surgical procedure called a fractional dilatation and curettage on Patricia Berg at GWU Medical Center in June 1987, in order to locate the cause of vaginal bleeding Ms. Berg was experiencing between menstrual periods. When performing the fractional dilatation and curettage, Footer was supposed to obtain separate tissue specimens from the cervix and from inside the uterus. It is undisputed on appeal that Footer negligently submitted the two tissue specimens to the pathologists at GWU Medical Center as a single uterine specimen. The pathologists read the specimen as normal, although it was later discovered that the cervical tissue mixed into the specimen showed an abnormal precancerous condition called dysplasia. It is further undisputed that, if the dysplasia had been detected in 1987, the possibility of eradicating the precancerous lesion — and curing Patricia Berg — would have been extremely high. The two-year delay in diagnosing Ms. Berg's condition, however, caused her condition to go from curable to fatal.
In the Joint Pretrial Statement, signed by counsel for all the parties, GWU Medical Center admitted that, despite Dr. Footer's negligence in submitting the specimens, its own "pathologist should have detected that Mrs. Berg's biopsy specimen on June 4, 1987 showed that she had a pre-invasive condition known as dysplasia" and that "the failure to detect this condition, combined with the conduct of the other defendants, was a substantial factor in the delay of two years in the detection of Mrs. Berg's cervical cancer."
As to the laboratory defendants, Berg alleged they negligently had read and reported the Pap smears Dr. Footer had taken from Patricia Berg on five separate occasions during 1987 and 1988. Berg contended that these defendants had interpreted the Pap smears as normal when they showed marked inflammation or dysplasia, or at least "should have been reported as lacking sufficient cells for evaluation with a recommendation for a repeat smear."
Berg reached settlement agreements with GWU Medical Center and the laboratory defendants but not with Dr. Footer. The case proceeded to trial against Footer alone. The doctor did not implead either settling defendant to seek contribution. Because this is not a comparative negligence jurisdiction, neither the jury nor the judge was asked to make findings ascribing proportionate fault to Dr. Footer, to GWU Medical Center, or to the laboratory defendants. After trial, the jury found that Dr. Footer's negligent failure to detect Patricia Berg's precancerous condition had caused her premature death and awarded the plaintiff $1,406,071 in damages.
In Berg's settlement agreement with the laboratory defendants, the defendants agreed to pay Berg $150,000 but denied every allegation of negligence and wrongdoing.1 The agreement also provided that Berg would indemnify the laboratory defendants for any contribution or indemnification actions brought by Footer.
GWU Medical Center's offer to settle included an immediate payment to Berg of $800,000 and an additional $200,000 "if after good faith efforts to collect full damages from the remaining defendants by way of settlement or verdict, plaintiffs total recovery is less than $1.5 million."2 GWU Medical Center and Berg further agreed that Berg would indemnify the Medical Center for all sums the Medical Center was ordered to pay in contribution or indemnification actions.3
In response to the jury's verdict, Dr. Footer filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 59(e),4 requesting dollar-for-dollar (pro tanto) credits totalling $1,150,000 for Berg's settlements with GWU Medical Center and the laboratory defendants. The trial court agreed. The court ruled that the jury's award of $1,406,071 represented "all damages to be awarded Plaintiffs" and stressed that "the Court knows of no authority in this jurisdiction that would allow" a plaintiff to recover more than that amount. The trial court accordingly ordered that Footer receive credits for the $150,000 paid by the laboratory defendants and the $800,000 paid by GWU Medical Center. The court also credited the additional $200,000 specified under the settlement agreement with GWU Medical Center because "Plaintiffs' total recovery determined by the jury was less than $1.5 million." The trial court then concluded that Dr. Footer owed $256,071 after receiving the $1,150,000 in credits due.5
GWU Medical Center was granted leave to intervene, and Berg and the Medical Center noted their appeals, contending that Dr. Footer, as a nonsettling defendant, was only entitled to credits totaling $778,035.50, represented by the $150,000 settlement with the laboratory defendants plus $628,035.50 for the GWU Medical Center settlement, reflecting GWU's pro rata (50%) share of the $1,406,071 jury verdict after subtraction of the $150,000. According to Berg and the Medical Center, Berg is entitled to $1,503,035.50 comprised of $150,000 from the laboratory defendants, $800,000 (not $1,000,000) from GWU Medical Center, and $628,035.50 (not $256,071) from Dr. Footer.
How appellants arrive at these results, and why we conclude that they are correct, comprise the analysis we now present.
How to credit the judgment entered upon a jury verdict against a nonsettling defendant with the proceeds a settling defendant paid to the plaintiff is purely a question of law, subject to this court's review de novo. See Bertram v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., 35 F.3d 1008, 1019 (5th Cir.1994) (). We therefore proceed without deference to the trial court's analysis.
Until almost mid-century in this jurisdiction, a plaintiff's settlement with one of several joint tortfeasors extinguished the claim against all others on the ground that there was a single injury for which the injured party was entitled to but one satisfaction. See Kaplowitz v. Kay, 63 App.D.C. 178, 179, 70 F.2d 782, 783 (1934). In 1943, however, the federal court of appeals — which at this time had the last word — abandoned this extinguishment rule in McKenna v. Austin, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 134 F.2d 659 (1943). Judge Rutledge, writing for a divided court, declared that "partial satisfaction taken in compromise and release of liability of one or some of the wrongdoers does not discharge the others." Id. at 234, 134 F.2d at 665. Once a plaintiff who had settled with one tortfeasor could sue a nonsettling tortfeasor, however, the court had to resolve how much credit, if any, the nonsettling defendant should receive for the settlement when the jury returned a plaintiff's verdict. That question has resulted in endless debate here and elsewhere.6
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in cas...
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