Bergan Mercy Health System v. Haven
| Decision Date | 15 December 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. S-99-078.,S-99-078. |
| Citation | 260 Neb. 846,620 N.W.2d 339 |
| Parties | BERGAN MERCY HEALTH SYSTEM, Appellant, v. Dondi S. HAVEN, Appellee. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
John J. Jolley, Jr., of Baird, Holm, McEachen, Pedersen, Hamann & Strasheim, Omaha, for appellant.
James E. Harris and Britany S. Shotkoski, of Harris, Feldman Law Offices, Omaha, for appellee.
Randall L. Goyette, of Baylor, Evnen, Curtiss, Grimit & Witt, Lincoln, for amicus curiae Nebraska Medical Association.
Neil B. Danberg, Jr., Lyman L. Larsen, and Michael J. Leahy, of Stinson, Mag & Fizzell, Omaha, for amicus curiae Nebraska Association of Hospitals and Health Systems.
Denzel R. Busick, Grand Island, for amicus curiae Nebraska Association of Trial Attorneys.
The two questions presented in this appeal are (1) whether the Nebraska medical lien statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 52-401 (Reissue 1998), constitutes unconstitutional special legislation under Neb. Const. art. III, § 18, and (2) whether Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1563.02 (Reissue 1995) exempts the proceeds of a personal injury settlement from a lien filed under § 52-401.
The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. Appellee Dondi S. Haven was injured in an automobile accident and was treated by appellant Bergan Mercy Health System (Bergan) from November 1 through 4, 1996, and on February 21 and June 5, 1997. There is no issue in this appeal whether the charges of $23,000 are the usual, customary, or reasonable charges as the parties have stipulated for the purposes of this motion that the charges are usual, customary, and reasonable.
Bergan's operative petition alleges that General Casualty Insurance (General Casualty) insured the tort-feasor responsible for Haven's injuries. Bergan alleges that it filed a notice of hospital lien with General Casualty, pursuant to § 52-401. Bergan further alleges that subsequent to the filing of the notice of hospital lien, Haven settled his claim against the tort-feasor for in excess of $100,000 and that Haven's attorney claimed an attorney fee of one-third of that amount.
Bergan filed suit in the district court, alleging two "counts," the first of which simply prayed for judgment on the unpaid debt, and the second of which invoked the provisions of § 52-401. Haven's answer, inter alia, charged that § 52-401 was unconstitutional special legislation and was in direct conflict with § 25-1563.02, which exempts personal injury settlements from the claims of creditors.
Bergan filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which the district court sustained on March 10, 1998. Haven filed a motion to reconsider, which was sustained on July 23, 1998. In its order sustaining the motion to reconsider, the district court determined that § 52-401 conflicted with § 25-1563.02 and that § 52-401 was unconstitutional special legislation under Neb. Const. art. III, § 18. Bergan appealed from the July 23 order, but the appeal was dismissed on September 18, 1998, by the Nebraska Court of Appeals for lack of a final, appealable order in case No. A-98-847.
Trial was had to the district court on January 15, 1999. Incorporating by reference the reasons stated in its order of July 23, 1999, the district court entered judgment in favor of Bergan on count I of its petition, finding that such services and supplies were provided at the specific request of Haven on an open account and per Haven's express agreement to pay. Haven has not cross-appealed the decision as to count I. As to count II, whether § 25-1563.02 exempts the proceeds of a personal injury settlement from a lien filed under § 52-401, the district court, giving deference to Matter of Borgmann, 176 B.R. 172 (Bankr.D.Neb.1994), determined that under the exemption statute, § 25-1563.01, the mandatory terms thereof exempt personal injury or wrongful death settlements, whether in a lump sum or on a periodic basis, from any claims of creditors, which exemption includes liens under § 52-401. As to the defense of unconstitutionality of § 52-401, the district court found that the hospital lien statute, § 52-401, fails the "substantial difference" classification test and creates an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification not based on any substantial difference or circumstances or situation between patients with a claim for their injuries against a third party and those patients who seek treatment for injuries who do not have a claim for the injuries against a third party.
Bergan filed a motion in this court to bypass the Court of Appeals, which was granted. Bergan has also properly filed a notice of a constitutional question as required by Neb.Ct.R. of Prac. 9E (rev. 2000).
Bergan assigns, consolidated and restated, that the district court erred in determining that (1) § 52-401 is unconstitutional because it constitutes special legislation that contravenes Neb. Const. art. III, § 18, and (2) § 52-401 conflicts with § 25-1563.02 and that the proceeds of a personal injury settlement are exempt from the lien established by § 52-401.
Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law; accordingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the court below. State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore, 258 Neb. 738, 605 N.W.2d 440 (2000); State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore, 258 Neb. 199, 602 N.W.2d 465 (1999).
Statutes are afforded a presumption of constitutionality, and the unconstitutionality of a statute must be clearly established before it will be declared void. Daily v. Board of Ed. of Morrill Cty., 256 Neb. 73, 588 N.W.2d 813 (1999). The burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute is on the one attacking its validity. Daily v. Board of Ed. of Morrill Cty., supra; State ex rel. Shepherd v. Neb. Equal Opp. Comm.,
251 Neb. 517, 557 N.W.2d 684 (1997).
Statutory interpretation is a matter of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below. Phelps Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Graf, 258 Neb. 810, 606 N.W.2d 736 (2000); Snyder v. Contemporary Obstetrics & Gyn., 258 Neb. 643, 605 N.W.2d 782 (2000).
Bergan assigns that the trial court erred in determining that § 52-401 is unconstitutional special legislation. Section 52-401 provides:
Whenever any person employs a physician, nurse, or hospital to perform professional service or services of any nature, in the treatment of or in connection with an injury, and such injured person claims damages from the party causing the injury, such physician, nurse, or hospital, as the case may be, shall have a lien upon any sum awarded the injured person in judgment or obtained by settlement or compromise on the amount due for the usual and customary charges of such physician, nurse, or hospital applicable at the times services are performed, except that no such lien shall be valid against anyone coming under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.
A legislative act constitutes special legislation, violative of Neb. Const. art. III, § 18, if (1) it creates an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification or (2) it creates a permanently closed class. Swanson v. State, 249 Neb. 466, 544 N.W.2d 333 (1996); City of Ralston v. Balka, 247 Neb. 773, 530 N.W.2d 594 (1995). When the Legislature confers privileges on a class arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons standing in the same relation to the privileges, without reasonable distinction or substantial difference, then the statute in question has resulted in the kind of improper discrimination prohibited by the Nebraska Constitution. Swanson v. State, supra.
A legislative classification, in order to be valid, must be based upon some reason of public policy, some substantial difference of situation or circumstances, that would naturally suggest the justice or expediency of diverse legislation with respect to the objects to be classified. Big John's Billiards v. Balka, 260 Neb. 702, 619 N.W.2d 444 (2000); State ex rel. Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 300 N.W.2d 181 (1980). See, also, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991). Classifications for the purpose of legislation must be real and not illusive; they cannot be based on distinctions without a substantial difference. State ex rel. Douglas v. Marsh, supra.
The general test of constitutionality with respect to prohibitions against special legislation is reasonableness of classification and uniformity of operation. Classification is proper if the special class has some reasonable distinction from other subjects of a like general character, which distinction bears some reasonable relation to the legitimate objectives and purposes of the legislation. Kuchar v. Krings, 248 Neb. 995, 540 N.W.2d 582 (1995); State ex rel. Douglas v. Marsh, supra.
The question is always whether the things or persons classified by the act form by themselves a proper and legitimate class with reference to the purpose of the act. Id.
As Haven has conceded that § 52-401 does not create a closed class, our analysis is focused upon whether § 52-401 creates an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification. Haven argues, and the trial court found, that the relevant classification for the special legislation analysis is the class of persons subject to a lien under § 52-401—persons injured by tort-feasors. The Nebraska Association of Hospitals and Health Systems, as amicus curiae, argues that the appropriate classification for analysis consists of the doctors, nurses, and hospitals benefited by § 52-401.
In fact, § 52-401 must be analyzed with respect to both classifications, as it presents a unique circumstance in which two classifications are...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gourley v. METHODIST HEALTH SYSTEM
...creates an arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification or (2) it creates a permanently closed class. Bergan Mercy Health Sys. v. Haven, 260 Neb. 846, 620 N.W.2d 339 (2000). This case does not involve a permanently closed We have consistently stated that the test for determining the ......
-
In re A.M.
...18. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U.S. 502, 505, 31 S.Ct. 490, 55 L.Ed. 561 (1911). 19. Bergan Mercy Health Sys. v. Haven, 260 Neb. 846, 850, 620 N.W.2d 339, 344 (2000). 20. Yant v. City of Grand Island, 279 Neb. 935, 940, 784 N.W.2d 101, 106 (2010), quoting Hug v. City of Omaha, 2......
-
Volquardson v. Hartford Ins. Co.
...which has the effect of nullifying another statute. Keller v. Tavarone, 262 Neb. 2, 628 N.W.2d 222 (2001); Bergan Mercy Health Sys. v. Haven, 260 Neb. 846, 620 N.W.2d 339 (2000). A court may examine the legislative history of the act in question in order to ascertain the intent of the Legis......
-
Wainscott v. Centura Health Corp.
...v. Jonovich, 205 Ariz. 383, 71 P.3d 910, 914 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Bergan Mercy Health Sys. v. Haven, 260 Neb. 846, 620 N.W.2d 339, 345 (2000). Providing a collection mechanism for hospitals also “furthers the important policy of reducing the amount of litigation......
-
The Damages of Caps in Nebraska
...2009). [88] Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill. 1976). [89]Compare id., with Bergan Mercy Health Sys. v. Haven, 260 Neb. 846, 851-52, 620 N.W.2d 339, 345 [90]Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 741-42. [91]Id. at 743. [92] Beason v. I.E. Miller Servs., Inc., 441 P.3d 1107, 1111......