Bergen v. Waterloo Register Co.
| Citation | 151 N.W.2d 469,260 Iowa 833 |
| Decision Date | 06 June 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 52415,52415 |
| Parties | Russell BERGEN, Claimant, Appellee, v. WATERLOO REGISTER COMPANY, Employer, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, Insurance Carrier, Appellants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Beecher, Buckmaster, Beecher, Holmes & Lindeman, Waterloo, for appellants.
Mosier, Mosier, Thomas, Beatty & Dutton, Waterloo, for appellee.
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the Iowa Industrial Commissioner had the authority to or could legally order payments for medical benefits and temporary disability resulting from proposed surgery to be performed upon the claimant at a future time, that time being later than three years after the date of the last payment of compensation. The trial court upheld the order of the commissioner, and the employer and its insurance carrier appeal. We affirm.
The facts are not in dispute. On May 23, 1961, the claimant suffered an injury while working for the appellant employer. The injury was compensable under the Iowa Workmen's Compensation Law and the claimant was paid weekly compensation for temporary and permanent partial disability amounting to a total of $2,137.50, and his medical and hospital bills totaling $1,234.22 were also paid by the employer. The last payment of compensation was on August 11, 1962, and the employer's report and menorandum of agreement were filed with the Iowa Industrial Commissioner, herein referred to as the commissioner, on November 7, 1962.
On March 3, 1964, the claimant filed with the commissioner a petition for review reopening alleging a need and desire for further surgery. He asked that it be authorized and that it be performed by Dr. John Walker. Hearing was had on this request. On June 3, 1965, the commissioner filed his decision therein, finding claimant's condition had changed, that further surgery was warranted, and ordered the employer to furnish the requested treatment and to pay further compensation for temporary disability caused by the surgery. On June 30, 1965, the commissioner wrote a letter to counsel for both the claimant and the employer to the effect that the employer could arrange for claimant's surgery at any time, tender it to claimant, and that this would discharge the employer's obligation.
On July 7, 1965, counsel for the employer wrote a letter to claimant tendering the surgery and limiting the tender to the period prior to September 1, 1965. Surgery having not been performed prior to that date, the employer filed a 'Motion for Order Acknowledging Discharge of Obligation under Review-Reopening Decision' with the commissioner. On October 14, 1965, the commissioner entered an order requiring claimant to show cause why the motion should not be sustained. On October 25, 1965, claimant filed his resistance thereto stating, in substance, that because of financial and personal problems, he had been unable to accept the employer's limited tender of surgery. On November 24, 1965, the commissioner sustained the resistance, overruled the employer's motion to discharge, and ordered the employer to renew the tender and hold it good until January 31, 1966.
The employer filed notice of appeal to the district court on December 27, 1965, contending (1) that the commissioner was without power or authority to enter such an order for the reasons that (a) he ordered medical payments at a time more than three years from the last payment date of compensation herein, and (b) he ordered payment of compensation at a time which was in excess of three years after the last payment of compensation herein, (2) that the claimant was barred from receiving medical payments by section 86.34 of the code, and (3) that claimant was barred from receiving any compensation benefits by virtue of section 86.34 of the code.
Pursuant to hearing and arguments of counsel the district court on May 10, 1966, ruled that section 86.34 did not bar the commissioner from continuing to exercise jurisdiction in the matter for a reasonable time after November 7, 1965, and denied the employer's appeal.
In the statement of errors relied upon for reversal appellants contend: 1. The trial court erred in affirming the order of the Iowa Industrial Commissioner dated November 24, 1965. 2. The trial court erred in ruling that the commissioner had power to order that compensation payments would accrue at a time which was more than three years after the date of last payment of compensation made under a memorandum of agreement. 3. The trial court erred in ruling that the commissioner had power to order the payment of medical expenses which were to be incurred upon a date or dates more than three years after the date of last payment of compensation made under a memorandum of agreement.
Section 86.34 of the 1958 Code of Iowa provides:
I. A determination by the commissioner that there is a change of condition which warrants a modification of a memorandum of agreement, being a factual question, may not be redetermined on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support the commissioner's finding. Henderson v. Iles, 250 Iowa 787, 794, 96 N.W.2d 321; Rose v. John Deere Ottumwa Works, 247 Iowa 900, 907, 76 N.W.2d 756; Williams v. Larsen Construction Co., 255 Iowa 1149, 125 N.W.2d 248; Bousfield v. Sisters of Mercy, 249 Iowa 64, 86 N.W.2d 109; Stice v. Consolidated Indiana Coal Co., 228 Iowa 1031, 291 N.W. 452. As we understand it, no serious question is raised herein as to the commissioner's finding that, subsequent to the last payment of compensation, claimant suffered a change of condition which would justify further medical benefits and additional compensation. The record seems to sustain that finding.
II. The nub of this controversy is whether the provisions of section 86.34 prohibit the commissioner from allowing or ordering medical benefits or compensation commencing after three years from the date of the last payment of compensation under the filed memorandum of agreement.
In this jurisdiction at least, the question presented has not...
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