Berger v. United States
Decision Date | 31 January 1921 |
Docket Number | No. 460,460 |
Parties | BERGER et al. v. UNITED STATES |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Seymour Stedman, of Chicago, Ill., and Henry F. Cochems, of Milwaukee, Wis., for Berger and others.
Mr. Solicitor General Frierson, of Chattanooga, Tenn., for the United States.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 23-26 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 21 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 988) provides as follows:
February 2, 1918, there was returned into the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, an indictment against plaintiffs in error (it will be convenient to refer to them as defendants), charging them with a violation of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917, known as the Espionage Act (40 Stat. 217, c. 30).1 In due time they invoked section 21 by filing an affidavit charging Judge Landis, who was to preside at the trial, with personal bias and prejudice against them, and moved for the assignment of another judge to preside at the trial. The motion was denied and upon the trial defendants were convicted and each sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. From the judgment and sentence they took the case to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. That court, reciting that certain questions of law under section 21 have arisen upon the affidavit and motion upon which the court is in doubt and upon which it desires the advice and instructions of this court, certifies questions of the sufficiency of the affidavit and the duty of the judge thereunder, and also certifies the affidavit and other proceedings upon such motion.
The affidavit, omitting formal and unnecessary parts, is as follows:
Petitioners [defendants] represent beliefs are the following facts: That said Adolph Germer was born in Prussia, a state or province of Germany; that Victor L. Berger was born in Rehback, Austria; that William F. Kruse is of immediate German extraction; that said Judge Landis is prejudiced and biased against said defendants because of their nativity, and in support thereof the defendants allege, that, on information and belief, on or about the 1st day of November said Judge Landis said in substance: 'If anybody has said anything worse about the Germans than I have I would like to know it so I can ust it.' And referring to a German who was charged with stating that 'Germany had money and plenty of men and wait and see what she is going to do to the United States,' Judge Landis said in substance:
'These defendants further aver that they have at no time defended the Kaiser, but on the contrary they have been opposed to an autocracy in Germany and every other country; that Victor L. Berger, defendant herein, editor of the Milwaukee Leader, a Socialist daily paper, Adolph Germer, national secretary of the Socialist party, William F. Kruse, editor of the Young Socialists Magazine, a Socialist publication, and J. Louis Engdahl disapproved the entrance of the United States into this war.
'Your petitioners further aver that the defendants Tucker and Engdahl were born in the United States and were not born in enemy countries, and are not immediate descendants of persons born in enemy countries, but verily believe because they are impleaded with Berger, Kruse and Germer that they as well as Berger, Germer and Kruse cannot receive a fair and impartial trial, and that the prejudice of said Judge Landis against said Berger, Germer and Kruse would prejudice the defense of said defendants Tucker and Engdahl impleaded in this case.'
The affidavit was accompanied by the certificate of Seymour Stedman, attorney for defendants, that the affidavit and application were made in good faith.
The questions certified are as follows:
(1) Is the aforesaid affidavit of prejudice sufficient to invoke the operation of the act which provides for the filing of affidavit of prejudice of a judge?
(2) Did said Judge Landis have the lawful right to pass upon the sufficiency of the said affidavit of his prejudice, or upon any question arising out of the filing of said affidavit?
(3) Upon the filing of the said affidavit of prejudice of said Judge Landis, did the said judge have lawful right and power to preside as judge on the trial of plaintiffs in error upon said indictment?
The basis of the question is section 21, and the primary question under it is the duty and power of the judge, whether the filing of an affidavit of personal bias or prejudice compels his retirement from the case or whether he can exercise a judgment upon the facts affirmed and determine his qualification against them and the belief based upon them?
These alternatives present the contentions in the case. Defendants contend for the first; the United States contends for the second. The assertion of defendants is that the mandate of the section is not subject to the discretion or judgment of the judge. The assertion of the United States is that the motion and its supporting affidavit, like other motions and their supporting evidence, are submitted for decision and the exercise of the judicial judgment upon them. In other words, the action of the affidavit is not 'automatic,' to quote the Solicitor General, but depends upon the substance and merit of its reasons and the truth of its facts, and upon both the judge has jurisdiction to pass. The issue is therefore precise, and while not in broad compass is practically of first impression as now presented.
In Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U. S. 420, 32 Sup. Ct. 753, 56 L. Ed. 1147, the section was referred to but not passed upon. In Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 230 U. S. 35, 33 Sup. Ct. 1007, 57 L. Ed. 1379, the phase of the section presented here was not presented. There proceedings in bankruptcy had progressed to a decree of adjudication, and the judge who had conducted them was charged by certain creditors with bias and prejudice based on his rulings in the case. Such use of section 21 was disapproved. 'It was never intended,' it was said, 'to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of adverse rulings made, for such rulings are reviewable otherwise, but to prevent his future action in the pending cause.' As pertinent to the comment and to the meaning of section 21, we may say, that Judge Chatfield, against whom the affidavit was directed, said that he felt that the intention of section 21 was 'to cause a transfer of the case without reference to the merits of the charge of bias,' and he did so immediately, in order, as he said, 'that the application of the creditors' might 'be considered as speedily as possible by such judge as' might 'be designated.' Another judge was designated and to restrain action by the latter and vacate the orders that he had made, and to command Judge Chatfield to resume jurisdiction, mandamus was sought. It was denied. The case establishes that the bias or prejudice which can be urged against a judge must be based upon something other than rulings in the case.
The cases at circuit in which section 21 was considered have not much guidance. They, however, deserve attention. Ex parte N. K. Fairbank Co. (D. C.) 194 Fed. 978,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
United States v. Boffa
...and the judge may not question either the truth of the allegations or the good faith of the affidavit, Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33-35, 41 S.Ct. 230, 233, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921); Simmons v. United States, 302 F.2d 71, 75 (C.A.3, 1962), even though the judge may know to a certainty ......
-
Blakely v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.
...that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment.'" Bell v. Chandler, 569 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1978) (quoting Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33-34 (1921)). "A disqualification order under § 144 should be issued when 'a reasonable man would conclude on the facts stated (in the ......
-
Lindsey v. City of Beaufort
...a decision upon the truth of the facts gives chance for the evil against which the section is directed. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36, 41 S.Ct. 230, 234, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921). See also, Liteky, et al v. United States, 510 U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1964). Before an......
-
Duplan Corporation v. Deering Milliken, Inc.
...statute never contemplated crippling our courts by disqualifying a judge, solely on the basis of a bias (or state of mind, 255 U.S. 42, 41 S.Ct. 236, 65 L.Ed. 481) against wrongdoers, civil or criminal, acquired from evidence presented in the course of judicial proceedings before him. Any o......
-
The appearance of justice revisited.
...a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.... (118) 28 U.S.C. [sections] 144. (119) 255 U.S. 22 (1921). (120) See id. at 35. The Berger interpretation of [sections] 21 has been held authoritative by federal courts interpreting [sections] 144. See......
-
The Elusive Goal of Impartiality
...a slight change in wording). 150. 28 U.S.C. § 144. 151. FLAMM, supra note 4, § 23.3, at 682. 152. See, e.g. , Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921) (authorizing the challenged judge to decide the merits of a disqualification motion); FLAMM, supra note 4, § 23.41, at 674– 75. 153. ......