Beritiech v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 94-0934-BH-S
Decision Date | 12 April 1995 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 94-0934-BH-S,94-0820-BH-C. |
Citation | 881 F. Supp. 557 |
Parties | Joseph M. BERITIECH, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and Joey Abston, Defendants. Glover ROBERTS, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and Frederick D. Byrd, Sr., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Wyman O. Gilmore, Jr., Grove Hill, AL, Sidney W. Jackson, III, Mobile, AL, for plaintiff.
Stephen C. Jackson, Tony G. Miller, Lee E. Bains, Jr., Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Birmingham, AL, for defendants.
These actions are before the court on the plaintiffs' motions to remand to the Circuit Court of Mobile County.
Plaintiffs Joseph M. Beritiech and Glover Roberts, both Alabama domiciliaries, filed their complaints separately in circuit court. The defendants in Beritiech are Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New York, and Joey Abston, a Metropolitan insurance agent in Mobile and an Alabama domiciliary. The defendants in Roberts are Metropolitan Life and Frederick D. Byrd, Sr., also a Metropolitan insurance agent in Mobile and an Alabama domiciliary.
Plaintiff Beritiech alleges that defendant Abston told him in 1990 that if he converted the $10,000 accumulated cash value of his whole-life insurance policy, he could get $25,000 in flexible-premium life insurance for no additional premiums. Beritiech claims Abston stated the cash value accumulated in his whole-life policy would never decrease, and his flexible-premium policy would provide greater cash value than the whole-life policy. He further claims that from 1990 to 1994, Abston continually reassured him his policy was in good order, that there was sufficient money to pay the premiums, and that the policy would remain in effect if Beritiech paid $35 monthly premiums.
Now Beritiech claims he will have to pay $1,600 per year to keep his policy in effect and that the cash value from his whole-life policy is almost depleted.
Plaintiff Roberts alleges that in 1967 or 1968 he purchased a dividend policy from Metropolitan Life. Premiums were $38 per month. In 1986, he contacted the company to buy $50,000 in life insurance. Roberts alleges that defendant Byrd stated that for $38 per month, Roberts would have a dividend policy with a face amount of $50,000, which would go to his beneficiary upon his death, and that he would have to pay premiums only until he turned 65, although the policy would remain in effect through age 90.
Roberts claims that when he turned 65, in 1993, he learned that unless he increased his monthly premium to $65 and agreed to a reduction in the policy to $30,000, his policy would lapse, because Byrd had reduced the value of the original dividend policy and used $3,142 from it to pay for the life-insurance policy.
Both plaintiffs assert state-law claims for fraud, misrepresentation, suppression, deceit, malice, and oppression. Beritiech also alleges conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and failure to maintain adequate procedures, while Roberts alleges negligence, wantonness, and breach of contract.
Metropolitan Life removed both actions before the plaintiffs had served the nondiverse defendants. It invokes the court's diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446. Both plaintiffs have filed motions to remand. See id. § 1447(c). Beritiech did so after serving nondiverse defendant Abston, but Roberts did so before serving nondiverse defendant Byrd.
In opposing each motion to remand, Metropolitan Life sets forth several arguments, any one of which, if persuasive, would suffice to deny remand.
The court must construe removal jurisdiction narrowly to limit federal jurisdiction and prevent encroachment on the state court's right to decide actions properly before it, especially in diversity actions. The removing defendants bear the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Robinson v. Quality Ins. Co., 633 F.Supp. 572, 574 (S.D.Ala.1986) (citations omitted); Harris v. Huffco Petroleum, 633 F.Supp. 250, 253 (S.D.Ala.1986) (citations omitted).
Metropolitan Life's first argument is based on the first section of the removal statute:
28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a, b) (emphasis added).
Citing the second sentence of § 1441(b), Metropolitan Life urges the court to disregard the domicile of the nondiverse defendants in determining the propriety of removal, because they were not "properly joined and served" before removal.
Pullman relied on 28 U.S.C. § 71, an earlier removal statute. Id. at 538, 59 S.Ct. at 349; Pecherski v. General Motors Corp., 636 F.2d 1156, 1159, 1159 n. 2 (8th Cir.1981) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 71). After Pullman, Congress amended the removal statute to add § 1441. Pecherski, 636 F.2d at 1159.
The immediate issue before the court is whether in determining the propriety of removal the court may consider the domicile of Abston, a nondiverse defendant served after removal but before the filing of a motion to remand, or the domicile of Byrd, a nondiverse defendant served after the filing of a motion to remand. The underlying issue is whether § 1441(b) supersedes Pullman. Over this underlying issue the courts are divided. Compare Mask v. Chrysler Corp., 825 F.Supp. 285, 289 (N.D.Ala.1993),1aff'd without opinion, 29 F.3d 641 (11th Cir. 1994),2and South Panola Consol. School Dist. v. O'Bryan, 434 F.Supp. 750, 754 (N.D.Miss.1977) (citing Pacific S.S. Co. v. Sutton, 7 F.2d 579, 581 (9th Cir.1925)),3with Pecherski, 636 F.2d at 1160-61 (Jane Doe defendant unserved), Kelly v. Drake Beam Morin, Inc., 695 F.Supp. 354, 356-57 (E.D.Mich.1988) (nondiverse defendant unserved), and Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, Inc. v. Pharmacy Reports, Inc., 486 F.Supp. 606, 614-15 (E.D.La.1980) ( )(citing Clarence E. Morris, Inc. v. Vitek, 412 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir.1969)).
Schwegmann Bros., 486 F.Supp. at 614; see also Harris, 633 F.Supp. at 253 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806); Martin v. Snyder, 148 U.S. 663, 13 S.Ct. 706, 37 L.Ed. 602 (1893)). Section 1441(b) therefore "did not change the removal requirement set forth in Pullman that a court, in determining the propriety of removal based on diversity of citizenship, must consider all named defendants, regardless of service." Pecherski, 636 F.2d at 1160.
The court reaches this conclusion not for any policy reasons, however meritorious they may be, see, e.g., Pecherski, 636 F.2d at 1161 n. 6,4 but rather because the plain meaning of the statute requires this result. See, e.g., id. at 1160; Kelly, 695 F.Supp. at 356-57; Schwegmann Bros., 486 F.Supp. at 614-15; but see, e.g., Mask, 825 F.Supp. at 289;5 South Panola, 434 F.Supp. at 754.
A nondiverse defendant's having been served either (1) after removal but before...
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