Berkemeier v. Rushville Nat. Bank, 1-582A117
Decision Date | 31 August 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 1-582A117,1-582A117 |
Citation | 438 N.E.2d 1054 |
Parties | Robert BERKEMEIER and Marilyn Berkemeier, Defendants-Appellants, v. RUSHVILLE NATIONAL BANK, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Eric N. Allen, Free, Brand, Tosick & Allen, Greenfield, for defendants-appellants.
William B. Keaton, Keaton & Keaton, P. C., Rushville, for plaintiff-appellee.
Robert Berkemeier and Marilyn Berkemeier (Berkemeiers) appeal from that part of a judgment awarding attorney's fees of $17,500 to Rushville National Bank (Bank). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Berkemeiers executed a promissory note secured by a first mortgage on real estate and a security agreement on personal property in the amount of $233,548.93, with interest at twenty percent (20%), and attorney's fees, due September 1, 1981. When Berkemeiers failed to pay the note when due, Bank sued on the note and to foreclose the mortgage and security agreement. Berkemeiers did not appear, although duly served with process, and Bank moved for a default judgment. Bank filed an affidavit of its president stating there was due from Berkemeiers the sum of $233,548.93 plus interest at twenty percent (20%) per annum from June 3, 1981, and attorney fees of $17,500.00. The court heard no other evidence as to the amount of attorney's fees and entered judgment against Berkemeiers for the principal and interest due ($253,512.56) plus $17,500.00 attorney's fees. Berkemeiers filed a motion for relief from judgment claiming surprise which was supported by an affidavit of Robert Berkemeier to the effect that he did not appear and defend because he knew he owed the money but was surprised by the excessive attorney fee award. The next day, Berkemeiers filed a motion to correct errors challenging only the attorney fee award. Bank responded with another affidavit from its president setting forth Bank's fee agreement with its attorneys. Both the motion for relief from judgment and the motion to correct errors were denied, and this appeal followed.
The sole issue presented by Berkemeiers as stated in their appellants' brief is:
"Did the trial court err in awarding the Plaintiff [Bank] the sum of Seventeen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($17,500.00) for attorney fees in a mortgage foreclosure action where Judgment was obtained by default, without hearing any evidence supporting the award of those fees?"
The question of whether or not a trial judge, based upon his own knowledge and experience as a lawyer and his own expertise in the area of reasonable attorney's fees, can take judicial notice of the amount and reasonableness of such fees and base an award of fees upon that knowledge alone without other supporting evidence in the record has been the subject of several recent cases. In Marshall v. Russell R. Ewin, Inc., (1972) 152 Ind.App. 171, 282 N.E.2d 841, trans. denied, Judge Lowdermilk stated the law formerly was that where the amount of attorney's fees was not fixed in the note, the amount had to be established by proper evidence, citing Interstate Motor Freight Systems v. Gasoline Equipment Co., (1940) 107 Ind.App. 494, 24 N.E.2d 418. However, the court said that the former law as stated in Interstate had been overruled by McDaniel v. McDaniel, (1964) 245 Ind. 551, 201 N.E.2d 215, and that "a court may properly take judicial notice of reasonable attorney fees in the trial of a cause." Marshall, 152 Ind.App. at 185, 282 N.E.2d at 850. However, although McDaniel does state that "the reasonableness of attorney fees is also a matter regarding which the judge, being a lawyer, may take judicial notice[,]" 245 Ind. at 562, 201 N.E.2d at 220, the opinion in McDaniel reveals that there was expert testimony before the court concerning attorney's fees. 1 In Brames v. Crates, (1980) Ind.App., 399 N.E.2d 437, this court said that the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a matter of which the trial judge, being a lawyer, may take judicial notice. Whether there was any evidence at all presented regarding attorney fees is not revealed by the Brames opinion. In Streets v. M. G. I. C. Mortgage Corp., (1978) Ind.App., 378 N.E.2d 915, testimony that a reasonable charge for such services would be a contingent fee of one-third of the judgment was held to be sufficient to sustain an award of fees in that amount. In First Valley Bank v. First Savings and Loan Association of Central Indiana, (1980) Ind.App., 412 N.E.2d 1237, trans. denied, this court stated that "the trial court might award attorney fees on the sole basis of its own observation of the trial, without hearing any evidence on the point." 412 N.E.2d at 1245. However, in that case, extensive hearings were held on the question of attorney fees, so the court did not, in fact, base its award solely on the basis of its own observation.
We now come to a consideration of recent cases which have required evidence to support an award of attorney's fees where the cases were not routine or the amount of fees was not small. In U. S. Aircraft Financing, Inc. v. Jankovich, (1980) Ind.App., 407 N.E.2d 287, trans. denied, which was an action seeking forfeiture of a conditional sales contract, involving an award of $30,000.00 in attorney's fees, Judge Chipman wrote:
Judge Miller quoted extensively from the language herein quoted from Jankovich in reversing an $8,500 attorney fee award in Henry B. Gilpin Co. v. Moxley, (1982) Ind.App., 434 N.E.2d 914. Further, this court in Moxley held the client's assertions as to the value of his attorney's services...
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