Brames v. Crates, 3-477A98
Decision Date | 22 January 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 3-477A98,3-477A98 |
Parties | 28 UCC Rep.Serv. 419 Byron L. BRAMES and Joanne E. Brames, Appellants (Plaintiffs Below), v. Chester W. CRATES, Appellee (Defendant Below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
David K. Hawk, Parrish, Eggers, Larson & Burt, Fort Wayne, for appellants.
Edward E. Beck, Shambaugh, Kast & Beck, Stephen J. Williams, Pichon & Williams, Fort Wayne, for appellee.
This is an appeal from an action in which plaintiffs-appellants Byron L. Brames and Joanne E. Brames sued defendant-appellee Chester W. Crates upon an alleged promissory note. On July 9, 1975, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and awarded them $62,781.22. Thereafter defendant filed a motion to correct errors which the court granted, setting aside the entry of summary judgment. After the cause was submitted for trial, the court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
and received the current market price, less storage charges, drying charges and discounts for moisture.
$2,604 for wheat, or a total of $38,253.66.
Plaintiffs assert the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to correct errors which set aside the summary judgment entered in their favor. To fortify this assertion, plaintiffs rely on the following portion of Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 59(E)(7):
(Emphasis supplied.)
Plaintiffs insist that insofar as a summary judgment hearing is a trial, the action of the court in setting aside the summary judgment constituted the grant of a new trial which required compliance with TR. 59(E)(7). Hence it is suggested that the court erred in failing to state its general reasons for overruling the summary judgment entry. This contention must be rejected since a summary judgment proceeding is not a trial as its purpose is to avoid a trial where there is no issue as to a material fact. Deckard v. Mathers (1972), 152 Ind.App. 440, 284 N.E.2d 92; Walsh v. Farm Bureau Co-op. (1969), 146 Ind.App. 42, 252 N.E.2d 609; Verplank v. Commercial Bank (1969), 145 Ind.App. 324, 251 N.E.2d 52; Babchuk v. Heinold Elevator Co., Inc. (1969), 144 Ind.App. 328, 246 N.E.2d 211. In contrast to a trial where the purpose is to try the facts and determine the preponderance of the evidence, a summary judgment proceeding is a procedure for applying the law to the facts where no factual controversy exists. Amer. States Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Jennings (1972), 152 Ind.App. 422, 284 N.E.2d 873. There was no error here.
Plaintiffs also contend they were entitled to recover as a matter of law upon the alleged promissory note absent a finding of a defense thereto. They argue that all facts not embraced within the special findings are deemed as not proven by the party having the burden of proof on the issue. Thus plaintiffs reason that insofar as the trial court did not make specific findings on the defenses of lack of delivery, failure of consideration or mutual mistake, said omissions demonstrate as a matter of law that defendant failed to sustain his burden of proof.
Under pre-Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 52 cases, there was a presumption that all facts not contained in requested special findings of fact were regarded as not proved by the party having the burden of proof. Patterson v. Gary Land Co. (1934), 101 Ind.App. 644, 188 N.E. 685; Kerfoot v. Kessener (1949), 227 Ind. 58, 84 N.E.2d 190. However, TR. 52(D) now provides that "(t) he court's failure to find upon a material issue upon which a finding of fact is required by this subdivision or this rule shall not be resolved by any presumption and may be challenged under subdivision (B) of this rule; . . ." See also Daly v. Nau (1975), Ind.App., 339 N.E.2d 71. Since plaintiffs have charged that defendant failed to sustain his burden of proof, the inquiry then turns to whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination that the instrument sued upon was intended as a security instrument and not as a negotiable instrument.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment reveals that on January 29, 1975 a large storage bin at the Crateco facilities collapsed at which time it was discovered that none of the bins contained an amount equal to the grain which had been stored there. As a result plaintiff Byron Brames became concerned about the...
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