Berlingo v. Sterling Ocean House, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 12923,12923
• Citation: 203 Conn. 103,523 A.2d 888
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Leonard BERLINGO v. STERLING OCEAN HOUSE, INC.

Page 888

523 A.2d 888

203 Conn. 103

Leonard BERLINGO v. STERLING OCEAN HOUSE, INC.

No. 12923.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 6, 1987.

Decided April 7, 1987.

William H. Narwold, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

D. Seeley Hubbard, Greenwich with whom, on the brief, was James W. Cuminale, Greenwich, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY and SANTANIELLO, JJ.

DANNEHY, Associate Justice.

This is an action of forcible entry and detainer. From a judgment for the plaintiff the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court which found no error. See Berlingo v. Sterling Ocean House, Inc., 5 Conn.App. 302, 504 A.2d 516 (1985). ¹ We granted certification and now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

This action was commenced as an action of forcible entry and detainer under General Statutes § 47a-43. ² Proceedings of this nature are necessarily of a summary kind. Section 47a-43 definitively provides that when forcible entry and detainer occurs the party held out of possession may exhibit his complaint to any judge of the Superior Court. Such judge shall then issue a summons to the party complained of, notifying him to appear within eight days from the exhibition of the complaint, in the Superior Court for the judicial district wherein the injury complained of occurred and to answer to the matters in the complaint. General Statutes § 47a-43(b). This summons must be served six days, inclusive, before the day set for trial. General Statutes § 47a-43(c). The issue joined on a complaint brought under § 47a-43 shall be tried by the judge, unless one of the parties, before the issue is joined, moves for trial by jury. General Statutes § 47a-44; see generally Tuite v. Tuite, 150 Conn. 345, 189 A.2d 394 (1963).

The present complaint is brought under § 47a-43. It alleges that the defendant forcefully entered certain premises in the possession of the plaintiff, and continues, with strong hand, to detain possession from him. In his prayer for relief, the plaintiff requests (1) that process be issued against the defendant in the manner prescribed by statute, (2) double money damages and costs and (3) such other relief as the court finds just and proper.

The record shows that the action was instituted by a complaint dated April 27, 1984. A motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted was filed on May 8, 1984. The court apparently denied the motion but failed to file any note or memorandum disclosing the reasons for its action. The case was assigned for trial on May 10, 1984. Prior to trial, the defendant called the court's attention to the fact that the pleadings had not been closed in that the defendant had not filed any answer to the plaintiff's complaint. We infer that the court did not feel bound by the usual rules of pleading, and, over the objection of the defendant, ordered the trial to proceed. The pleadings have not yet been closed to our knowledge.

The trial judge was remiss in ordering the trial to proceed without insisting upon the filing of proper pleadings. The court's order predictably plunged the case into confusion and possible error to the advantage of no one.

We are not unmindful of the time already spent in hearing this case. Justice more than judicial economy requires an attempt to decide the case rather than reversing and remanding with instructions to put the pleadings in proper form before rendition of appropriate judgment. Reluctantly, we have made an independent examination of the whole record. We are satisfied that the facts the court found are those upon which the parties expect the appeal to be decided. We are convinced that we can decide the appeal with certainty and without exceeding the limits of our jurisdiction.

These are the salient facts. In January, 1980, the Stamford Golf Authority (SGA) leased to the defendant certain premises located at the Sterling Farms Golf Course and Recreational Complex in Stamford. The demised premises consisted of space in the main clubhouse to be used as a restaurant and a separate building known as Halfway House. On August 13, 1981, the plaintiff entered into a long term agreement with the defendant to manage the snack bar in Halfway House. Also by the provisions of the agreement, the plaintiff was to have possession of Halfway House and to pay a stated monthly rental for the months of March through November in each year. The plaintiff entered into and took possession of Halfway House under this agreement in August, 1981. Almost from the beginning a controversy existed between the plaintiff and the defendant as to their rights and liabilities in the management agreement. It is not necessary to discuss the particulars of that controversy.

In the spring of 1983, a fire occurred in the main clubhouse which rendered the space occupied by the restaurant untenantable. On May 25, 1983, SGA voted, at a special meeting, to terminate its lease with the defendant. SGA then entered into a month-to-month lease with the plaintiff for Halfway House. The plaintiff continued to operate the snack bar under this lease until November, 1983, when he vacated Halfway House. His month-to-month tenancy, however, remained in effect and he continued to keep some of his personal property there until April 20, 1984.

Immediately after the fire in 1983, SGA proceeded to rebuild the restaurant in the main clubhouse. In December, 1983, when the rebuilding was completed, SGA relet both the restaurant and Halfway House to the defendant for the balance of the term of their original lease. Meanwhile, the plaintiff continued in possession of Halfway House. On February 13, 1984, the defendant wrote the plaintiff a letter stating that their management agreement was terminated and requesting that the plaintiff remove his personal property from Halfway House. On the same day that the letter was sent, the defendant padlocked the entrance to Halfway House. The next day, after some conversation with SGA, the defendant turned over the keys to the padlock to SGA. Two days later SGA removed the padlock and placed its own lock on Halfway House. During the two day period in which Halfway House was padlocked by the defendant, the plaintiff did not attempt to enter the premises. It does not appear that he was even aware that the lock was placed on the door. On March 22, 1984, SGA sent a letter to the plaintiff advising him that his periodic tenancy in Halfway House was terminated and notifying him to relinquish possession of Halfway House within thirty days. On April 20, 1984, the plaintiff removed his personal belongings from Halfway House and quit possession.

One week later, on April 27, 1984, the plaintiff commenced an action of forcible entry and detainer against the defendant. SGA was not made a party to this action. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and, upon its denial of the...