Freeman v. Alamo Management Co.

• Decision Date: 21 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 14271,14271
• Citation: 221 Conn. 674,607 A.2d 370
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Alice FREEMAN v. ALAMO MANAGEMENT COMPANY, et al.

Page 370

607 A.2d 370

221 Conn. 674

Alice FREEMAN v. ALAMO MANAGEMENT COMPANY, et al.

No. 14271.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 10, 1991.

Decided April 21, 1992.

Joseph Procopio, Arlington, Va., with whom was Thomas R. Frizzell, Waterbury, for appellants-appellees (defendants).

Thomas W. Calkins, Waterbury, for appellee-appellant (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, GLASS, COVELLO and BORDEN, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether, in an action for unlawful entry and detainer under General Statutes § 47a-43(a)(3), ¹ entitlement to an award of statutory punitive damages, pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-46, ² may be established by a preponderance of the evidence. The plaintiff, Alice Freeman, brought an action for damages against the defendants, Alamo Management Company, and Dwayne Boise, to recover for the forcible entry into her apartment and the wrongful disposition of her personal property. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff both on her claim and on the defendants' counterclaim, and awarded her damages in the amount of $14,000. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment in part, and remanded the case for a retrial on damages only, ruling that the plaintiff was required to establish a statutory violation by clear and convincing evidence in order to recover statutory double damages. We granted certification ³ and now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court based its decision upon the following facts found by the trial court. "On October 15, 1987, the plaintiff conveyed title to a three-family house located at 123-125 Pearl Street, Waterbury, to the defendant Alamo Management Company (Alamo). The plaintiff had occupied the first floor apartment. Before the closing, she attempted to enter into a use and occupancy agreement with Alamo because she was unable to find another apartment. Although this agreement never materialized, she remained in possession of the first floor apartment after the closing. She moved some of her belongings to a storage area, but left the balance of her appliances and personal property on the premises while she looked for a larger storage unit.

"Alamo entered into an agreement to sell the premises to a third party. The new buyer had a mortgage commitment on November 26, 1987. On Saturday, November 28, 1987, the defendant Dwayne Boise, acting as an agent of the defendant Alamo, forcibly entered the plaintiff's apartment and began to remove her property. When the plaintiff arrived, Boise refused to allow her to enter the apartment. Her appliances were set aside so that she could pick them up the following Monday, but her other personal property was strewn about the yard or thrown in a dump truck for disposal.

"The trial court also found (1) that because the plaintiff's original possession of the premises was rightful, the only proper mode of eviction available to the defendants was that of summary process, (2) that the plaintiff had not abandoned the premises, (3) that the defendant Boise violated General Statutes § 47a-43(a)(3) when he forcibly entered the plaintiff's apartment, removed her personal property, and disposed of it, [and] (4) that the plaintiff was entitled to double damages pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-46 in the amount of $14,000...." Freeman v. Alamo Management Co., 24 Conn.App. 124, 126-27, 586 A.2d 619 (1991). ⁴

The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's award of double damages. Id., at 135, 586 A.2d 619. Because violation of the entry and detainer statute "involves willful, wrongful and unlawful acts," and because the penalty of double damages is "a remedy with serious consequences to an individual"; id., at 130, 586 A.2d 619; the Appellate Court reasoned that it would be inappropriate to determine by the "preponderance of the evidence" standard whether that remedy should be imposed. That standard, which apparently was relied on by the trial court, "indicates that the litigants should share equally the risk of error ... because the interests at stake have roughly equal societal importance." Id. In contrast, the Appellate Court noted, the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, which is employed in criminal cases, "implies that the party on whom that burden is imposed should bear almost the entire risk of error." Id. The Appellate Court held that the appropriate standard for determining whether double damages should be imposed was "[p]roof by 'clear and convincing' evidence [which] is an intermediate standard generally used in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing, or when particularly important individual rights are involved." Id., at 131, 586 A.2d 619. Concluding that "if the evidence [of the underlying statutory violation] satisfies only the fair preponderance standard, damages cannot be doubled"; id.; it remanded the case for a new trial limited to the issue of whether double damages should be imposed.

Both the plaintiff and the defendants requested our review of this judgment. The plaintiff maintains that the trial court imposed the proper standard of proof, while the defendants, on their cross appeal, claim that a new trial should encompass the issue of liability as well as the issue of damages. Because we agree with the plaintiff's contention that the preponderance of the evidence standard governs this case, and therefore conclude that a new trial is not required, we need not consider the defendants' claims about the scope of such a new trial.

As the Appellate Court noted, the issue of what standard of proof is required for double damages pursuant to § 47a-46 appears to be one of first impression, and the statute is silent on the question. Freeman v. Alamo Management Co., supra, 24 Conn.App. at 129, 586 A.2d 619. The preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate in ordinary tort cases because the litigants should " 'share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.' " Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1395, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). The Appellate Court took the view that, for punitive damages, the more exacting standard of clear and convincing evidence should govern. That standard requires "that degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the issuable fact in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution.... [T]he burden of persuasion is sustained if the evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 66, 554 A.2d 277, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082, 109 S.Ct. 2103, 104 L.Ed.2d 664 (1989).

The argument for a high standard of proof for punitive damages is that "[t]he interests that the parties have at stake in a punitive damages case are not similarly equal. If punitive damages are imposed improperly, or in an excessive amount, the defendant suffers far more than a plaintiff does if the jury incorrectly fails to impose them. The interests at stake are different in two respects. The defendant, unlike the plaintiff, suffers a stigma that may be permanent; and the plaintiff, unlike the defendant, has little or no legitimate personal interest in a correct result. As courts have uniformly held, no plaintiff has a right to punitive damages: the purpose of punitive damages is to vindicate the public interest, not that of a particular plaintiff." M. Wheeler, "The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures," 69 Va.L.Rev. 269, 292 (1983).

A number of jurisdictions require clear and convincing evidence for the award of punitive damages. ⁵ See J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law and Practice (1985 & Sup.1991) § 9.12; annot., Standard of Proof as to Conduct Underlying Punitive Damages Awards--Modern Status, 58 A.L.R.4th 878 (1987 & Sup.1991). Most of these jurisdictions, however, have adopted this standard by statute rather than by judicial decision; see J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, supra; and most of these statutes reflect a legislative response to a well publicized, dramatic increase in the size and frequency of punitive damages awards. See Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282-83, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 2924-25, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); D. Owen, "Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products," 49 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1, 59 (1982).

Whatever the validity of the concerns about boundless punitive damages may be elsewhere, the risk of unfair and excessive punitive damages awards is substantially limited in this state by routine constraints on the amount of punitive damages. "The Connecticut courts have ... consistently limited punitive or exemplary damage awards in Connecticut to costs in excess of taxable costs." 6 Connecticut Practice, J. Fitzgerald & R. Yules, Connecticut Trial Practice (1987) § 5.19, p. 196; see Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 80, 485 A.2d 1305 (1985); Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 488, 234 A.2d 825 (1967). There are statutory exceptions to this rule, such as § 47a-46 which is at issue in this case. ⁶ The legislature has not, however, established any statutory linkage between a right to recover punitive damages and a higher standard of proof. See J. Fitzgerald & R. Yules, supra, § 5.20 (listing statutes); see also Munson v. Atwood, 30 Conn. 102 (1861). Recently, in undertaking product liability reform, the General Assembly expressly rejected a proposal to adopt the clear and convincing evidence standard for awarding punitive damages, ⁷ and elected instead to cap the amount of...