Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp.

Decision Date18 September 1986
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. B-76-183-CA.
Citation643 F. Supp. 1494
PartiesWesley P. BERNARD, et al. v. GULF OIL CORPORATION, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

Stella M. Morrison, Port Arthur, Tex., Charles E. Cotton, New Orleans, La., Judith Reed, Julius LeVonne Chambers, Eric Schnapper, New York City, Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Lake Charles, La., for plaintiffs.

Janet L. Lachman, William G. Duck, Houston, Tex., for defendant, Gulf Oil Corp.

Carl A. Parker, Port Arthur, Tex., for defendant, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Intern. Union, Local 4-23.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOE J. FISHER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are six present and retired black employees at Gulf Oil Corporation's Port Arthur, Texas, refinery. Plaintiffs, who are also present or former members of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Worker's Union, Local 4-23 ("OCAW"), allege that Gulf and the OCAW have engaged in a broad range of employment discrimination against black employees. Plaintiffs seek declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and Section 16 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.1

A trial was held in April 1984 on the class-wide liability of Gulf and the OCAW. The class-wide claims are predicated upon two fundamental theories: that Gulf and the OCAW committed pre- and post-Title VII violations (1) by formulating and maintaining a non-bona fide seniority system and (2) by administering non-job-related promotion tests and attendance policies that adversely affected blacks.

The individual claims of the named Plaintiffs were also before the Court. They consisted primarily of allegations that Gulf intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs by not promoting them to supervisory positions and by disqualifying them from other positions.

Both the seniority system and the testing requirements changed during the years in issue. Because the facts are complex, they are addressed in chronological order; first, as to the seniority system and second, as to the test-based promotion program. The individual claims are addressed last.

I. CLASS CLAIMS
A. The Seniority System

(1) Pre-1963 Discrimination

Prior to 1963, there existed two OCAW locals at Gulf: Local 245, which represented only black employees, and Local 23, which represented only white employees. At the insistence of the international union, these locals merged in 1963, 2 years before the effective date of Title VII.

Prior to 1967, Gulf's workforce was divided into two major divisions: the Craft Division and the Labor Division. The Craft Division had 14 skilled occupational sections. Each section had its own "line of progression" (LOP). For example, at the lowest end of the boilermaker section is the helper; at the highest end, the number one boilermaker. The higher positions were functionally related to the lower ones and presupposed competency and efficiency in the lower jobs. The Labor Division was composed of men who did work requiring less skill. By 1954, most craft sections had laborers assigned to them. The Labor Division also had separate lines of progressions.

Prior to 1956, all the labor jobs were occupied by blacks, and no laborer was permitted to enter into the Craft Division. The Craft Division was staffed entirely by whites. In both divisions, new employees started at the lowest level positions. That occupational segregation was partially the result of a gentlemen's agreement between the black and white locals to not bid on each others' jobs. The OCAW negotiating committees at that time were made up of both black and white members. The agreement was not imposed by Gulf nor was it incorporated into any of the formal labor agreements. The local memberships apparently viewed the agreement as a means by which to protect their respective positions.

In 1956, the lowest level Labor Division job became the entry-level position for employees of every race.2 At the same time, seniority provisions were established for transfer between the Labor and Craft Divisions. These provisions covered both black and white laborers who sought promotion to the craft jobs. A labor transferee would start at the lowest job in a Craft Division section. (Technically, such a transferee would first bid into the Mechanical Helper Pool before entering a craft). A laborer could not transfer into an upper level craft position. Vacancies in those jobs were first offered to people in a lower level job in the same section. Such vacancies were posted for plant-wide bidding (i.e., outside that section) only when other Craft Division workers had more craft seniority than those bidding from the same section.

Between 1956 and 1963, the period during which this system was in use, a laborer who successfully bid into a craft-line entry position was assigned dual seniority: divisional seniority and plant seniority. Regardless of how much plant seniority a transferee may have accumulated previously, he started in the craft (for purposes of craft-line promotions and demotions) with only one days' divisional seniority. One's plant seniority came into play if workforce reductions were required. That is, a transferee could use his plant seniority to return to labor and thereby avoid lay off. When a transferee was required to return to labor, his Labor Division seniority would then determine promotions and demotions in that division. After 1963, the divisional seniority system was eliminated and plant seniority became the basis for all promotions, demotions, and lay offs.

Plaintiffs allege that the 1956-1963 one-day divisional seniority rule was discriminatory. The discriminatory results were specifically felt when workforce reductions occurred between 1959 and 1961, at which time newly arrived craft-line blacks (and whites) were demoted while pre-1956 craftline whites with less plant seniority were not.

Plaintiffs argue that the one-day divisional seniority rule, in conjunction with the pre-1956 assignment of blacks to Labor and whites to Craft, causally operated to stunt blacks' advancement into the entry-and upper-level craft positions. Plaintiffs conclude that Gulf's seniority system was therefore non-bona fide under Title VII and that both pre- and post-Act discriminatees ought to be awarded constructive seniority and back pay.

Is The Seniority System Bona Fide?

If Gulf and the OCAW can prove that their seniority system is bona fide, then they are immune to charges of pre-Title VII employment discrimination. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-55, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1863-65, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). The Court has held that to be bona fide, a pre-Title VII seniority system must not have been designed with the intent to discriminate. Id. The Court also held that a bona fide departmental seniority system does not violate Title VII merely because it may perpetuate into the post-Act period the effects of pre-Act discrimination. Id. at 352-53, 97 S.Ct. at 1863-64. Moreover, a necessary precondition for maintenance of a post-Act claim is the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC. See United States v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977). Thus, if Plaintiffs cannot prove that Gulf operated a non-bona fide seniority system, they must prove that Defendants engaged in acts of discrimination (whether perpetuated effects or entirely independent) occurring on or after December 26, 1966, which is 180 days prior to the date on which Plaintiffs filed their charges of employment discrimination with the EEOC.

Applying Teamsters, the Fifth Circuit has phrased the bona fide inquiry this way: Has there been purposeful discrimination in connection with the establishment or continuation of a seniority system which will render that system mala fide? James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 351 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034, 98 S.Ct. 767, 54 L.Ed.2d 781 (1978). In arriving at an answer to that question, four factors are evaluated in the context of the totality of circumstances:

(1) whether the seniority system operates to discourage all employees equally from transferring between seniority units,

(2) whether the seniority units are in the same or separate bargaining units and, if separate, whether that structure is rational and industry-wide,

(3) whether the seniority system had its genesis in racial discrimination, and

(4) whether the seniority system was negotiated and maintained free from any illegal purpose. Id. at 352. As will be seen, under James Gulf's seniority system is bona fide and thus does not violate Title VII.

(i) Equal Transference Between Seniority Units

Plaintiffs argue that the one-day seniority rule was designed to negatively affect blacks and render worthless any plant seniority that they may have accumulated. The Court disagrees.

The one-day rule was facially and operationally neutral: it applied equally to whites and blacks. The purpose and effect of the rule was to maintain the most qualified persons in their respective technical Craft Division positions, as well as to protect the integrity of the vertical promotion system and the legitimate expectations of those already in the craft-lines.

Because a transferee did not forfeit his plant or labor seniority upon transferring into the Craft Division, the rule could not possibly discourage a black laborer from transferring. A transferee could still use plant seniority to avoid layoff and labor seniority in the event he was demoted. There is no evidence that a transferee was subjected to a wage cut upon entering the Craft Division. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 223-24 (5th Cir.1974) (fact that transferee endured a wage cut highly detrimental to bona fides of seniority system).

The elimination of the one-day rule predated the enactment of Title VII. By the effective date of that statute, Gulf and the OCAW had opened...

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4 cases
  • Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., 87-2033
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • March 22, 1988
    ...of fair representation. Following a bench trial, the court held for Gulf and the OCAW on all of the classwide and individual claims, 643 F.Supp. 1494. On appeal, plaintiffs assert that the district court incorrectly disposed of each of the classwide and individual claims, but concede that t......
  • Ellison v. Darden Restaurants, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
    • March 18, 1999
    ...ever applied for the position of general manager or, for that matter, that Tawanna Anderson ever applied. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., 643 F.Supp. 1494, 1505 (E.D.Tex.1986) (holding that plaintiff's failure to make request for promotion precluded plaintiff from establishing prima facie ca......
  • Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • December 18, 1989
    ...case was tried in 1984. In 1986, the district court issued its opinion finding in favor of the defendants on all claims. 643 F.Supp. 1494 (E.D.Tex.1986) (Bernard III ). This court affirmed in part and vacated in part, remanding the case for further findings. 841 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.1988) (Ber......
  • Levitt v. State of Maryland Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., CV 85-4099.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • September 18, 1986

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