Bernier-Aponte v. Izquierdo-Encarnacion, CIVIL NO. 01-1953 (DRD).

• Decision Date: 19 February 2002
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 01-1953 (DRD).
• Parties: Sharon BERNIER-APONTE, et als., Plaintiffs, v. Jose M. IZQUIERDO-ENCARNACION, et als., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

196 F.Supp.2d 93

Sharon BERNIER-APONTE, et als., Plaintiffs, v. Jose M. IZQUIERDO-ENCARNACION, et als., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 01-1953 (DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

February 19, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Eliezer Aldarondo-Ortiz, Aldarondo & Lopez Bras, Hato Rey, PR, for plaintiffs.

Ivan M. Castro-Ortiz, Hato Rey, PR, for all plaintiffs.

Marie L. Cortes-Cortes, Dept. of Justice, Fed. Litigation Div., San Juan, PR, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 28). In essence, Defendants are seeking dismissal of the complaint on two grounds: first, that the original complaint filed by Plaintiffs does not allege minimal facts sufficient to comply with the legal standard established for pleadings in similar cases; and second, that Plaintiffs are constitutionally barred from obtaining monetary relief against those Defendants acting in their official capacity, under the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiffs opposed the Motion to Dismiss, by filing a Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Complaint and Request to Have the Court Declare Moot Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 30). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), all of the facts alleged in this case are accepted as true, as they appear in the complaint. Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988). Because Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which was accepted by the Court, pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a) (See Docket No. 35), all of the facts alleged in the amended complaint are accepted as true.

Defendants are all officials of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's Department of Transportation and Public Works ("DTOP"). Until March 31, 2001, Plaintiffs were employed by the DTOP, as irregular employees.¹ They performed general maintenance duties of state roads and the surrounding areas. At the time of termination, most of the Plaintiffs had either met or were very close to meeting the requirements to acquire permanent status.² Plaintiffs are all actively affiliated with the New Progressive Party (PNP) and this was well known by Defendants. Most, if not all, of the irregular positions held by Plaintiffs were filled by persons associated with the Popular Democratic Party (PDP). Moreover, Plaintiffs were not given a valid reason for their dismissal.

Defendants are seeking dismissal of the complaint on two grounds: first, that the complaint does not allege minimal facts sufficient to comply with the legal standard established for pleadings in similar cases; and second, that Plaintiffs are constitutionally barred from obtaining monetary relief against those Defendants acting in their official capacity, under the Eleventh Amendment. (Docket No. 28). Plaintiffs opposed the Motion to Dismiss, by filing a Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Complaint and Request to Have the Court Declare Moot Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 30).

II MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

When deciding a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual claims, and indulge all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor. Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 190 (1st Cir.1996). Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is appropriate if the facts alleged, taken as true, do not justify recovery. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp. 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir.1988). Although all inferences must be made in Plaintiffs' favor, the Court need not accept "bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like." Aulson, 83 F.3d at 3.

Moreover, when considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) the Court must limit its focus to the allegations of the complaint. Litton Indus., Inc. v. Colon, 587 F.2d 70, 74 (1st Cir.1978). Specifically, the inquiry should be "whether a liberal reading of [the complaint] can reasonably admit of a claim...." Id.; see also Doyle, 103 F.3d at 190.

Recently, in Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75 (1st Cir.1999) the Court held that a dismissal for failure to state a claim can only be upheld if, after giving credence to all well pleaded facts and making all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the factual averments do not justify recovery on some theory asserted in the complaint. Id. at 77. With this standard in mind, all of the facts alleged in the complaint are accepted as true. See Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1989); Gooley, 851 F.2d at 514.

III PLEADINGS UNDER § 1983

Defendants's first argument is that the complaint originally filed (Docket No. 1) does not comply with the "heightened pleading standard of [Darmouth Review, supra, which] still is viable in section 1983 cases where an improper motive by state actors was an essential element of the plaintiff's claim." (See Docket No. 28, p. 6-7). In other words, the gist of their argument is that the original complaint does not allege "minimal facts, not subjective characterizations, as to who did what to whom and why." Dewey v. University of New Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1982). Nevertheless, the Court finds that this argument has been rendered moot by the filing of an amended complaint (Docket No. 36), which was subsequently accepted by the Court. (Docket No. 35). The Court has closely examined the amended complaint and finds that it properly addresses the alleged deficiencies proffered by Defendants. The complaint is sufficient at least as to a First Amendment civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because plaintiffs all belong to the P.N.P. and were replaced allegedly by persons from the opposing party, precisely because they were members of the P.N.P. Thus, they allege they were terminated and/or not renewed in their positions due to their political affiliation. Moreover, in light of the liberal norm that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice," the Court finds that Defendants first argument is insufficient and thus denied as moot. See FED.R.CIV.P. 8(f).³

IV ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

Defendants' next argument turns on the principle that a claim for monetary damages against a defendant acting in his state official capacities is precluded by the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution. Plaintiffs seek punitive and compensatory damages and attorney fees for alleged civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants argue that as long as monetary damages are sought with regard to appearing State officers in their official capacities, this complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

The Eleventh Amendment proscribes that "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment renders states, including Puerto Rico, immune from claims brought in federal courts by citizens of the same or any other state.⁴ Metcalf & Eddy v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Authority, 991 F.2d 935, 938 (1st Cir.1993); De Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 121 (1st Cir.1991).

There are of course exceptions to this rule. Specifically, the Eleventh Amendment protection does not apply in four (4) circumstances: a state may consent to be sued in federal forum; a state may waive its own immunity by statute or the like; Congress may abrogate state immunity; or, if circumstances allow, other constitutional imperatives may take precedence over the Eleventh Amendment's bar. Metcalf at 938. In the present case, none of these exceptions are raised.

Eleventh Amendment immunity does not solely protect the State. Rather, since a State only exists through its instrumentalities, Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to arms or "alter egos" of the State. Ainsworth Aristocrat Int'l Pty. Ltd. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 818 F.2d 1034, 1036 (1st Cir.1987); see also, Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). In addition to state agencies and institutions, Eleventh Amendment immunity may also attach to suits against state officials "when the state is the real, substantial party in interest." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101, 104, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Although, state officials are literally persons, a suit against a state official in his official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45; Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985). As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself, therefore, immunity attaches to state officials, in their official capacity. See also, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611.

A. In order for Eleventh Amendment immunity to attach to its employees, the Court must first find that the Department of Public Works and Transportation is an "alter ego" of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Eleventh Amendment immunity bars actions for money damages by private citizens against arms or "alter egos" of a State in the federal courts. Metcalf, at 938. For immunity to attach, the Court must find that the DTOP is an arm or an "alter ego" of the...