Bernstein v. Sephora, Div. Of Dfs Group L.P.
Decision Date | 11 January 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 99-02010-CIV-JORDAN.,99-02010-CIV-JORDAN. |
Citation | 182 F.Supp.2d 1214 |
Parties | Nicolette BERNSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. SEPHORA, a division of DFS GROUP L.P., DFS Group L.P. and DFS Group Limited, Inc., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
William Robert Amlong, Randall Lane Bloom, Amlong & Amlong, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Nicolette Bernstein.
Alvin David Lodish, Sherril May Colombo, Bilzin Sumberg Dunn Baena Price & Axelrod, Miami, FL, for defendant.
ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
This cause is before the Court upon the three post-trial motions of the defendants (collectively, "Sephora"), and upon the one post-trial motion of the plaintiff ("Bernstein"). Specifically, Sephora moves (1) for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b); (2) for a new trial under FRCP 59(a); and (3) for remittitur of the jury's award of $130,500 for damages for emotional pain and mental anguish. Bernstein moves under FRCP 59(a) for a new trial on the issue of damages. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Sephora's motion for judgment as a matter of law; denies both Sephora's and Bernsteins's motions for a new trial; and grants Sephora's motion for remittitur of the jury's award of damages for emotional pain and mental anguish, which is remitted to $75,000.
Bernstein, a female of Jewish ethnicity, was employed by Sephora, owner of a chain of beauty products stores, from July 6, 1998, through February 23, 1999. She instituted this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging racial and religious discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. On February 21, 2001, the Court granted in part and denied in part Sephora's motion for summary judgment, leaving two issues for adjudication: (1) whether Sephora unlawfully discriminated against Bernstein by denying her a promotion to store director at its new location in The Falls because of her race; and (2) whether the denial of that promotion was an unlawful act of retaliation by Sephora against Bernstein because she had previously complained of sexual harassment.
A jury trial commenced on April 26, 2001. At the close of Bernstein's case-in-chief, and again at the close of all the evidence, Sephora moved for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to FRCP 50(a). The Court denied both motions. Sephora also moved for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether Bernstein was entitled to a jury instruction on punitive damages; this motion was granted. On May 1, 2001, after brief deliberation, the jury returned a verdict finding Sephora liable for racial discrimination, but not liable for retaliation. The jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $2,000 for lost wages and benefits, and $130,500 for emotional pain and mental anguish. In accordance with the jury's verdict, the Court entered judgment in the amount of $132,500 on May 1, 2001. The four motions that are the subject of this order followed shortly thereafter.
Sephora moves for judgment as a matter of law on the jury's finding that it racially discriminated against Bernstein in violation of Title VII, by denying her the Falls store promotion. In ruling on this motion, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Bernstein, the nonmoving party, and the Court may not make credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). "[A]lthough the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Id. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097. "A Rule 50(b) motion should only be granted where reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340, 1344-45 (11th Cir.2000) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). However, "[a]lthough [the Court] accord[s] substantial deference to the jury's verdict, [it] cannot accord the jury with the benefit of unreasonable inferences, or those at war with the undisputed facts." McAnally v. Gildersleeve, 16 F.3d 1493, 1500 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"A plaintiff may establish a Title VII claim through the introduction of direct evidence of discrimination or through circumstantial evidence that creates an inference of discrimination." Bass v. Board of County Comm'rs, Orange County, Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1103 (11th Cir.2001). A claim based purely on circumstantial, or indirect, evidence of discrimination requires the plaintiff first to establish a prima facie case of discrimination according to the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Bass, 256 F.3d at 1103-04; see also infra Part II.A.2. However, "[i]n cases of discrimination proven by direct evidence, it is incorrect to rely on the McDonnell Douglas test because, while circumstantial evidence is used to create an inference of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, no such inference is required in the case of direct evidence." Bass, 256 F.3d at 1104.
In discussing the merits of Sephora's Rule 50(b) motion, the parties to the instant case debate whether Bernstein established a prima facie case of discrimination, thus implicitly2 presupposing that her claim is predicated only on indirect evidence of discrimination. The Court finds this supposition to be premature. The threshold question is not whether Bernstein has made out a prima facie case, but whether she even has to. The issue is of more than academic interest; if Bernstein's claim is based on direct evidence, the Court must deny Sephora's Rule 50(b) motion. See Taylor v. Runyon, 175 F.3d 861, 867 n. 2 (11th Cir.1999) () (bracketed text in original) (quoting Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir.1997)). Thus, the Court must first resolve whether Bernstein's claim is properly viewed as asserting that there is direct evidence, or merely indirect evidence, of discrimination.
The Eleventh Circuit has described direct evidence as
evidence, which if believed, proves existence of [the] fact in issue without inference or presumption. Evidence that only suggests discrimination, or that is subject to more than one interpretation, does not constitute direct evidence. In a long line of cases, th[e Eleventh Circuit] has found direct evidence where actions or statements of any employer reflect[ ] a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the discrimination or retaliation complained of by the employee.
Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1189 ( ). "Only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of race ... constitute direct evidence of discrimination." Bass, 256 F.3d at 1105 ( )(quoting Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 1999)). Among other things, the statement must "reflect[ ] a discriminatory attitude" and "tie[ ] the discriminatory attitude to the relevant employment decision." Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir.1999). Application of these legal precepts to the facts of a case is not always easy, but the Court believes that in the instant case, Bernstein introduced direct evidence that Mr. de la Hoz entertained a discriminatory attitude that directly animated his role in the denial of Bernstein's promotion. To be sure, Mr. de la Hoz's broad statements of antipathy toward Jews demonstrate only generic prejudice, and would not constitute direct evidence. See Damon, 196 F.3d at 1359 ( ); Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1322 n. 1 (11th Cir.1998) ( )("[y]ou black girls make me sick" and "[y]ou black girls get away with everything" were not direct evidence of discrimination for plaintiff's dismissal) that statements such as .
At trial Bernstein did, however, introduce several pieces of potentially direct evidence. First, Ms. Cogburn testified that Mr. de la Hoz stated that he wanted Bernstein to quit (and she conceded that Mr. de la Hoz "probably" stated that he would make Bernstein miserable enough to quit), in the same conversation that he described Bernstein as a "JAP" ("Jewish American Princess"), a "Jewish bitch," and a "JAP bitch." See 1 Trial Tr., at 67-68. Second, Bernstein herself testified that Ms. Cogburn told her that Mr. de la Hoz had told Ms. Cogburn "that of all the races that he hated on the planet, the one that he hated the most were the Jews, and that they had to work together to get rid of that JAP bitch," see 2 Trial Tr., at 103-04, and that "[s]he and her princess ways had to go." Id. at 110. Mr. de la Hoz's assertions of his intent to drive Bernstein from the workplace and his request for assistance in doing so, made in conjunction with expressions of animosity toward Bernstein's race, and occurring at the same time that Mr. de la Hoz was participating in the promotion decision, demonstrate the close nexus between discriminatory attitude...
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