Johnson v. Autozone Inc.

Decision Date24 February 2011
Docket NumberCivil Action No. CV–09–S–0786–NE.
Citation768 F.Supp.2d 1124
PartiesPeter JOHNSON, Plaintiff,v.AUTOZONE, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Temple D. Trueblood, Wiggins Childs Quinn & Pantazis PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.A. Kent Gieselmann, Jr., Jason Matthew Stephens, Jeffrey B. Chugg, Susan M. Bjorklund, Lawrence & Russell LLP, Memphis, TN, Richard E. Trewhella, Jr., Bricker S. Daughtry, Carr Allison PC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

C. LYNWOOD SMITH, JR., District Judge.

Plaintiff, Peter Johnson, asserts claims against his current employer, AutoZone, Inc., under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (Title VII), for failure to accommodate plaintiff's religious beliefs,1 religious discrimination,2 religious harassment,3 and retaliation.4 This case is before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment as to all of plaintiff's claims.5 Upon consideration of the parties' pleadings, briefs, and evidentiary submissions, the court concludes that the motion for summary judgment is due to be granted for the reasons stated herein.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).6 In other words, summary judgment is proper “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “In making this determination, the court must review all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.2000) ( en banc ) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.1995)). Inferences in favor of the non-moving party are not unqualified, however. [A]n inference is not reasonable if it is only a guess or a possibility, for such an inference is not based on the evidence, but is pure conjecture and speculation.” Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir.1983). Moreover,

[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Haves, 52 F.3d at 921) (emphasis supplied). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (asking “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law”).

II. SUMMARY OF FACTS

Plaintiff, a devout member of the Seventh–Day Adventist Church, currently works full-time for defendant, AutoZone, Inc. (AutoZone), as a Parts Sales Manager.7 Due to plaintiff's religious beliefs, he can never work on his Sabbath day, which spans from Friday at sundown to Saturday at sundown each week.8 AutoZone hired plaintiff to work as a part-time “hub driver” at its South Parkway store in February of 2003.9 At that time, Store Manager Roy Lee supervised the employees at the South Parkway store.10 Plaintiff received Mr. Lee's permission to take off work during his Sabbath days.11 Mr. Lee testified that he granted plaintiff's request because plaintiff was not needed, and religion was not a factor in his decision. 12

In 2003, plaintiff became a full-time employee when AutoZone promoted him to the position of Parts Sales Manager.13 Although unwritten, AutoZone had in effect (and still maintains) a policy that “to be a full-time employee at Auto Zone, you have to be available seven days a week, no matter what.” 14 Nevertheless, Store Manager Roy Lee approved plaintiff's renewed request for an exemption because, at his particular store, Mr. Lee “could get away with him not working Fridays and Saturdays.” 15 Lee “might have,” but was unable to recall whether he reported plaintiff's need for a religious accommodation to anyone directly above him or to AutoZone's Department of Human Resources.16

In either 2003 or 2004, Store Manager Lee recommended plaintiff for AutoZone's Manager–in–Training (MIT) Program.17 The MIT program was an eight week, informal training course intended to familiarize trainees with management information.18 Completion of the program in no way guaranteed trainees a management position, but District Manager Bruce Sherer—who supervises ten AutoZone stores in North Alabama and approximately 120 employees—allegedly told plaintiff that there was a possibility that he could be promoted to an Assistant Manager position after completion of the MIT program. 19 Plaintiff testified that Mr. Lee assured him that it would not be a problem for plaintiff to continue to observe his Sabbath day throughout the training and afterwards.20 Further, plaintiff testified that Lee had cleared the training with AutoZone's District Manager for North Alabama, Bruce Sherer.21 Mr. Lee, however, testified that he informed plaintiff that higher management members were required to work Saturdays and be available seven days a week.22 According to Lee, he reminded plaintiff of this fact “before, during, [and] after” plaintiff enrolled in the MIT program. 23 Plaintiff was recommended for the program despite Lee's knowledge that plaintiff would not work on Saturdays, because Mr. Lee “hoped” plaintiff would agree to work seven days a week if faced with the opportunity to move to a higher management position.24

Relying solely on Store Manager Lee's word that “everything was fine” regarding plaintiff observing the Sabbath while undergoing management training, plaintiff enrolled in the MIT program.25 For payroll purposes, MIT participants like plaintiff were coded as “manager-in-training,” but the position and pay was identical to that of a Parts Sales Manager, the position that plaintiff held while enrolled in the MIT program.26 After about a month in the program, District Manager Bruce Sherer met with plaintiff and explained that he would have to either withdraw or be terminated.27 Mr. Sherer informed plaintiff that he “ha[d] to be available on Saturdays” to remain in the program.28

After his conversation with Mr. Sherer, plaintiff stepped down from the MIT program and returned to his position as Parts Sales Manager at the South Parkway store.29 Plaintiff worked in that position under Store Manager Roy Lee for approximately three years, and then transferred to AutoZone's Jordan Lane Store.30

Upon transfer to that store, plaintiff was under the supervision of Store Manager Joe Courtney.31 Mr. Courtney also agreed to give plaintiff his Sabbath days off, and he even afforded plaintiff an exemption from work on Wednesday nights to accommodate plaintiff's desire to preach on those nights.32 Courtney noted that he did so despite other employees who [g]rumbled about it,” including another Parts Sales Manager who allegedly complained that the arrangement was unfair.33 Mr. Courtney did this “not out of the kindness of [his] heart,” but simply because “that's the way it had been done” in the past.34

Plaintiff began asking Director Sherer for a promotion to Store Manager and various other promotions.35 Sherer repeatedly responded that plaintiff's unavailability from Friday evening through Saturday evening was an issue, and that there was nothing that Sherer could do about it.36 However, Mr. Sherer also allegedly gave plaintiff a list of things that he could do that might result in some sort of a promotion.37 In that regard, plaintiff testified as follows:

Bruce Sherer informed me, he led me to believe if I did certain things in his words I'll see what I can do. The subject we were discussing was promotion because I would always ask when I can be promoted. When are you going to allow me to get out of this position? I have a roof or a ceiling over my head. I can't grow with the company. And Bruce would say well, bring up the WITT scores at [the Parkway Memorial store] when I[sic] sent back there. That's when I got the nickname the selling machine because I could sell anything, and then I would go back to Bruce well, I got the scores up, everybody calls me the selling machine, and then he would say well, you know, let's get all of this up and let's do these things, and I would say absolutely, because I believed in Bruce 100 percent, and I did what he asked me to do. And then he changed it again. Well, I want you to train for me, so I did the training job, and I did it extremely well.... It was hard because I wanted more. I'm more than a [Parts Sales Manager]. I'm more, and it never happened.38

A Store Manager position opened sometime prior to June of 2008 at the Jordan Lane store when Joe Courtney decided to leave the company. While serving as the Jordan Lane Store Manager, Joe Courtney often used his vacation days to take approximately two Saturdays off each month in order to participate in “drag racing” activities.39 On at least a few occasions, Mr. Courtney took three Saturdays off in a single month.40 Even though Director Sherer was aware of Courtney's Saturday vacation days as early as 2004—which were, at that time, less frequent than the Saturdays taken off by Courtney in 2007 and 2008he did not squarely confront Mr. Courtney about the issue until sometime in 2008.41 During that discussion, Director Sherer informed Courtney that he...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • The Bd. of County Commissioners of The County of La Plata v. Brown Group Retail Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Colorado
    • 3 Marzo 2011
  • Abbott v. Elwood Staffing Servs., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
    • 31 Julio 2014
    ...unreliable because the charge is drafted in anticipation of litigation”) (citation omitted).Johnson v. AutoZone, Inc., 768 F.Supp.2d 1124, 1134 at n. 82 (N.D.Ala.2011) (Smith, J.); see also, Roxbury–Smellie v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 324 Fed.Appx. 783, 785 (11th Cir.2009) (“The statements m......
  • Powell v. Colvin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
    • 26 Abril 2016
    ...of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question." Johnson v. AutoZone, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1149 (N.D. Ala. 2011), quoting Tippie v. Spacelabs Medical, Inc., 180 Fed. App' x 51, 56 (11th Cir. 2006).10 An employer's reason can......
  • Williams v. Ruskin Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • 1 Marzo 2012
    ...that allegation casts upon plaintiff the burden to demonstrate that the stated reason is pretextual." Johnson v. AutoZone, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1149 (N.D. Ala. 2011). In order for a plaintiff to be successful, the "disparities in qualifications must be of such weight and significance......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT