Berry v. Arnold School District

• Decision Date: 26 February 1940
• Docket Number: 4-5794
• Citation: 137 S.W.2d 256,199 Ark. 1118
• Parties: BERRY v. ARNOLD SCHOOL DISTRICT
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

137 S.W.2d 256

199 Ark. 1118

BERRY v. ARNOLD SCHOOL DISTRICT

4-5794

Supreme Court of Arkansas

February 26, 1940

Appeal from Baxter Circuit Court; John L. Bledsoe, Judge; affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Nat T. Dyer, for appellant.

John C. Ashley, for appellee.

OPINION

MEHAFFY, J.

The appellant, Loyce D. Berry, sued the Arnold School District for a breach of contract of employment as teacher, alleging that the board of directors of Arnold School District, on April 23, 1938, entered into a written contract with appellant to teach in said district. The contract provided among other things, that Berry was employed for a term of eight months, provided funds are available for such term commencing on July 11, 1938, and agreed to pay him $ 80 for each school month. The contract provided that the teacher would give said school his entire time and best efforts during school hours; use his utmost influence with parents to secure a full attendance of pupils, and generally to comply with all the requirements of the laws of this state in relation to teachers, to the best of his ability.

Appellant began to teach under said contract on July 11, 1938, and taught to September 9, 1938, when a vacation was arranged. On October 10, 1938, appellant reported for duty and was on said date discharged by a majority of the board of directors acting in their official capacity. They appeared with Jim Martin, sheriff of Baxter county, who served upon appellant an order signed by R. C. Love, judge of the Baxter county court, directing the sheriff to take from the appellant the key to the door of the school house and the key to a steel book case therein, and deliver them to the school directors.

The appellant alleges that in order to serve the peace and by order of a majority of the directors, but protesting by written notice that appellant would hold Arnold School District liable for the breach of his contract, he peaceably surrendered the keys and ceased to teach in said district; that his discharge was without just cause and he was then and at all times during the term of his contract, ready and willing to teach said school; that he was paid for services rendered the sum of $ 40 and appellee owed him for services rendered under his contract the sum of $ 140; that at the time he entered into said contract, he was engaged in selling life insurance, and over week-ends continued during the period he taught under said contract to sell life insurance; he prayed judgment against the district and directors for the $ 140 and interest, and for the further sum of $ 460 with interest from April 11, 1938, a total of $ 600.

On June 13, 1939, appellant took a non-suit as to the directors, and on said date the school district filed its separate answer. The answer was a general denial alleging that the district had paid him $ 40 for services rendered the first two weeks; that he failed to give his entire time and efforts to teaching, and was overbearing and quarrelsome towards the pupils and whipped them in an inhuman manner, and was abusive and quarrelsome towards patrons and directors; that he appeared during school hours intoxicated and is not of good moral character, and is unfit to teach in the public schools; that because of his conduct the board of directors at the end of the third week informed appellant that he had breached his contract and that the same was thereby terminated. Over the protest of the board, appellant continued to teach until September 9, 1938, when, without consulting the board, he closed the school. The appellee denies that it breached the contract, denies that appellant was damaged, and that he should recover any amount.

Before the evidence was offered the court made the following statement:

"A valid contract of employment is admitted; and that appellant taught three weeks under this contract, and was paid for two week's services and tendered $ 20 for the third week's services.

"The district contends that plaintiff was discharged at the end of the third week, while he contends that he was not discharged until October 10th.

"The contract having been admitted, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant district to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff breached his contract."

There was a jury trial and a verdict and judgment for $ 200 in favor of appellant.

At the close of the testimony the appellant requested that the court direct a verdict for him and also to instruct the jury that the contract provided that it cannot be terminated except by mutual consent, and that no such consent was shown, and that the appellant requested a trial by the board on charges, which was refused. He asked the court to instruct the jury that he was not discharged by authority of a resolution of the board; that he was discharged without just grounds.

The court overruled this motion, and exceptions were saved. After the verdict and judgment the appellant filed motion for new trial which was overruled, and the case is here on appeal.

The evidence showed that the appellant whipped one of the pupils, 15 years old, with a paddle. He whipped the boy the first time for saying a riddle, and the second time for throwing a paper-wad.

Barrett Richardson, the boy he whipped, testified that he was 15 years old; that he whipped him the first time for telling a riddle; he got the riddle out of the Kansas City Star; made him get in a stooped position to whip him with the side and edge of the paddle; hit him twelve or fourteen licks; there were bruises on him; they were black and about that long (indicating) and as wide as the edge of the paddle.

Floyd Neal testified that he saw Barrett Richardson the morning after he was whipped; saw one place across his hip three or four...