Berry v. Dannelly
Decision Date | 25 November 1932 |
Docket Number | 2 Div. 14. |
Citation | 145 So. 663,226 Ala. 151 |
Parties | BERRY v. DANNELLY. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1933.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Wilcox County; John Miller, Judge.
Action by Donie C. Dannelly, as executrix of the will of Pat M Dannelly, deceased, against E. W. Berry. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Before entering upon the trial, defendant moved that the case be withdrawn from the then present call of the court, on the ground that the panel of jurors from which a jury to try the case was to be selected had been told that defendant carried insurance on his automobile in which deceased was riding when he received his injuries. In support of the motion, each member of the jury panel was sworn and examined. Certain of them testified that they had not therefore heard that defendant carried insurance nor that the suit was a friendly suit. Others testified that they had heard that defendant carried insurance, and some that they heard the suit was a friendly one. Upon cross-examination, each member of the panel testified that nothing he had heard with respect to insurance had prejudiced or biased his judgment, and that, if one of the jury trying the case, he would be governed by the evidence. Thereupon the trial court overruled the motion.
J. M Bonner, of Camden, and Coleman, Spain, Stewart & Davies, of Birmingham, for appellant.
S. F Hobbs, of Selma, for appellee.
This action is by the personal representative of Pat M. Dannelly, deceased, against the appellant, under the Homicide Act, section 5696 of the Code 1923, for negligently causing his death.
The complaint, consisting of a single count, alleges that, while said Dannelly was riding with the defendant as a guest in defendant's automobile, which the defendant was then and there driving on a public highway, the defendant so negligently drove or operated said automobile that it collided with an automobile truck or other vehicle then and there on said highway, and as a proximate consequence said Dannelly sustained personal injuries from which he died, and that said injuries and death "were proximately caused by the negligence of defendant in the driving or operation of said automobile."
The plea was the general issue, "not guilty."
The evidence is without dispute that on the evening of November 19, 1931, about 5:30 o'clock the defendant, while driving his automobile on the Montgomery-Mobile highway, some ten or twelve miles south of Montgomery, with the said Dannelly as a guest in his automobile, drove or allowed his automobile to run into the rear of a truck loaded with cattle, and as a proximate consequence Dannelly was seriously injured, and that said injury caused his death.
The evidence offered by the plaintiff tended to show that the truck, in charge of one Davis, but being driven by a chauffeur, was proceeding south to the right of the middle line of the highway, in the same direction defendant was going, and was traveling between twelve and twenty miles per hour; that the truck was equipped with head and tail lights burning.
The evidence offered by the defendant tended to show that the truck was standing on the highway, to the right of the median line, with the right rear wheel on the margin, and there was no tail light on the truck.
The evidence is further without dispute that the highway at this point was subject to heavy traffic, and that automobiles and trucks traveled thereon with great frequency; that immediately before the catastrophe a truck approached from the south, going north, and passed the Davis truck and defendant's automobile; that the lights on the truck proceeding north were exceedingly bright and were not dimmed as it approached and passed the two vehicles proceeding south. The evidence further shows that the defendant was an expert driver of an automobile.
The defendant testified: (Italics supplied.)
The defendant here asked the witness the following question: Objection was sustained to this question, and defendant reserved an exception.
The defendant further testified: (Italics supplied.)
Defendant's counsel then asked him: The court sustained plaintiff's objection to this question, and defendant excepted.
The defendant further testified: " When I became blinded I removed my foot from the accelerator and pulled to the right, toward the curb as far as I dared." (Italics supplied.)
Defendant's counsel here asked the witness: "Was there any time to do anything other than that?" The court sustained an objection to this question, and defendant reserved an exception.
The defendant further testified: "I did not say to him [Davis] that I did not blame him."
And on cross-examination: etc. (Italics supplied.)
And on his redirect examination: (Italics supplied.)
While, as a general rule, a traveler on a public highway who has no knowledge of an obstruction on the highway, or knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to put him on notice, has the right to assume that it is clear of permanent or semipermanent obstructions (Morgan Hill Paving Co. v. Fonville, 218 Ala. 566, 119 So. 610; City of Huntsville v. Phillips, 191 Ala. 524, 67 So. 664), yet we know of no rule of law or logic that justifies him in assuming that such highway is not occupied by other vehicles or travelers, and he is under legal duty to use the care of an ordinarily prudent man to avoid collision with others exercising their lawful rights in the use of the highway ( St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Guthrie, 216 Ala. 613, 114 So. 215, 56 A. L. R. 1110).
If the defendant was constantly watching the road ahead, as he testified, it is difficult to understand how he failed to discover the presence of Davis' truck in time to avert the collision. In the circumstances, he not only had the aid of the headlights on his car, but the aid of the bright lights on the truck that approached and passed from the south, which, it would seem, were bound to disclose the presence of the Davis truck as it approached and passed.
The more reasonable inference is that defendant, in his effort to steer clear of the truck approaching from the south by steering his car as near to the curb on his right as he "dared," to use his language, relaxed his vigilance in keeping a lookout ahead within the range of the shaft of light cast by the lamps of his automobile, and thus
failed to discover the presence of the truck of Davis immediately ahead.
The evidence is without dispute that defendant made no effort to stop, but merely took his foot off the accelerator and allowed his automobile, which was moving forward at a rate of thirty miles per hour, to coast until it ran into the rear of the truck.
The evidence presented a case for jury decision, and justified the refusal of the general affirmative charge requested by the defendant. Langley Bus Co. v. Messer, 222 Ala. 533, 133 So. 287.
Charge 2, asserting that plaintiff would not be entitled to recover if the jury was reasonably satisfied that Dannelly received his injury as the result of a "mere accident," was refused without error. Smith...
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...defendant as a proximate cause. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Guthrie, 216 Ala. 613, 114 So. 215, 56 A.L.R. 1110; Berry v. Dannelly, 226 Ala. 151, 154, 145 So. 663; Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Holifield, 152 Miss. 674, 120 So. 750; Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Kennard, 164 Miss. 380, 145 So. 110......
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...did not appear from the content of the question. Sanders v. State, 202 Ala. 37, 79 So. 375; Stallings v. State, supra; Berry v. Dannelly, 226 Ala. 151, 145 So. 663. In connection with this same visit the appellant's mother testified that the defendant told witness that his wife had fainted.......
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...the correctness vel non of said refused charges, and whether their refusal injuriously affected the rights of appellant. Berry v. Dannelly, Ex'x (Ala. Sup.) 145 So. 663; Climer v. St. Clair County Telephone Co., 200 656, 77 So. 30; section 9509, Code of 1923; Denton v. State, 17 Ala. App. 3......