St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Guthrie

• Decision Date: 20 October 1927
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 970
• Citation: 216 Ala. 613,114 So. 215
• Parties: ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RY. CO. v. GUTHRIE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

114 So. 215

216 Ala. 613

ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RY. CO. v. GUTHRIE.

6 Div. 970

Supreme Court of Alabama

October 20, 1927

Appeal from Circuit Court, Walker County; R.L. Blanton, Judge.

Action for damages by John Guthrie against the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Transferred from Court of Appeals under Code 1923, § 7326. Reversed and remanded.

Bankhead & Bankhead, of Jasper, for appellant.

Curtis Pennington & Pou, of Jasper, for appellee.

SAYRE J.

Appellee's complaint is set out in the report of the case. It will be noted that the allegation is, in substance, that defendant in the nighttime, obstructed the highway by placing box cars across the same, and that the automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger ran against the cars, whereby he was injured. The complaint appears to proceed upon the theory that the derelictions of the defendant particularized therein in and of themselves, that is, without further statement or qualification, constituted actionable negligence. Well-considered adjudications in other jurisdictions hold to the contrary. The rule is that, in the absence of statutory requirement, the mere leaving of a train across the highway without lights or other signals to disclose its presence there is not per se negligence, and that, as for injuries received by running into the train, the obstruction of the highway is not to be considered as the efficient cause of such injuries, but merely as a condition which in and of itself furnishes no cause of action, and the fact that the condition of obstruction is unreasonably prolonged makes no difference in the application of the rule. The rule sanctioned by the authorities to which we have referred is that, in order to charge the railroad with negligence in such a case, it must be shown that defendant's employees in charge of the train, in the exercise of reasonable care, ought to know that on account of darkness the cars upon the crossing are such an obstruction that people traveling along the highway in automobiles properly equipped with lights and carefully operated at a reasonable rate of speed would be likely to come into collision with them; in other words, the employees of the defendant, in the absence of some peculiar environment, are justified in believing that travelers in automobiles properly lighted and driving at reasonable speed will observe the cars upon the crossing in time to avoid coming into collision with them. It can hardly be contended with reason that the precautions in respect of which, according to the complaint as thus far stated, the defendant failed in its duty, would be necessary in the daytime. It would seem to be a reasonable corollary that on any occasion, day or night, when the occupation of the crossing would be visible to a traveler using such care for his own safety as the employees of the railroad have a right to presume he will use, in time to allow the traveler to stop before coming into collision with the cars, the railroad ought not to be held liable. Trask v. Boston & Maine, 219 Mass. 410, 106 N.E. 1022; McGlauflin v. Boston & M.R. Co., 230 Mass. 431, 119 N.E. 955, L.R.A.1918E, 790; Gilman v. Central Vermont R. Co., 93 Vt. 340, 107 A. 122, 16 A.L.R. 1102; Gage v. Boston & M.R.R., 77 N.H. 289, 90 A. 855, L.R.A.1915A, 363; Orton v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (C.C.A.) 7 F. (2d) 36.

But the complaint concludes with an allegation that plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of defendant's agents, etc., while acting in the line of their duty, etc., in this, "that said agents, servants or employees negligently obstructed or blocked the crossing on said highway," and, under our...