Berry v. Feil

• Decision Date: 11 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 64750.,64750.
• Citation: 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 37,357 P.3d 344
• Parties: William J. BERRY, Appellant, v. Pamela FEIL; and Dennis Brown, Respondents.
• Court: Nevada Court of Appeals

357 P.3d 344

131 Nev. Adv. Op. 37

William J. BERRY, Appellant

v.Pamela FEIL; and Dennis Brown, Respondents.

No. 64750.

Court of Appeals of Nevada.

June 11, 2015.

William James Berry, Ely, in Pro Se.

Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, and Clark G. Leslie, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Respondent Pamela Feil.

Dennis Brown, Lovelock, in Pro Se.

Before GIBBONS, C.J., TAO and SILVER, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In this opinion, we address whether civil rights complaints filed by inmates under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Nevada state courts are subject to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement imposed by the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995's (PLRA) amendment of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We must further determine whether Nevada district courts are required to stay inmate § 1983 claims filed prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies so that the inmate can exhaust all available administrative remedies, or whether complaints filed before exhaustion is complete must be dismissed. Below, the district court dismissed appellant's complaint, concluding that § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement applied to appellant's § 1983 claims, that appellant had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and that there was no basis for the court to stay his claims to allow him to exhaust those remedies.

Because the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to any inmate § 1983 civil rights claims regarding prison conditions, regardless of what court the complaint is filed in, the district court properly applied the exhaustion requirement to this case. And since appellant's complaint alleged federal civil rights claims and not state tort claims, the district court did not have the discretion to stay the case to allow appellant to exhaust his administrative remedies. Indeed, because the PLRA makes prefiling exhaustion mandatory for § 1983 civil rights claims challenging conditions of confinement, the district court was required to dismiss, rather than stay, appellant's complaint. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing appellant's complaint based on his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing the complaint.

BACKGROUND

Appellant William J. Berry, an inmate, filed the underlying civil rights complaint against respondents Pamela Feil, the Lovelock Correctional Center law library supervisor, and Dennis Brown, an inmate library clerk, in the Sixth Judicial District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, Berry alleged that Feil and Brown failed to mail his confidential legal mail and conspired to hide evidence of this alleged transgression, and that Feil retaliated against Berry for filing a grievance against her by refusing his requests for legal supplies and confiscating his books. Based on these allegations, the complaint asserted violations of Berry's right to free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and his rights to due process and unobstructed access to the courts under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Feil subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. While Feil acknowledged that Berry filed grievances regarding the incidents alleged in his complaint, she asserted he nonetheless failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not complete all the steps of the grievance process as required by federal law. In response, Berry moved to strike the motion to dismiss. Although he did not file a separate, specifically labeled opposition to the motion to dismiss, his motion to strike included substantive arguments addressing the grounds on which Feil sought to have his complaint dismissed, and thus, despite its title, it effectively operated as both a motion to strike and an opposition to Feil's motion. The district court subsequently dismissed Berry's entire complaint without prejudice based on his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.¹ This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 in an effort to curb a sharp rise in prisoner litigation that had occurred in the years preceding its passage. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). Among other things, the PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983 ] or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–134, § 803, 110 Stat. 1321 –71 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1996) ).

In its order dismissing the complaint, the district court noted that § 1997e(a) limits inmates' abilities to file civil rights actions relating to prison conditions by requiring them to first exhaust all available administrative remedies. Thus, because it found Berry failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the district court concluded Berry's complaint must be dismissed pursuant to the PLRA. On appeal, Berry argues the district court erred in applying the PLRA's exhaustion requirement to his state court civil rights action, even though his case was brought under § 1983. He further argues that, rather than dismissing his action, the district court was required to stay his case to allow him to exhaust his administrative remedies.²

We address each of Berry's arguments below in turn. In addressing these contentions, we must accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in favor of Berry. See Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227–28, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008) (explaining that, on appeal, a court rigorously reviews a dismissal for failure to state a claim, accepting all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff).

Applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to inmate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights actions filed in Nevada district courts

Berry filed a district court civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Under § 1983, a civil rights action may be initiated to seek redress from a person acting under color of law of any state or the federal government who has deprived that party of a right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Butler ex rel. Biller v. Bayer, 123 Nev. 450, 458, 168 P.3d 1055, 1061 (2007). Although § 1983 actions provide a mechanism for parties to obtain relief for violations of their federal rights, both state and federal courts have jurisdiction over actions initiated pursuant to that statute. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 731, 129 S.Ct. 2108, 173 L.Ed.2d 920 (2009). And as set forth above, the PLRA's amendment of § 1997e(a) requires the exhaustion of all available administrative remedies before inmates can bring § 1983 civil rights claims challenging conditions of confinement.

Below, the district court relied on § 1997e(a) in dismissing Berry's underlying action based on its determination Berry had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his civil rights complaint. On appeal from this determination, Berry insinuates that § 1997e(a) does not apply to his complaint because it was brought in state, rather than federal court. Contrary to Berry's argument, however, federal and state courts that have been confronted with this issue have widely recognized that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to § 1983 actions filed in state courts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana ex rel. La. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 468 F.3d 278, 280 (5th Cir.2006) ; Baker v. Rolnick, 210 Ariz. 321, 110 P.3d 1284, 1288–89 (App.2005).³

For example, in Johnson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed an inmate's § 1983 civil rights complaint that had been removed from state court to federal court, where it was subsequently dismissed on exhaustion grounds under § 1997e(a). 468 F.3d at 279. On appeal from the dismissal order, the inmate-plaintiff argued that § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement did not apply because his complaint was originally brought in state court. Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, however, determining that the language of § 1997e(a) did not limit its application to only those claims filed in federal court. Id. at 280.

The Arizona Court of Appeals came to the same conclusion in addressing an appeal from the dismissal of an inmate's § 1983 civil rights action. Baker, 110 P.3d at 1285. In challenging the dismissal of his complaint, the inmate-plaintiff in Baker argued § 1997e(a) did not apply to actions filed in state courts. Id. at 1287. The Baker court rejected this argument, however, and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, relying on § 1997e(a)'s “broad and unequivocal” declaration that “no action shall be brought without exhaustion of remedies” and Congress's intent to have state courts uniformly apply federal civil rights laws. Id. at 1288 (internal quotations omitted).

We find the reasoning of these decisions persuasive. Not only does § 1997e(a) not include language restricting its applicability to federal court actions, see Johnson, 468 F.3d at 280, but it specifically declares “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title” by any inmate until all available administrative remedies have been exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). And as the Baker court recognized, the “unequivocal” plain language utilized in § 1997e(a) makes that statute applicable to all § 1983 actions brought by incarcerated individuals to challenge the conditions of their confinement, regardless of whether those actions are filed in state or federal court. Baker, 110 P.3d at 1288 ; see also ...