Baker v. Rolnick

• Decision Date: 03 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 03-0605.,1 CA-CV 03-0605.
• Parties: John P. BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Loraine ROLNICK, ADOC Counselor Supervisor; Kelly Knoll, ADOC Counselor; Scott Schmier, ADOC Counselor; Olivia Gonzales, ADOC Practitioner Nurse; Terry L. Stewart, Director of Arizona Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

110 P.3d 1284

210 Ariz. 321

John P. BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Loraine ROLNICK, ADOC Counselor Supervisor; Kelly Knoll, ADOC Counselor; Scott Schmier, ADOC Counselor; Olivia Gonzales, ADOC Practitioner Nurse; Terry L. Stewart, Director of Arizona Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees.

No. -0605.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department D.

May 3, 2005.

John P. Baker, Buckeye, In Propria Persona.

Terry Goddard, Attorney General, By Paul E. Carter, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

NORRIS, Presiding Judge.

¶ 1 Appellant John P. Baker, a prisoner in a state correctional institution, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his claims against employees of the Arizona Department of Corrections ("ADOC") for alleged civil rights violations asserted under a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). The sole issue raised on appeal is whether Baker was required to exhaust his administrative remedies through the ADOC's inmate grievance system before filing his § 1983 claims in superior court.

¶ 2 We hold prisoners in state correctional institutions must exhaust all administrative remedies available to them before filing a complaint in state court alleging claims under § 1983. We reach this conclusion by relying on a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2003), which requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies available to them before bringing suit under § 1983 or any other federal law. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Baker's complaint due to his failure to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him before bringing his § 1983 claim in state court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Baker is an inmate in the ADOC. On August 30, 2002, Baker filed a "civil rights complaint" in the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona against five ADOC employees and asserted they had violated his constitutional rights.¹ Baker claimed the ADOC defendants' actions collectively violated ADOC policy and his constitutional rights. Baker alleged Defendant Schmier had delayed or denied his request for extra legal supplies; Defendant Rolnick had kept him in the "wrong institution;" Defendant Knoll had untimely processed his grievances; Defendant Gonzales had denied him adequate medical care after surgery; and Defendant Stewart had implemented an improper inmate property policy. Baker did not allege he had exhausted any administrative remedies available to him with respect to his complaints against the ADOC defendants.

¶ 4 In support of his claims, Baker referenced several amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to assert a cause of action against any person who, under color of state law or authority, deprives another person within the jurisdiction of the United States of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. Baker cited dozens of federal court cases involving § 1983 actions in an outline of "Points and Authorities" attached to his complaint. Consistent with Baker's citations, the trial court construed his complaint as a civil rights case brought pursuant to § 1983.

¶ 5 The ADOC defendants answered and denied Baker's allegations of wrongdoing. They also affirmatively alleged Baker had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.²

¶ 6 Subsequently, the ADOC defendants moved to dismiss Baker's complaint under Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Pursuant to § 1997e(a), prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies available to them before bringing suit under § 1983 or any other federal law.

¶ 7 In support of their exhaustion argument, the ADOC defendants provided the court with a copy of ADOC Department Order ("DO") 802,³ which established the Inmate Grievance System. According to its statement of purpose, the Inmate Grievance System was designed to provide inmates with "timely, administrative remedies to complaints which might otherwise unnecessarily burden the courts." DO 800. The system allows inmates to use the grievance process for issues relating to "property, staff, visitation, mail, food service, institutional procedures, [d]epartment [w]ritten [i]nstructions, program access, medical care, religion, and conditions of confinement." DO 802.01 § 1.1.1.

¶ 8 An inmate may initiate a standard, emergency, staff, medical or department written instruction grievance. The system imposes slightly different sequential administrative steps depending on the type of grievance initiated. By way of illustration, under DO 802.08 § 1.1, which governs standard grievance proceedings, inmates must first attempt to resolve issues informally by filing an Inmate Issue/Response form with their assigned counselors. If the problem cannot be resolved informally, the inmate may submit a formal Inmate Grievance to the Grievance Coordinator for review. DO 802.08 § 1.4. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Grievance Coordinator's response, the inmate may then appeal to the Warden or Deputy Warden within ten days after receiving the Grievance Coordinator's response. DO 802.09 § 1.3.1. The inmate may appeal the Warden's or Deputy Warden's response to the Director within ten days after receiving the Warden or Deputy Warden's response. DO 802.09 § 1.4.1. The Director's response is final and exhausts all available administrative remedies. DO 802.09 § 1.4.4. The other four types of grievance proceedings also terminate with the Director's response for purposes of exhaustion. DO 802.10-802.14.

¶ 9 The ADOC defendants additionally submitted an affidavit to the court from an ADOC legal assistant. Counsel for the ADOC defendants had requested the legal assistant to obtain "evidence" of any grievances Baker had filed against ADOC defendants Schmier, Rolnick, Knoll and Gonzales. Relying on ADOC grievance records and "logs," the ADOC legal assistant concluded Baker had failed to "exhaust the available administrative remedies with regard to grievances he might have filed regarding any of the issues [Baker raised against these] individuals." The legal assistant's affidavit did not address whether Baker had exhausted his complaints against Defendant Stewart.

¶ 10 In response, Baker principally argued § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement only applied to § 1983 actions filed in federal courts. He also generally asserted that he had "grieved" the ADOC defendants' actions or otherwise appealed their decisions, that classification issues were not grievable, and that he had attempted to "grieve" various issues, but "they came back `not processed' and, therefore, could not be appealed to a higher level."⁴

¶ 11 The trial court granted the ADOC defendants' motion to dismiss. It found Baker had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. ¶ 12 Baker timely appealed. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 12-2101(B) (2003).

DISCUSSION

¶ 13 Baker's sole legal argument on appeal is that the trial court should have allowed his § 1983 claims against the ADOC defendants to go forward because § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement only applies to civil rights claims pending in federal, not state court. Baker does not challenge the trial court's factual finding that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under DO 802 regarding his complaints against the ADOC defendants.⁵

¶ 14 We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Fairway Constructors, Inc. v. Ahern, 193 Ariz. 122, 124, ¶ 6, 970 P.2d 954, 956 (App.1998). In reviewing the claim, we take all facts asserted to be true but review all legal issues de novo. Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y. v. Pima County, 200 Ariz. 199, 201, ¶ 2, 25 P.3d 1, 3 (App.2001); see also Logan v. Forever Living Prods. Int'l, Inc., 203 Ariz. 191, 192, ¶ 2, 52 P.3d 760, 761 (2002).

I. Administrative Exhaustion Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

¶ 15 Ordinarily, plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under § 1983 need not exhaust any administrative remedies available to them. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). Congress replaced this "general rule of non-exhaustion," however, with a "general rule of exhaustion" for all prisoner suits based on federal law. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), part of what is commonly referred to as the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), prisoners are required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit under § 1983. Section 1997e(a) mandates:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

¶ 16 In Porter, the Supreme Court explained exhaustion in cases subject to § 1997e(a) is "mandatory." 534 U.S. at 524, 122 S.Ct. 983. It further summarized the objectives of this mandatory exhaustion requirement as follows:

Beyond doubt, Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits; to this purpose, Congress afforded corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case. In some instances, corrective action taken in response to an inmate's grievance might improve prison administration and satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation. In other instances, the internal review might "filter out some frivolous claims." And for cases ultimately brought to court, adjudication could be facilitated by an administrative record that clarifies the contours of the controversy.

Id. at 524-25, 122 S.Ct. 983 (citations omitted). Federal courts have uniformly recognized § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion...