Berry v. Koehler

• Decision Date: 02 June 1961
• Docket Number: No. 8813,8813
• Citation: 84 Idaho 170,369 P.2d 1010
• Parties: Thomas L. BERRY, doing business as The Quality Repair Dental Lab and The Fit-Rite Denture Materials Sales Laboratory; George S. Snyder, doing business as the Fit-Rite Denture Material Sales Laboratory, Plaintiff-Appellants and Cross-Respondents, v. Earle E. KOEHLER, Commissioner of Law Enforcement, State of Idaho; Frank Benson, Attorney General of the State of Idaho; Edward Babcock, Prosecuting Attorney of Twin Falls County and William C. Roden, Prosecuting Attorney of Ada County, Defendants-Respondents and Cross-Appellants.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1010

369 P.2d 1010

84 Idaho 170

Thomas L. BERRY, doing business as The Quality Repair Dental Lab and The Fit-Rite Denture Materials Sales Laboratory; George S. Snyder, doing business as the Fit-Rite Denture Material Sales Laboratory, Plaintiff-Appellants and Cross-Respondents, v. Earle E. KOEHLER, Commissioner of Law Enforcement, State of Idaho; Frank Benson, Attorney General of the State of Idaho; Edward Babcock, Prosecuting Attorney of Twin Falls County and William C. Roden, Prosecuting Attorney of Ada County, Defendants-Respondents and Cross-Appellants.

No. 8813.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

June 2, 1961.

On Rehearing March 23, 1962.

Elam & Burke and Vernon K. Smith, Boise, for appellants and cross-respondents

Samuel Kaufman, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent and cross-appellants.

McFADDEN, Justice.

Plaintiffs, as appellants and cross-respondents (herein referred to as appellants), are the same individuals as the appellants in the case of Berry v. Summers, 76 Idaho 446, 283 P.2d 1093, which held unconstitutional the provisions of the S.L.1953, Ch. 105, § 1. Defendants, respondents and cross-appellants (herein referred to as respondents), at the time of filing this appeal, were incumbents of their respective offices.

S.L.1957, Ch. 81, § 1, the subject of this action is as follows:

'Section 1. That Section 54-901 Idaho Code be, and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:

'54-901 Definition--Practice of Dentistry.--The practice of dentistry is the doing by one person, for a direct or indirect consideration, of one or more of the following with respect to the teeth, gums, alveolar process, jaws, or adjacent tissues of another person, namely;

'Examining for diagnosis, treatment, extraction, repair, replacement, substitution, or correction;

'Diagnosing of disease, pain, injury, deficiency, deformity or physical condition;

'Treating, operating, prescribing, extracting, repairing, taking impressions, fitting, replacing, substituting, or correcting;

'Cleaning, polishing, or removing stains or concretions, or applying topical medication;

'Administering anaesthetics or medicaments in connection with any of the foregoing.

'The doing of any of the foregoing acts with respect to dental prosthetic appliances which requires or necessitates the presence, aid, assistance or cooperation of the person intended to be the user or wearer of such dental prosthetic appliance is hereby specifically defined as practicing dentistry and is not mere mechanical work upon inert matter in a dental laboratory as the term is used hereafter in this act.' The emphasized portion of the section was added by S.L.1957, Ch. 81, § 1. Appellants by this action challenge the constitutionality of such added portion, claiming that, as applied to them, it violates the provisions of Article 1, § 13 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho, and of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that it transgresses their right to follow their chosen calling.

The trial court held, on the authority of Berry v. Summers, supra, that appellants had the right to; (1) reline denture plates; (2) repair broken denture plates; (3) replace artificial teeth in denture plates; (4) duplicate denture plates; (5) make transfers of false or artificial teeth, strictly within the methods outlined by appellants by their complaint, and that S.L.1957, Ch. 81, was void and unenforceable against them, insofar as it prohibited their performing such services as outlined, and particularly from doing 'relines'. The decree enjoined the appellants generally from examining into the mouth of the wearer of a prosthetic appliance, for purpose of diagnosis, treatment, repair or replacement, substitution or correction; from diagnosing or prescribing; from taking impressions; from fitting, adjusting or correcting dentures in the wearer's mouth; and from making new teeth using impression trays, or using wearer's old teeth for the tray in taking such impressions. Appellants were further enjoined Appellants assigned as error certain of the court's specific findings of fact to the effect that the practices engaged in by the appellants in their business constituted the 'practice of dentistry.' They complain particularly of the court's refusal to hold the decision of Berry v. Summers, supra, res judicata as to the issues in this case. They also urge that the court erred in failing to declare S.L.1957, Ch. 81, unconstitutional, even though holding it unenforceable insofar as it affects appellants' right to provide services performed by them in the manner recognized in Berry v. Summers. Appellants' contentions and argument in support of their assignments of error depend upon the ultimate question of whether the act impinges basic and fundamental constitutional rights.

from advertising their willingness or ability to do any of the matters thus enjoined.

The Legislature, under the broad field of 'police power', may enact laws concerning the health, welfare and morals of the people. This authority, resting with the legislature, is not subject to question by the courts, except to determine whether such authority has been exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner, and whether it actually accomplishes some real purpose, State v. Finney, 65 Idaho 630, 150 P.2d 130. This concept has been appropriately stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in McLean v. State of Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 29 S.Ct. 206, 208, 53 L.Ed. 315, as follows:

'It is also true that the police power of the state is not unlimited, and is subject to judicial review; and when exerted in an arbitrary or oppressive manner, such laws may be annulled as violative of rights protected by the Constitution. While the courts can set aside legislative enactments upon this ground, the principles upon which such interference is warranted are as well settled as is the right of judicial interference itself.

'The legislature, being familiar with local conditions, is, primarily, the judge of the necessity of such enactments. The mere fact that a court may differ with the legislature in its views of public policy, or that judges may hold views inconsistent with the propriety of the legislation in question, affords no ground for judicial interference, unless the act in question is unmistakably and palpably in excess of legislative power * * *.

'If there existed a condition of affairs concerning which the legislature of the state, exercising its conceded right to enact laws for the protection of the health, safety, or welfare of the people, might pass the law, it must be sustained; if such action was arbitrary interference with the right to contract or carry on business, and having no just relation to the protection of the public within the scope of legislative power, the act must fail.'

It is also incumbent upon this court in reviewing the constitutionality of legislative action to presume it to be constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is shown beyond all reasonable doubt. Bannock County v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 53 Idaho 159, 22 P.2d 674; Eberle v. Nielson, 78 Idaho 572, 306 P.2d 1083.

The wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute are questions for the legislature alone. Saccamonno v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 30 Idaho 513, 166 P. 267; State ex rel. Capital Inv. Co. v. Lukens, 48 Idaho 357, 283 P. 527; 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 1228. In passing on the constitutionality of an act, the courts may not inquire into either the wisdom or motive of the legislature. Wanke v. Ziebarth Const. Co., 69 Idaho 64, 202 P.2d 384. It is the duty of the courts to interpret the meaning of legislative enactments without regard to the possible results. State v. Village of Garden City, 74 Idaho 513, 265 P.2d 328.

The courts almost universally recognize that the field of dentistry and its As appellants urge, not only must the legislature have authority, under the police power, to regulate the practice of dentistry, but also the legislation enacted must reasonably serve the public health, safety and morals. As is stated in Amsel v. Brooks, 1954, 141 Conn. 288, 106 A.2d 152, 156, 45 A.L.R.2d 1234, 'The regulation and prohibition it imposes must have a rational relationship to the preservation and promotion of the public welfare.' Though the 1957 act here involved amends I.C. § 54-901, the statutory definition of the term 'practice of dentistry,' the actual effect of the amendment is not to redefine 'practice of dentistry', but to redefine 'mechanical work upon inert matter in a dental laboratory,' a statutory exception to the prohibition of practice of dentistry by persons not properly licensed. I.C. § 54-901 defines as the 'practice of dentistry' in doing (inter alia) for a consideration, the following:

practice is directly related to the public health and welfare, and that the adoption of laws pertaining to it is within the province of the legislature. Ice v. State, Ind. 1959, 161 N.E.2d 171; Holcomb v. Johnston, 1957, 213 Ga. 249, 98 S.E.2d 561; Lasdon v. Hallihan, 1941, 377 Ill. 187, 36 N.E.2d 227; People ex rel. Chicago Dental Society v. A. A. A. Dental Laboratories, Inc., 1956, 8 Ill.2d 330, 134 N.E.2d 285; State ex rel. Zimmerer v. Clark, Iowa, 107 N.W.2d 726; see also Weill v. State, 1948, 250 Ala. 328, 34 So.2d 132, 138, where the court stated: 'Citation of authority is not necessary to support the proposition that under the police power the legislature may impose such restrictions on the practice of dentistry as the protection of the public may require.'

'Examining for diagnosis, treatment, extraction, repair, replacement, substitution, or correction;

'Diagnosing of disease, pain, injury, deficiency, deformity or physical condition;

'Treating, operating, prescribing, extracting, repairing, taking impressions, fitting, replacing, substituting, or correcting;

'Cleaning, polishing, or removing stains or concretions, or applying topical medication;'

with respect...