Berry v. Smith

• Citation: 139 S.E. 252
• Parties: BERRY. v. SMITH.
• Decision Date: 22 September 1927
• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

139 S.E. 252

BERRY.

v.SMITH.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Sept. 22, 1927.

Error to Circuit Court, Bedford County.

Action by Silas Smith against T. D. Berry and others for false imprisonment. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant named brings error. Reversed, and order of dismissal entered.

Caskie & Frost, of Lynchburg, for plaintiff in error.

A. J. Cauthorn and Landon Lowry, both of Bedford City, for defendant in error.

CHICHESTER, J. This is an action for "false imprisonment, " instituted in the circuit court of Bedford county by Silas Smith against T. D. Berry, G. B. Spradlin, and R. W. Updike, in which the jury found a verdict of $857.29 against Berry, and found for Spradlin & Updike. Upon this verdict the trial court entered judgment. This judgment is before us for review upon a writ of error duly granted the defendant, Berry.

The facts out of which the action arose, as far as it is necessary to state them here, are that T. D. Berry, who was a justice of the peace of Bedford county, issued a criminal warrant against Smith, charging him with getting goods from Spradlin & Updike, merchants, under false pretenses, and with stealing a drugget from them. It turned out at the trial that Smith was guilty of no criminal offense, and that, at most, he had contracted to pay or owed Spradlin & Updike a debt of $4.10, and he was acquitted. The action for false imprisonment followed, and resulted as above indicated.

After setting out the facts above narrated, but in considerably greater detail, and alleging the arrest of Smith, the "notice of motion" makes four specific charges against Berry as the basis of the plaintiff's right to recover.

First. That the warrant purported to be on oath, but was not in fact sworn to.

Second. That there was an understanding between Berry and the merchants that he was to make the collection of the claim by means of a criminal warrant.

Third. That Berry issued the criminal warrant because he would get more fees under a criminal warrant than under a civil warrant, and in order to compel Smith by duress to pay the sum of $4.10, and that Ber-ry knew that there was no criminal liability, and that his actions were thus fraudulent.

The, re was a demurrer to the notice of motion, which the trial court overruled.

The second ground of demurrer was:

"That the defendant was acting throughout the matters set up as a duly constituted justice of the peace in Bedford county, Va., and in the discharge of his duties as such with jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the person of the plaintiff, so that no civil liability in favor of the said Smith would or could attach to his actions."

The demurrer should have been sustained upon this ground and the action dismissed.

It is a well-established principle of the law that judicial officers, acting within their jurisdiction, are exempt from liability in civil actions for their official acts, although such acts are alleged to have been done maliciously and corruptly. Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131.

The reason for this rule, long ago recognized in Virginia, is aptly stated in Robertson V. Hale, 68 N. H. 538, 44 A. 695, as follows:

"It is a general rule that courts and judges are not liable in civil actions for their judicial acts within the scope of their jurisdiction, and this protection extends to magistrates exercising an inferior and limited jurisdiction, as justices of the peace. For the purpose of securing a fearless and impartial administration of justice, and to guard against an oppressive abuse of legal authority, the law exempts all judicial officers, from the highest to the lowest, from civil liability in the performance of their judicial duties within their jurisdiction, but makes them liable to impeachment of indictment for official misconduct or corruption."

In 13 A. E. R., at page 1345, the annotator states this rule as follows:

"It is uniformly held that, where the officer has jurisdiction of the person and of the subject-matter, he is exempt from civil liability for false imprisonment, so long as he acts within his jurisdiction and in a judicial capacity."

He cites decisions in support of the rule from 36 states, the United States Supreme Court, Canada, and England.

From an Oklahoma case (Comstock v. Eagleton, 11 Okl. 487, 69 P. 955) the following is quoted:

"Every judge should feel perfectly free to follow the dictates of his own judgment; and the one thing essential to that independence is that they shall not be exposed to a private action for damages for anything that they may do in their official capacity. No judge would feel free if he knew that upon the rendition of a judgment or order he might be subjected to a suit by the defeated party. * * * "

An Illinois case (Feld v. I.oftis, 240 Ill. 105, 88 N. E. 281) is also quoted from as follows:

"Imprisonment under legal process of a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter cannot be made the basis of an action for false im prisonment. When a justice of the peace is applied to for a writ, where he has authority to act officially and decide upon the sufficiency of the affidavit, if he errs in his judgment as to its...