Huendling v. Jensen

• Decision Date: 10 June 1969
• Docket Number: No. 53368,53368
• Parties: Vernon P. HUENDLING, Appellee, v. Darlo JENSEN; Walter Davitt d/b/a Denison Super Valu, First National Bank, Denison, Iowa; L. D. Servoss; Western Surety Company, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 745

168 N.W.2d 745

Vernon P. HUENDLING, Appellee, v. Darlo JENSEN; Walter Davitt d/b/a Denison Super Valu, First National Bank, Denison, Iowa; L. D. Servoss; Western Surety Company, Appellants.

No. 53368.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 10, 1969.

William H. Welch, Logan, for L. D. Servoss, appellant.

Wunschel & Schechtman, Carroll, for appellee.

STUART, Justice.

Plaintiff brought this action founded upon false arrest against L. D. Servoss and several other parties. By trial time, the action had been dismissed as to all defendants except Servoss for various reasons not pertinent here. Trial to the court resulted in a judgment against Servoss of $2500. He has appealed and for our purposes here will be considered the only defendant.

Plaintiff's wife paid for groceries purchased at Denison Super Valu by a check drawn on her husband's account in the Breda Savings Bank, Breda, Iowa. She signed both her husband's name and her name to the check.

The manager of the supermarket deposited the check in the First National Bank of Denison, which by mistake sent the check for collection to the Crawford County Savings Bank of Denison. It returned the check to the First National after affixing a yellow slip on which the phrase 'wrong bank' was checked.

The First National returned the check to the manager of the supermarket who took it and some other 'bad checks' to Servoss, a justice of the peace, in Crawford County. Servoss had collected other checks for the supermarket for a 20 percent commission. In accordance with his customary practice, he had the manager sign a preliminary information charging plaintiff with the crime of false drawing and uttering of a check. He issued a warrant for plaintiff's arrest on this information. Whether the information and warrant originally named plaintiff or his wife is not significant as plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of his person.

A constable arrested plaintiff, a farmer of substantial means, and brought him to defendant's office. Defendant suggested he plead guilty. A call to the Breda Savings Bank disclosed plaintiff had carried a substantial balance in his checking account at all times. The check would have cleared the bank any time it had been properly presented.

Plaintiff remained in custody about 1 1/4 hours. The charge was later dismissed by defendant.

Plaintiff offered parts of defendant's discovery deposition into evidence. We quote portions:

'Q. I say in all these checks that you received from the Denison Super Valu that have been returned to them, that is, unpaid, is your first proceedings to get out a preliminary information? A. Yes.

'Q. Do you ever collect from them by writing them a letter? A. No, no, never had any collections other than some checks.

'Q. Well, now, let's be a little more specific. What do you mean by a collection? A. They were checks with insufficient funds that I collected.

'Q. And you collect those? A. Yeah.

'Q. Now, when you collect this money for the check, do you return all of that to the Super Valu? A. Yes.

'Q. Do you receive any commission? A. Yes.

'Q. For collections? A. 20 percent for collecting.

'* * *

'Q. How great a time lapse was there between your conversations with Mr. Jensen at the Denison Super Valu and the issuance of the warrant? A. Well, it would have been done right away, that is, reasonably short length of time. I wasn't going to hold him up.

'* * *

'Q. On these checks that you collected for the Denison Super Valu prior to this one here, did you charge them 20 percent commission? A. Yes.

'Q. And had you collected this one, you would have charged them 20 percent on this--A. I presume so, yes.

'Q. Too? Was this by agreement with them? A. Yes.

'Q. Is this your ordinary charge? A. Yes.

'Q. In addition to this, do you get court costs? A. Yeah, we get half of the court costs.

'* * *

'Q. Now, as I understand it, Mr. Servoss, your usual procedure which you followed in this case was that when somebody called you to collect a check, you prepare the information--A. Yeah.

'Q. And take it down to them, is that correct? A. Yeah.

'Q. And do you advise them to sign this information if they want their money? A. If they want me to do anything with it, they have got to sign the information.'

The manager of the supermarket stated Mr. Servoss's procedure was not used by the other justice of peace who also did some collecting for him.

The trial court found defendant 'is a justice of the peace who carries on an extensive collection business and who, when it comes to unpaid checks is not averse to using the criminal arm of the law in the furtherance of his collection business' to shield himself and shift the court costs to the county.

The evidence supports these findings and conclusions. Defendant does not claim otherwise.

1. The basic question for our determination is whether a justice of the peace who requires a preliminary information and issues an arrest warrant as part of his regular procedure for collecting bad checks for a 20 percent commission is protected by judicial immunity when there was no probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.

'Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it 'is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences'. (Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868), quoted in Bradley v. Fisher, supra (13 Wall. 349; note, at 350, 20 L.Ed. at 650).) It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.' Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553--554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217--1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 294--295 (1967).

Iowa, in common with other jurisdictions extends judicial immunity to courts of limited jurisdiction, including justices of the peace. Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 382--385, 61 N.W. 1004, 1006--1007, 27 L.R.A. 92; Londegan v. Hammer, 30 Iowa 508, 512; 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace, § 19a, p. 45; 31 Am.Jur. 227, Justices of the Peace, § 27; Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802, 806; Anno: 13 A.L.R. 1344, 1348.

'A justice of the peace when acting judicially, and within the sphere of his jurisdiction, is not liable in a civil action for any error he may commit, even though he acts from impure and corrupt motives.' Yelton v. Becker, Mo.App., 248 S.W.2d 86, 89. Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa 378, 384, 7 N.W. 623, 625; Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802, 803; Anno: 13 A.L.R. 1344, 1345.

We must evaluate defendant's action in this case in the light of this generally accepted statement.

The cases distinguish judicial acts from ministerial acts. Heath v. Halfhill, 106 Iowa 131, 133, 76 N.W. 522, 523; Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 385, 61 N.W. 1004, 1007, 27 L.R.A. 92; Gowing v. Gowgill, 12 Iowa 495, 497; Fraley v. Ramey, 239 F.Supp. 993, 995 (D.C.W.Va.1965); Pierce v. Caldwell, 83 Idaho 229, 360 P.2d 992, 994; Yelton v. Becker, Mo.App., 248 S.W.2d 86, 89; Pruitt v. Turner, Tex.Civ.App., 336 S.W.2d 440, 442--443; Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802, 805; Anno: 13 A.L.R. 1344, 1347. Those routine matters which might be performed by a clerk are said to be ministerial. Yelton v. Becker, supra; Pruitt v. Turner, supra; 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace § 20, p. 49. Judicial acts are those which call for the exercising of judgment and legal discretion. Yelton v. Becker, supra; Pruitt v. Turner, supra; Rogers v. Marion, 11 Cal.App.2d 750, 54 P.2d 760; 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace § 19 c, p. 47. Defendant here issued a warrant for plaintiff's arrest upon a preliminary information. The justice of peace must determine whether there was probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. This is a judicial act. Fraley v. Ramey, 239 F.Supp. 993, 994 (D.C.W.Va.1965); Yelton v. Becker, supra; Rogers v. Marion, supra; 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace § 19c, p. 47.

A justice of the peace is acting within the sphere of his jurisdiction if: (1) the statutory prerequisites to jurisdiction are fulfilled; Lanpher v. Dewell, 56 Iowa 153, 155--157, 9 N.W. 101, 102--103; Williams v. Kozak, 280 F. 373, 374 (4th Cir.1922); Rock v. Antoine's, Inc., Del., 197 A.2d 737, 741; Waters v. Ray, Fla.App., 167 So.2d 326, 329--330; Duncan v. Brothers, Ky., 344 S.W.2d 398, 399--400; Utley v. City of Independence, 240 Or. 384, 402 P.2d 91, 93; Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802, 811; Anno: 13 A.L.R. 1344, 1360; (2) he has jurisdiction of the subject matter; and (3) the person. Fraley v. Ramey, 239 F.Supp. 993, 996; Pierce v. Caldwell, 83 Idaho 229, 360 P.2d 992, 994; Williamson v. Waugh, D.C., 160 F.Supp. 72, 76; Duncan v. Brothers, supra; Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802, 803; Anno: 13 A.L.R. 1344, 1345.

He is immune even though he exceeds his jurisdiction. McGrew v. Holmes, 145 Iowa 540, 542, 124 N.W. 195, 196; Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa 378, 384--386, 7 N.W. 623, 625--626; Pierce v. Caldwell, supra; Holland v. Lutz, 194 Kan. 712, 401 P.2d 1015, 1019; Shaw v. Moon, 117 Or. 558, 245 P. 318, 45 A.L.R. 600, 603; Anno: 173 A.L.R. 802, 810; Anno: 13 A.L.R. 1344, 1355.

Civil liability attaches only when he acts wholly without jurisdiction. Williams v. Kozak, supra; Rasmus v. Schaffer, 230 Ala. 245, 160 So. 244, 246; Waters v. Ray, supra; Holland v. Lutz, supra, 401 P.2d at 1020; Cox v....