Berryhill v. Synatzske

• Decision Date: 17 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. CV–13–847.,CV–13–847.
• Citation: 2014 Ark. 169,432 S.W.3d 637
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Parties: Mary BERRYHILL, Appellant v. Frances SYNATZSKE, Deceased, Bryan Huffman, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Frances Synatzske, and John Does 1–70, Appellees.

2014 Ark. 169
432 S.W.3d 637

Mary BERRYHILL, Appellant
v.
Frances SYNATZSKE, Deceased, Bryan Huffman, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Frances Synatzske, and John Does 1–70, Appellees.

No. CV–13–847.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 17, 2014.

[432 S.W.3d 639]

Whetstone and Odum, Little Rock, by: Kevin Odum; and Baker, Schulze & Murphy, by: J.G. “Gerry” Schulze, for appellant.

The Huckabay Law Firm, Little Rock, by: D. Michael Huckabay, Jr., and Kathryn B. Knisely, for appellees.

KAREN R. BAKER, Justice.

This appeal stems from a car accident between appellant, Mary Berryhill, and appellee, Frances Synatzske, that occurred on November 12, 2008. On September 21, 2011, Berryhill sued Synatzske alleging that Synatzske was responsible for the accident. In the same complaint, Berryhill also sued seventy John Does, including a John Doe that was designated to represent the estate of any defendant who predeceases the service of the complaint. On October 6, 2011, an answer was filed and stated that Synatzske had died and that an estate should be opened and served, and also alleged that the complaint should be dismissed for insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process.

On November 14, 2011, three days after the expiration of the statute of limitations, appellee, Bryan Huffman, filed a petition for appointment as special administrator of Synatzske's estate. On November 28, 2011, the circuit court appointed Huffman as special administrator of the estate (hereinafter the estate). On December 22, 2011, the circuit court granted Berryhill's motion to extend the time of service until May 16, 2012.

On April 3, 2012, approximately two months prior to the expiration of the deadline to perfect service, Berryhill filed an amended complaint naming the estate as a party. The estate answered and raised affirmative defenses of the statute of limitations, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service of process.

On July 5, 2012, the estate filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the original complaint was a nullity because Synatzske had died prior to the filing of the original complaint, and therefore, it could not be transformed into a valid suit by amending the complaint after the statute of limitations had passed. The estate further argued that Ark.Code Ann. § 16–56–125 could not be used to toll the statute of limitations because the statute only applied in circumstances in which the tortfeasor was unknown, and asserted that in this case Berryhill knew the identity of the tortfeasor.

Berryhill responded that her complaint named Synatzske, as well as her estate, as a John Doe defendant pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 16–56–125 (Repl.2005), in the event Synatzske died prior to filing the complaint. Berryhill further asserted that her complaint was proper because it was unknown at the time of the filing of the complaint whether Synatzske or her estate was the tortfeasor. Accordingly, Berryhill argued that the original complaint was not a nullity, and that she had timely substituted Huffman as a party and served him prior to the deadline passing. Finally, Berryhill argued that the amended complaint naming Huffman related back to the filing of the original complaint, which was prior to the running of the statute of limitations.

After a hearing, the circuit court granted the estate's motion for summary judgment on September 13, 2012, finding that Berryhill had failed to timely file her amended complaint naming the estate prior to the running of the statute of limitations. The circuit court further found that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the filing of the original complaint pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 16–56–125 because Berryhill knew the tortfeasor, but failed to

[432 S.W.3d 640]

amend her original complaint prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Berryhill appealed the decision to the court of appeals, which affirmed the circuit court's decision. Berryhill v. Synatzske, 2013 Ark. App. 483, 2013 WL 4854487. Berryhill then petitioned this court for review, which we granted. Berryhill presents one issue on appeal: the circuit court erred in granting the estate's motion for summary judgment.

Upon granting a petition for review, this court considers the appeal as though it had been originally filed in this court. Pack v. Little Rock Convention Ctr. & Visitors Bureau, 2013 Ark. 186, 427 S.W.3d 586. This case comes to us from an order of summary judgment. A trial court may grant summary judgment only when it is apparent that no genuine issues of material fact exist requiring litigation and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Crockett v. C.A.G. Invs., Inc., 2011 Ark. 208, 381 S.W.3d 793. On appeal, this court determines if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party leave a material question of fact unanswered. Bryan v. City of Cotter, 2009 Ark. 172, 303 S.W.3d 64. Summary judgment is also appropriate when the trial court finds that the allegations, taken as true, fail to state a cause of action. Cottrell v. Cottrell, 332 Ark. 352, 965 S.W.2d 129 (1998). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Harrisburg Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. Neal, 2011 Ark. 233, 381 S.W.3d 811.

I. Ark.Code Ann. § 16–56–125

With these standards identified, we now turn to the issue presented, which is whether the circuit court erred in granting Synatzske's motion for summary judgment. The issue requires us to interpret Ark.Code Ann. § 16–56–125. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo because it is for this court to decide what a statute means. Cooper Realty Invs., Inc. v. Ark. Contractors Licensing Bd., 355 Ark. 156, 134 S.W.3d 1 (2003). While we are not bound by the circuit court's ruling, we will accept that court's interpretation of a statute unless it is shown that the court erred. Id.

Turning to our review of the statute before us, “[t]he first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary meaning and usually accepted meaning in common language.” Potter v. City of Tontitown, 371 Ark. 200, 209, 264 S.W.3d 473, 481 (2007). “The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Dep't of Human Servs. & Child Welfare Agency Review Bd. v. Howard, 367 Ark. 55, 62, 238 S.W.3d 1, 6 (2006). Additionally, in construing any statute, we place it beside other statutes relevant to the subject matter in question and ascribe meaning and effect to be derived from the whole. Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272, 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998). Statutes relating to the same subject must be construed together and in harmony, if possible. Jester v. State, 367 Ark. 249, 239 S.W.3d 484 (2006).

The relevant statute, Ark.Code Ann. § 16–56–125 “Unknown Tortfeasors,” provides:

(a) For the...