Berryman v. Okla. Corp.
| Decision Date | 07 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 114322 |
| Parties | Jane BERRYMAN, Roberta Greenwell, John Wood and Bonnie Cain, Victor Trumbell and Trina Mehojah (Formerly Trina Jankowsi), Appellants, v. OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
Jane BERRYMAN, Roberta Greenwell, John Wood and Bonnie Cain, Victor Trumbell and Trina Mehojah (Formerly Trina Jankowsi), Appellants,
v.
OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION, Appellee.
Case Number: 114322
Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 2.
Decided: November 7, 2016
Mandate Issued: December 14, 2016
Wes Johnston, JOHNSTON & ASSOCIATES, Chickasha, Oklahoma, for Appellants
Robert J. Campbell, Jr., DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellee
DEBORAH B. BARNES, JUDGE:
¶ 1 Appellants seek review of a final order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) denying their request for reimbursement from the Petroleum Storage Tank Indemnity Fund (Indemnity Fund). Based on our review, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 In January 2013, Appellants filed an application for reimbursement from the Indemnity Fund. Appellants sought payment from the Indemnity Fund in the amount of $750,000 for damages sustained as a result of a petroleum leak (or leaks) as reflected in a judgment rendered in a district court action, following settlement, against the owner of a
gasoline station. Appellants' application was not approved, and Appellants commenced a formal proceeding before the OCC.
¶ 3 After a hearing conducted before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) over the course of nine days in the spring of 2013, the ALJ denied Appellants' application. As stated in the ALJ's report, Appellants "filed an application seeking reimbursement for property and personal injuries sustained as a result of a confirmed release from the site of an old retail gasoline station." Among other alleged damages, damage occurred to the home of one of the Appellants when her home "exploded and burned" in October 2007. This "explosion was later determined to be caused by vapor in a water well where free product was floating on top of the water in the well," and this free product accumulated in the well at least in part due to the well's proximity to an underground petroleum storage tank located at the gasoline station.
¶ 4 The ALJ denied the application because, among other things, the cap on available funds for the release had already been reached. In addition, the ALJ found unpersuasive Appellants' argument that the cap for a single occurrence does not apply in this case because the damage was the result of at least two occurrences rather than just one.
¶ 5 After hearing arguments of counsel, and after reviewing the record, the Referee recommended that the report of the ALJ be affirmed, and, in September 2015, the OCC entered its Final Order "find[ing] that the recommendation of the ALJ to deny the relief requested by [Appellants] should be affirmed as recommended by the Referee."
¶ 6 From the Final Order of the OCC, Appellants appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 7 Regarding the appropriate standard of review this Court must apply on appeal, the Oklahoma Constitution provides as follows:
The Supreme Court's review of appealable orders of the Corporation Commission shall be judicial only, and in all appeals involving an asserted violation of any right of the parties under the Constitution of the United States [or] the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, the Court shall exercise its own independent judgment as to both the law and the facts. In all other appeals from orders of the Corporation Commission the review by the Supreme Court shall not extend further than to determine whether the Commission has regularly pursued its authority, and whether the findings and conclusions of the Commission are sustained by the law and substantial evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court shall enter judgment, either affirming or reversing the order of the Commission appealed from.
Okla. Const. art. 9, 20.
¶ 8 Regarding review of issues of fact and the meaning of "substantial evidence," the Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated:
The [OCC] has a wide discretion in the performance of its statutory duties, and this Court may not substitute its judgment upon disputed factual determinations for that of the [OCC] but is restricted to a determination of substantial evidentiary support for the order issued under authority of the statutes. Searching a record for substantial evidence supporting the order appealed does not entail a comparison of the parties' evidence to determine that which is most convincing but only that the evidence supportive of the order be considered to determine whether it implies a quality of proof inducing a conviction that the evidence furnished a substantial basis of facts from which the issue could be reasonably resolved. Substantial evidence has been additionally outlined as something more than a scintilla; possessing something of substance and of relevant consequence carrying with it a fitness to induce conviction, but remains such that reasonable persons may fairly differ on the point of establishing the case. A determination of substantial evidentiary support does not require weighing the evidence but only a measurement of the supportive points to determine whether the criterion of substantiality is present.
Sundown Energy, L.P. v. Harding & Shelton, Inc. , 2010 OK 88, ¶ 9, 245 P.3d 1226 (citations omitted).
¶ 9 Furthermore, "[i]n cases involving questions of law relating to statutory interpretation, the appropriate standard of review is de novo , i.e., a non-deferential, plenary and independent review of the trial court's legal rulings." Hubbard v. Kaiser–Francis Oil Co. , 2011 OK 50,¶ 6, 256 P.3d 69 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
[G]reat weight is accorded the expertise of an administrative agency. On review, a presumption of validity attaches to the exercise of expertise. An appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of an agency, particularly in the area of expertise which the agency supervises.
However, an administrative agency order interpreting law is reviewed using a de novo standard. It has been noted that an administrative agency's statutory interpretation must be reasonable, and the agency cannot extend its power beyond that granted by statute.
In re Protest to Certificate of Title Brand Issued to AAAA Wrecker Serv., Inc. , 2010 OK CIV APP 121, ¶¶ 9–10, 242 P.3d 578 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. The Oklahoma Petroleum Storage Tank Release Indemnity Program
¶ 10 The Oklahoma Legislature created the Petroleum Storage Tank Release Indemnity Program (Indemnity Program) in 1989. State ex rel. Okla. Corp. Comm'n v. McPherson , 2010 OK 31, ¶ 2, 232 P.3d 458. The McPherson Court explained that, as a general matter,
[t]he Indemnity Program included the [Indemnity Fund] to pay statutorily specified expenses related to rehabilitating sites polluted by petroleum from petroleum storage tank systems. 17 O.S. 352(5), 353. The [OCC] has jurisdiction over the [Indemnity Fund] and [Indemnity Program]. 17 O.S. 2001 52.
McPherson , ¶ 2 (footnotes omitted). A first impression issue presented on this appeal is whether the Indemnity Program authorizes reimbursement for actual physical damages and medical injuries caused by an eligible release, or whether reimbursement for such damages and injuries is limited to those that occur as a result of remediation efforts.
¶ 11 The Indemnity Program provides that "any person entitled to reimbursement pursuant to the provisions of this act shall be reimbursed for certain allowable costs in connection with such corrective action, subject to the conditions specified by this act." 17 O.S. 2011 351(B) (footnote omitted). To be eligible for reimbursement, one must first of all be an "eligible person." The definition of "eligible person" includes, among other things, a "person who is an impacted party[ or] adjacent owner ... who willingly submits to the regulations of the [OCC] governing petroleum storage tank system owners, operators or agents[.]" Id . 352(6)(d). An "impacted party" is defined as
an owner whose property has been impacted by a release from an on-site or off-site petroleum storage tank which the impacted person did not own or operate and for which the impacted person has had no responsibility under Commission rules. An impacted party may apply for an eligibility determination on reimbursement from the [Indemnity Fund]. An impacted party is not subject to the [Indemnity Fund] deductible[.]1
Id . 352(9).2 In addition, an "eligible release" is defined as "a release for which allowable
costs, as determined by the Administrator, are reimbursable to or on behalf of an eligible person[.]" Id . 352(8).
¶ 12 In this case, the ALJ concluded Appellants are "[c]learly ... 'impacted parties' under the statute" in relation to the eligible release from the gasoline station. However, despite statutory language providing for reimbursement for "actual physical damage caused by an eligible release" and for "medical injuries incurred as a result of the eligible release," id . 356(I), the ALJ (and the Referee)...
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