Bess v. State, 76234
Decision Date | 04 May 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 76234,76234 |
Citation | 369 S.E.2d 784,187 Ga.App. 185 |
Parties | BESS v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Michael S. Bennett, C. Richard Williams, Jr., Valdosta, for appellant.
H. Lamar Cole, Dist. Atty., Robert T. Gilchrist, David Miller, Stephen J. Pearsall, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty of two counts of aggravated child molestation, one count of statutory rape, and one count of child molestation. Appellant appeals from the judgments of conviction and sentences entered on the jury's verdicts.
1. Hillman v. State, 184 Ga.App. 712(1) 362 S.E.2d 417 (1987). In response to appellant's Batson motion, the trial court ruled that a prima facie case of racial discrimination had been made and it then asked that the prosecuting attorney give an explanation for her exercise of peremptory strikes to remove eight of nine potential jurors who were black. After hearing the prosecuting attorney's explanations for striking the eight black potential jurors, the trial court found no Batson violation, holding that the explanations which had been offered were of sufficient racial neutrality so as to rebut appellant's prima facie case of racial discrimination. Appellant enumerates the trial court's ruling in this regard as error.
Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 327(5), 357 S.E.2d 792 (1987). Appellant's prima facie case was not a weak one. As noted, of the forty-two prospective jurors nine were black and, of those nine, all but one was eliminated by peremptory strikes. Accordingly, our review of the trial court's acceptance of the prosecuting attorney's reasons for using her peremptory strikes to eliminate eight black prospective jurors must be from the perspective of a relatively strong prima facie case of racial discrimination in the employment of those strikes.
On appeal, appellant concedes that it is only as to seven of the eight black prospective jurors who were eliminated that he questions the trial court's finding of a racially neutral explanation. Killens v. State, 184 Ga.App. 717, 719(2), 362 S.E.2d 425 (1987). That the prosecuting attorney in this case used peremptory strikes to eliminate two of the seven black veniremen in question because they stated that they knew appellant is a racially neutral justification and the trial court was authorized so to find. See McCormick v. State, 184 Ga.App. 687, 688, 362 S.E.2d 472 (1987). Likewise, the trial court's acceptance as a sufficient explanation that another black venireman had been stricken from the jury because there was reason to believe that he might have been the subject of a criminal investigation was not error. See McCormick v. State, supra at 689, 362 S.E.2d 472. Three of the black female veniremen were stricken from the jury on the basis that, in the opinion of the prosecuting attorney, they would be "good" jurors to serve in certain other criminal cases which might possibly be reached during the period of their jury duty. Specifically, the prosecuting attorney expressed a belief that, because of their apparent conservative nature, two of the women would be more "appropriate" jurors, from the State's point of view, in a drug case wherein the defendant was a black female, whereas it was believed that the third, who lived in a high crime area, would be a better juror in upcoming cases which dealt with drugs and stolen property. In addition, the prosecuting attorney felt that the third female, as the result of her age, might be exceptionally offended by the nature of the testimony in this case. For purposes of rebutting a Batson prima facie case, those reasons are all sufficiently racially neutral and the trial court was authorized to make such finding. See generally Hillman v. State, supra. "The trial court's findings are, of course, entitled to 'great deference,' [cit.], and will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous." Gamble v. State, supra 257 Ga. at 327, 357 S.E.2d 792. Under this standard, we find that, as to these six prospective jurors in question, the prosecuting attorney's reasons were racially neutral and we affirm the trial court's findings that, as to them, appellant's prima facie case of racial discrimination was rebutted.
It is the explanation given as to the seventh black prospective juror which presented the trial court the most difficulty and which, on appeal, has likewise given us the most concern. This prospective juror was a black female and the reason given for the use of a peremptory strike to remove her from appellant's jury was that she was over forty and had no children. The prosecuting attorney was of the opinion that, from the State's point of view, a childless female who was past her prime child-bearing years would not necessarily be an appropriate juror to serve in a case, such as this, wherein the alleged victim was a child. Our review of the record indicates that this ostensibly racially neutral explanation is weak, not on the merits of the explanation itself but on the existence of a factual premise to support the applicability of that explanation to the prospective juror. There is no affirmative support in the record for the conclusion that this prospective juror was childless. The prosecuting attorney apparently based her assumption that the prospective juror had no children merely on the fact that the juror was presently single. However, it would not necessarily follow from the fact that the prospective juror was presently single that she was also presently childless. Moreover, there is some doubt whether the marital status of the prospective juror as a single woman was itself a valid assumption on the part of the prosecuting attorney. However, the law provides that a prosecuting attorney's explanation, even if it is based upon mistake or ignorance, may be sufficient to rebut a prima facie Batson showing (see Killens v. State, supra), so long as it is not " ' "whimsical or fanciful" ' " but is Gamble v. State, supra at 327(5), 357 S.E.2d 792. In this case, there is no contention that anything in the record would show that the prospective juror was not childless. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the explanation or, even if based upon mistake or ignorance, was whimsical or fanciful. Compare Gamble v. State, supra. Moreover, in response to an inquiry from the trial court, the prosecuting attorney stated that a childless white female of similar age would have been stricken in this case and there is nothing to indicate that this is not true. Compare Gamble v. State, supra. Accordingly, we hold that, notwithstanding the relatively "weak explanation" given for striking this particular juror, it was sufficient and that the trial court did not err in concluding that, as to all black prospective jurors eliminated by peremptory strikes, the State rebutted appellant's prima facie Batson showing. "A court charged with the duty of determining whether the prosecut[ing attorney] has rebutted a prima facie case may be less troubled by one relatively weak explanation for striking a black juror when all the remaining explanations are persuasive than where several of the prosecutor's proffered justifications are questionable." Gamble v. State, supra at 327(5), 357 S.E.2d 792. McCormick v. State, 184 Ga.App. supra at 688, 362 S.E.2d 472.
2. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
McGlohon v. State
...with the party/victim closer in age to the juror's own age. Strozier v. Clark, 206 Ga.App. 85, 87, 424 S.E.2d 368; Bess v. State, 187 Ga.App. 185, 186-187, 369 S.E.2d 784. Age, however, was only one of the reasons offered for this strike. McGlohon also asserted that he struck this woman bec......
-
Gardner v. State, A97A0412
...v. State, 266 Ga. 568, 570, 468 S.E.2d 751 (1996); Crawford v. State, 220 Ga.App. 786, 788, 470 S.E.2d 323 (1996); Bess v. State, 187 Ga.App. 185, 369 S.E.2d 784 (1988).3 Although a challenge under Batson or McCollum may be raised for the improper use of strikes based on gender, as well as ......
-
Cook v. State
...673) ((1987)).' (Punctuation omitted.) Glanton v. State, 189 Ga.App. 505, 506-507 (376 SE2d 386) (1988). See also Bess v. State, 187 Ga.App. 185(1) (369 SE2d 784) (1988)." Kincey v. State, 191 Ga.App. 300(1), 381 S.E.2d In the case sub judice, we find no abuse in the trial court's determina......
-
Kincey v. State
...[ (1987) ]." (Punctuation omitted.) Glanton v. State, 189 Ga.App. 505, 506-507, 376 S.E.2d 386 (1988). See also Bess v. State, 187 Ga.App. 185 (1), 369 S.E.2d 784 (1988). Applying this standard, we agree that the trial court correctly found that the State presented legitimate reasons for ex......