Bessey v. Salemme
Decision Date | 31 January 1939 |
Citation | 19 N.E.2d 75,302 Mass. 188 |
Parties | ADRIAN E. BESSEY, administrator, v. FRANK SALEMME. ADRIAN E. BESSEY, administrator, v. SAME. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
May 6, 1938.
Present: LUMMUS QUA, DOLAN, & COX, JJ.
Negligence Imputed, Guest, Motor vehicle, In use of way, Contributory Due care of child. Parent and Child. Practice, Civil Requests, rulings and instructions.
A finding that the operator of a six ton motor truck was negligent was warranted by evidence that he drove it down grade at the rate of forty to forty-five miles an hour at about the center of a twenty-five foot road toward two approaching vehicles with one of which he collided as it turned out to its left from behind the other.
Evidence merely that occupants of an automobile did nothing when the operator, because of the sudden stopping of another automobile directly in front, turned quickly to the left into the path of a rapidly approaching truck, thus causing an instant collision, did not require a ruling that they were guilty of contributory negligence.
A request for an instruction to the jury that the "evidence indicates" a certain fact, and that, if they "so find" there could be no recovery, properly was refused as seeking an instruction in violation of G.L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 231, Section 81.
There was no evidence warranting a finding of contributory negligence of a boy nine years of age injured in a collision of motor vehicles in one of which he was riding where it appeared merely that he was "just sitting" on the rear seat with his mother.
A boy nine years of age riding in an automobile operated by his father when he sustained an injury in a collision with a motor truck caused by negligence of both operators was old enough to care for himself, and the father's negligence was not imputable to him so as to bar his action against the operator of the truck.
A guest in a private vehicle, capable of exercising care for his own safety and not in a relationship with the driver of agency or participant in a joint enterprise, if himself not contributorily negligent, either in surrendering care of himself to the driver or in any other particular, is not barred from recovery against a third person for injuries due to concurrent negligence of the driver and the third person.
THREE ACTIONS OF TORT. Writs in the Superior Court dated August 25, 1932.
The actions were tried together before Donahue, J. In the first action the defendant asked for the following rulings:
In the second action the defendant asked for the following ruling:
In the third action, the defendant asked for the following ruling:
In his charge, the judge instructed the jury:
There were verdicts for the plaintiffs respectively as follows: for the plaintiff in each of the first two actions in the sum of $1 for causing conscious suffering and of $3,000 for causing death; and for the plaintiff in the third action in the sum of $3,500.
The defendant alleged exceptions, among other things, to the refusal to give the rulings above set out; to the "charge there is no evidence that either of the passengers had surrendered their care to that of the driver"; that "although Bessey was negligent the passengers may recover"; "that there was no evidence of John Bessey's negligence and he could recover if the defendant was negligent."
J. F. Cavanagh, for the defendant. E. Martin, for the plaintiffs.
These are three actions of tort, which were tried together, arising out of a collision of an automobile operated by Prince M. Bessey hereinafter referred to as Bessey, with a motor truck operated by the defendant.
The plaintiff administrator's intestates, John A. Bessey and Persis M. Bessey, son and wife respectively of Bessey, and the plaintiff Berry were passengers in the Bessey automobile. There was a verdict for the plaintiff in each case.
The jury could have found that the Bessey automobile was travelling westerly and up-grade at a speed of from twenty to twenty-five miles an hour on a road, the travelled part of which was twenty-five feet wide, when an automobile that was preceding it at a distance of from twenty to thirty feet, stopped suddenly. Bessey turned to his left to avoid a collision. The truck, operated by the defendant and weighing close to six tons, was approaching on the down-grade. At a point distant five hundred to seven hundred feet from where the collision occurred, the truck had passed an automobile travelling in the same direction, and continued on at a speed of from forty to forty-five miles an hour in "about" the center of the road; "It did not get back in line." The evidence warranted a finding that Bessey was negligent in the operation of the automobile.
The defendant's first exception is to the refusal of the trial judge to allow in each case a motion for a directed verdict for the defendant, and he has argued that it should have been allowed on the ground that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant that was a contributory cause of the collision. We think there was no error. The jury could have found actionable negligence on the part of the defendant in the manner of his operation of the truck, as to its position on the road, and the rate of speed. Wall v. King, 280 Mass. 577 . Mazmanian v. Kuken, 285 Mass. 516 . G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 89, Section 1; c. 90, Section 17. The cases are distinguishable from Baker v. Davis, 299 Mass. 345 .
There was no error in the refusal to give the defendant's requests which called for rulings, as matter of law, that the intestates and Mrs. Berry were guilty of contributory negligence. Even if, under Rule 71 of the Superior Court (1932), the point had been properly raised by a motion (see Carp v. Kaplan, 251 Mass. 225 , 228; Bernier v. Pittsfield Coal Gas Co. 257 Mass. 188, 190; compare Bray v.
Hickman, 263 Mass. 409 , 416, 417), it could not have been sustained. The plaintiff Berry was riding in the front seat on Bessey's right, with a seven-year-old Bessey child seated in her lap. She testified that, when the automobile ahead came to an abrupt stop, Bessey turned to the left to pass ; that she first saw the truck as Bessey "turned out to go by this car" when it was "once and a half the length of the court room distance"; that Bessey had all the privileges of a driver to drive the automobile and that she paid attention to what he was doing; that when she saw him turn out and when she saw the truck, she said nothing; that she did not anticipate there would be an accident because it happened so quickly, "You wouldn't have time to breathe hardly, wouldn't have time to think or wonder...
To continue reading
Request your trial