Beta Alpha Shelter of Delta Tau Delta Fraternity, Inc. v. Strain

• Decision Date: 24 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 1-782A193,1-782A193
• Citation: 446 N.E.2d 626
• Parties: BETA ALPHA SHELTER OF DELTA TAU DELTA FRATERNITY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wm. J. STRAIN, d/b/a Wm. J. Strain, A.I.A., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 626

446 N.E.2d 626

BETA ALPHA SHELTER OF DELTA TAU DELTA FRATERNITY, INC. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wm. J. STRAIN, d/b/a Wm. J. Strain, A.I.A., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-782A193.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

First District.

March 24, 1983.

Terry Noffsinger, Noffsinger & Deig, Evansville, for plaintiff-appellant.

Arthur P. Kalleres, Joseph A. Schenk, Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, for defendant-appellee.

RATLIFF, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant Beta Alpha Shelter of the Delta Tau Delta Fraternity, Incorporated (fraternity) appeals from a negative judgment of the Monroe Superior Court in an action for damages resulting from the installation of a heating and cooling system. We affirm.

FACTS ¹

On or about March 19, 1964, appellee William J. Strain d/b/a William J. Strain, A.I.A., (Strain) contracted with the fraternity to provide certain services for the construction of a new fraternity house on the Bloomington campus of Indiana University. The building was substantially completed on March 10, 1965. Subsequent problems with the heating and cooling system resulted in the filing of the fraternity's first complaint on March 18, 1970, alleging that the system was negligently installed and that Strain issued a final certificate of completion when he knew or should have known of the negligent manner of installation. On November 1, 1971, William J. Strain died. His wife, as executrix of his estate, was substituted as the party defendant (hereinafter also referred to as Strain). In the summer of 1972, Ramon L. Stair, an architect with specialized experience in heating and cooling systems, was requested by the fraternity to inspect the heating and cooling system. In a written report dated October 3, 1972, in an oral presentation to the fraternity on October 31, 1972, and in his deposition on June 26, 1979, Mr. Stair indicated that the problem with the fraternity's heating and air-conditioning system was a result of improper design rather than improper construction. Stair's written report was furnished as an attachment to plaintiff's answers to interrogatories filed on October 18, 1974. On November 28, 1975, fraternity moved to supplement its complaint by attaching thereto a copy of the contract between Strain and the fraternity and a copy of the contract between John C. Owens and Associates for the drafting of the heating and ventilating plans and specifications. That motion was granted. On October 2, 1978, fraternity, with leave of court, filed an amended complaint adding a count for breach of implied warranty of habitability against all defendants. ² On June 22, 1979, fraternity filed a trial brief asserting that the issues to be tried included the question of negligent design. On or about July 2, 1979, Strain made an oral motion in limine seeking to prevent the introduction of any evidence tending to show negligence in the design of the heating and air-conditioning system. The court granted Strain's motion in limine. Then, on April 8, 1980, fraternity filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint to add an allegation of design error. That motion was denied by the trial court. The stipulated facts expressly indicate that there is no evidence of either negligent installation or a breach of implied warranty of habitability. The Monroe Superior Court entered a judgment against the fraternity on both counts of its amended complaint. From this judgment fraternity now appeals.

ISSUES

Fraternity presents six issues for review by this court. Combined and rephrased they are as follows:

1. Did the trial court err in granting Strain's oral motion in limine?

2. Did the trial court err in denying fraternity's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint?

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Issue One

Prior to trial Strain moved to exclude any evidence tending to show a design defect in the heating and cooling system. Appellant fraternity argues that the trial court erred in granting Strain's motion in limine because Strain had sufficient notice of the claimed allegation of design defect. Appellee Strain argues that the grant of a motion in limine is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and furthermore, that no sufficient notice was given by the complaint upon which appellant could base a claim of design defect. Neither party is wholly correct.

We initially note that motions in limine are designed to keep prejudicial matter from the jury. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. Pounds, (1981) Ind.App., 426 N.E.2d 45, 47, trans. denied; Baldwin v. Inter City Contractors Service, Inc., (1973) 156 Ind.App. 497, 501, 297 N.E.2d 831, 834, trans. denied (1974). The instant case was tried to the court. No jury was present. As the court in Baldwin noted, the granting of a motion in limine in a bench trial is error. Id. However, it is not error which mandates a reversal. In order to demonstrate reversible error, the complaining party must show both an erroneous ruling and prejudice resulting therefrom. Cunningham v. Cunningham, (1982) Ind.App., 430 N.E.2d 809, 813. Fraternity does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from the court's grant of the motion in limine. It is well settled that this court will not presume prejudice. Atwood v. Prairie Village, Inc., (1980) Ind.App., 401 N.E.2d 97, 100. Absent such a showing, this court will not disturb the ruling of the trial court.

While it may have been error to grant a motion in limine in a trial to the court, it is clear that the trial court by its grant of the motion was merely stating its conclusion that the fraternity had not given sufficient notice of its design defect claim in order to proceed with such at trial. The trial court, therefore, excluded any evidence of design error. The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Clouse v. Fielder, (1982) Ind.App., 431 N.E.2d 148, 155; Smith v. Crouse-Hinds Co., (1978) 175 Ind.App. 679, 373 N.E.2d 923, 926, trans. denied (1979). The trial court will be reversed for an abuse of discretion in excluding evidence ³ only upon a showing that the court's action is clearly erroneous and against the facts and circumstances before the court and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Rust v. Guinn, (1981) Ind.App., 429 N.E.2d 299, 305, trans. denied. In order to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing the evidence of design defect, we must first look to whether there was adequate notice to appellee Strain regarding fraternity's allegation of design defect.

We begin by noting that in Indiana a complaint need only state the operative facts involved in a cause of action. ⁴ State v. Rankin, (1973) 260 Ind. 228, 230-31, 294 N.E.2d 604, 606; F.W. Means & Co. v. Carstens, (1981) Ind.App., 428 N.E.2d 251, 262, trans. denied; B & D Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., (1979) Ind.App., 387 N.E.2d 476, 481, trans. denied. This is commonly described as notice pleading. F.W. Means. "The rules do not require that the complaint state all the elements of a cause of action." Rankin, (Emphasis in the original.). Also, while a statement of the theory at trial is highly desirable, it is not required. Id. With this in mind, we turn then to the facts of the instant case. Fraternity claims that its complaint was sufficient to put Strain on notice that it intended to include an allegation of design defect. We disagree. Fraternity's amended complaint alleged that the installation of the system was negligently performed ⁵ and that Strain was negligent in accepting work which he knew or should have known was incorrectly installed. It also alleged a violation of the implied warranty of habitability. Nowhere did the complaint in any manner allude to defects in design.

Appellant also argues that allegations of defective design are necessarily included within the language of the complaint. ⁶ Fraternity's contention is not well taken. Notwithstanding our supreme court's declarations in Rankin, we hold that where the plaintiff's complaint expressly sets forth its theories and facts in support thereof, the defendant may properly rely upon them in preparing for trial. We note that none of the facts asserted in the complaint gives rise to an inference that the complaint was to subsume a cause of action for defective design. In fact, the operative facts, as set out in the complaint, expressly negate any inference that design defect was to be relied upon at trial. ⁷

Appellant further argues that its answers to interrogatories were sufficient to provide Strain with notice of its intent to argue defective design at trial. Again, we cannot agree with appellant's contention. We recognize that in determining whether a complaint adequately notifies the defendant of matters to be litigated, the court can look beyond the pleadings. See, e.g., Rankin. This may include looking to the fruits of discovery. Id. In the instant case, the report of Ramon L. Stair was appended to the plaintiff's answers to interrogatories. It states that "[Stair] would have designed the air systems considerably larger than the systems that exist in the building." Record at 42. Plaintiff's answer to interrogatory number six states substantially the same thing. While this may in some cases have been sufficient to provide notice, we note that in the instant case the supplemental complaint and first amended complaint were filed subsequent to the plaintiff's answers to interrogatories. The amended complaint raised implied warranty of habitability as a new theory. It did not include design defect as a new theory. By amending its complaint to include the implied warranty theory subsequent to the filing of its answers to interrogatories, the fraternity in essence indicated that it did not intend to rely upon defective design as a theory at trial. As we held above, the defendant in such cases has a right to rely upon the plaintiff's allegations, especially where the plaintiff utilizes the opportunity...