Smith v. Crouse-Hinds Co., CROUSE-HINDS
| Decision Date | 15 August 1979 |
| Docket Number | CROUSE-HINDS,No. 3-575A89,3-575A89 |
| Parties | Willie SMITH, Appellant, v.CO., Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
I dissent to the denial of the petition to transfer in this cause for the reason that the Court of Appeals has overlooked the crucial evidentiary rule of relevancy. I agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that when physical evidence connected to the issues in the case is offered, the "authenticity of the exhibit must be established," normally by way of "prefatory evidence identifying the exhibit as the object involved in the incident." Smith v. Crouse-Hinds Co. (1978) Ind.App., 373 N.E.2d 923, 926.
However, in addition to showing that the object was involved in the incident, the plaintiff must also demonstrate, under principles of relevancy, that the evidence is reasonably connected to the malfeasance or misfeasance charged to the defendant. In Storckman v. Keller (1968) 143 Ind.App. 43, 237 N.E.2d 602, the plaintiff brought an action on the theory that the defendant had replaced three cap screws on the steering mechanism of an automobile with three smaller bolts and nuts of insufficient tensile strength. When the bolts sheared, the steering became inoperable, resulting in a crash and injury. At trial, plaintiff attempted to introduce in evidence a bolt allegedly taken from the automobile's frame. The Court of Appeals correctly upheld the trial court's exclusion of the evidence, observing that it was never established that the bolt was part of the steering mechanism at the time of the accident or even that it came from the same automobile.
Hence, in the case at bar, Smith not only had to demonstrate that the pin caused the explosion but also that the pin came from a Crouse-Hinds switch. Smith has totally failed in this regard. It is undisputed that Smith has offered no evidence whatsoever of any missing pins from Crouse-Hinds switches located above the soap tank, above the boxes of soap or in the entire plant. Indeed, plaintiff's witness George Johnson, the Control Manager for Marbon...
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