Bethea v. State

• Citation: 319 So.3d 666
• Decision Date: 02 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 4D21-98,4D21-98
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Parties: Jeremy Scott BETHEA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

319 So.3d 666

Jeremy Scott BETHEA, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D21-98

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[June 2, 2021]

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Logan T. Mohs, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Paul Patti, III, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Gross, J.

After a jury trial, Jeremy Bethea was convicted of battery, in violation of section 784.03(1), Florida Statutes (2018). The trial court converted that conviction into a domestic violence conviction. See §§ 741.28, 741.283, Fla. Stat. (2018).

We reverse the domestic violence designation of the conviction because that issue was not submitted to the jury. We also write to address appellant's challenge to a Stand Your Ground immunity hearing.

The Trial Court's Designation of the Battery Conviction as One of Domestic Violence Was Improper Since Fact Issues Pertaining to the Designation Were Not Submitted to the Jury

Appellant was charged with battery (domestic) in violation of sections 784.03(1) and 741.283, Florida Statutes (2018). Section 741.283 establishes minimum terms of imprisonment for those "adjudicated guilty of a crime of domestic violence, as defined in s. 741.28." The information described the victim as "a family or household member of [Appellant]." See § 741.28, Fla. Stat. (2018).

The trial court's instruction to the jury was as follows:

To prove the crime of battery, the State must prove the following element beyond a reasonable doubt:

[Appellant] actually and intentionally touched or struck [the victim] against her will.

An intentional touching or striking includes situations where a defendant knows that a touch or strike is substantially certain to result from his or her act.

The jury found Appellant guilty of battery as charged.

After the verdict and the dismissal of the jury, the trial court found that the battery was a crime of domestic violence. The court sentenced Appellant to, among other things, 12 months of probation and to serve eight long weekends in the Palm Beach County Jail. The written judgment of conviction contains a checked box, which designates the conviction as one of domestic violence.

Appellant moved to correct four sentencing errors. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2). Appellant argued, among other things, that the judgment and probation order should not have a checkmark indicating a finding of domestic violence. Appellant moved the court to remove the domestic designation in the probation order and in the judgment. The court granted the motion to correct three errors, but denied the part of the motion directed at the portion of the order characterizing the battery as one of domestic violence.

Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), applies to the domestic violence designation in this case. In Alleyne , the Supreme Court held

Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an "element" that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an "element" that must be submitted to the jury.

Id. at 103 (internal citation omitted).

A domestic violence designation under section 741.28(2) triggers mandatory minimum sentences under section 741.283. In this case, the facts necessary to a "domestic violence" designation are (1) a battery, (2) where the victim is a "family or household member" of the defendant, and (3) the battery "result[ed] in physical injury or death" of the victim. § 741.28(2), Fla. Stat. (2018). Section 741.283(1)(a) describes the mandatory minimum sentences for first, second, and third or subsequent domestic violence offenses and requires that the defendant has "intentionally caused bodily harm to another person."

Here, the jury was charged only on misdemeanor battery. It was not asked to make findings regarding bodily harm or injury of the victim or the victim's status as a "family or household member" of Appellant. Under Alleyne , the judge was precluded from making the domestic violence finding on her own.

Applying Gaymon v. State , 288 So. 3d 1087 (Fla. 2020), we remand for resentencing with instructions to empanel a jury to make the "domestic violence" determination, if the State seeks that finding in this case. If the State no longer seeks that finding, the trial court shall enter an amended judgment of conviction and probation order without the domestic violence designation.

The Burden of Proof Error at the Stand Your Ground Immunity Hearing Was Cured by Appellant's Conviction at Trial, Where His Guilt Was Established Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Prior to trial, Appellant filed an amended motion to dismiss based on Florida's Stand Your Ground immunity law. Relying on Jefferson v. State , 264 So. 3d 1019 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018), Appellant argued that a defendant only needs to "simply allege a facially sufficient prima facie claim of justifiable use of force under chapter 776 in a motion to dismiss," and that the defendant is not required to present physical evidence or testimony to support the motion. The trial court concluded that the defense would be required to present some evidence. The defense declined to call any witnesses. The trial court denied Appellant's amended motion to dismiss.

Well after the trial in this case, we decided State v. Cassaday , 315 So. 3d 705, 705–06 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 10, 2021). There, we agreed with the Second District's analysis in Jefferson that " section 776.032(4) merely requires that ‘a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity from criminal prosecution ... be[ ] raised by the defendant at a pretrial immunity hearing,’ not proven." Id. (quoting Jefferson , 264 So. 3d at 1027 ).

"[T]here is no evidentiary burden upon the person seeking Stand Your Ground immunity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "Instead, a defendant must ‘simply allege a facially sufficient prima facie claim of justifiable use of force under chapter 776 in a motion to dismiss filed under rule 3.190(b) and present argument in support of that motion at a pretrial immunity hearing.’ " Id. (quoting Jefferson , 264 So. 3d at 1028–29 ). This court outlined the procedure set forth in Jefferson as follows:

In sum, procedurally, a claim for immunity from criminal prosecution pursuant to section 736.032(4) must first be raised ... by the criminal defendant in a pretrial rule 3.190(b) motion to dismiss. The trial court is then to determine whether, at first glance and assuming all facts as true, the alleged facts set forth in the motion support the elements of self-defense in either section 776.012, 776.013, or 776.031. If the trial court determines that the defendant's claim of self-defense satisfies the requirements set forth in the applicable self-defense statute raised by the accused, the State shall then present clear and convincing evidence to overcome the self-defense claim.

Id. (quoting Jefferson , 264 So. 3d at 1029 ).

When a trial court errs by placing the initial burden of proof on the defendant during a Stand Your Ground immunity pretrial hearing, that error can be cured by "the State establish[ing] the defendant's guilt at trial by proof beyond a reasonable doubt" because "[t]he State's trial burden of overcoming the defendant's self-defense claim by...