Bethel v. Jenkins

• Decision Date: 25 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-3392,19-3392
• Citation: 988 F.3d 931
• Parties: Robert W. BETHEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charlotte JENKINS, Warden; Michael Allen Eiring, Lieutenant; Timothy Shoop, Warden, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

988 F.3d 931

Robert W. BETHEL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Charlotte JENKINS, Warden; Michael Allen Eiring, Lieutenant; Timothy Shoop, Warden, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-3392

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: February 25, 2021

ON BRIEF: Mindy Worly, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. Robert W. Bethel, Chillicothe, Ohio, pro se.

Before: BATCHELDER, CLAY, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Robert W. Bethel, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants, Warden Charlotte Jenkins, Lieutenant Michael Allen Eiring, and Warden Timothy Shoop, former and current officials at Chillicothe Correctional Institution ("CCI"). On appeal, Bethel argues that the district court erred by (1) finding that CCI's policy—prohibiting inmates from receiving packages ordered by third parties from unapproved vendors—did not violate his First Amendment right to free speech pursuant to Turner v. Safley , 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) ; (2) finding that he had no protected interest under procedural due process that was violated by the policy and that Bethel received sufficient process; and (3) determining that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and failing to find that Defendants violated Bethel's clearly established rights. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.

BACKGROUND

Bethel is presently incarcerated at CCI in Chillicothe, Ohio, serving a capital sentence. On February 6, 2015, pursuant to Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections ("ODRC") Policy 61-PRP-01, Defendants Jenkins and Eiring implemented a policy at CCI prohibiting "orders for printed material placed by third parties through unapproved vendors." (R. 68-5, Jenkins Decl. at PageID # 1398; R. 67-1, Eiring Mem. at PageID # 1080–81.) An inmate's family or friends could only place orders on their behalf through an approved vendor, and any orders from unapproved vendors had to "be initiated by the inmate and approved by CCI staff." (R. 67-1, Eiring Mem. at PageID # 1081.) And in the event that "an inmate [was] sent a package from an unapproved source," the inmate had "the option of returning the package to the vendor at the inmate's expense or having the package destroyed." (Id. ) Pursuant to this policy, between March 2015 and June 2015, Defendants withheld four books from Bethel on the grounds that they were not ordered by Bethel, and Bethel received notice explaining why the books were being withheld and offering him the option of having the books mailed back or destroyed.

On multiple occasions, Bethel tried to appeal the withholding decision by requesting a Form DRC 4147 from Eiring, who explained that the books were withheld because they were not ordered by Bethel through his institutional account and, had they been withheld based on content, he could receive a Form DRC 4147. Bethel also used the prison's internal communication system to ask Eiring and mailroom staff whether his books were withheld because they believed the books were not from a distributor or because the books were deemed to pose a security threat to CCI. Both Eiring and a mailroom employee responded that the books were withheld because they were not ordered by Bethel from his institutional account.

Bethel later learned from Gary Otte and Freddie McNeill, also incarcerated at CCI, that they had both ordered and received religious books, which were initially withheld for being ordered by a third party but were then intercepted by the chaplain for review of their religious content. The CCI Chaplain confirmed this occurrence, informing Bethel that Defendants were allowing violations of the policy by permitting the chaplain to screen religious printed materials ordered by third parties that would otherwise be withheld and then to give those materials to the inmates for whom they were intended.

Bethel proceeded to file a grievance against Eiring and multiple informal complaint resolutions, requesting that CCI stop implementing this policy and that he be reimbursed for the postage he purchased to return the books that were withheld. His grievance was denied on the ground that the book was ordered by a third party from an unapproved vendor, in violation of ODRC policy, on which Bethel had received a memorandum. Bethel continued to file grievances on the same grounds, which were similarly denied and affirmed on appeal to the Chief Inspector.

Bethel filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Jenkins and Eiring for violating his constitutional rights under the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment as well as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in implementing and enforcing this policy. He sued Defendants in their individual and official capacities and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and nominal damages. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, which, upon the recommendation of a magistrate judge, was granted by the district court. We affirmed the dismissal of the Establishment Clause claim but reversed the dismissal of the Free Speech and Procedural Due Process claims, finding that Bethel had sufficiently alleged these claims.¹ Bethel v. Jenkins , No. 16-4185, 2017 WL 4863118, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 22, 2017).

On remand, Bethel filed an amended complaint, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages against Defendants for free speech and due process violations. He alleged that (1) Defendants violated his right to free speech by preventing him from receiving printed materials ordered by third parties pursuant to CCI policy and by allowing for violation of the policy for religious materials; and (2) Defendants violated his right to procedural due process by withholding these books and denying his requests to appeal the withholding decisions as well as to receive pre-approval exemption from the policy. Notably, before the first appeal was filed and decided, on March 1, 2017, CCI rescinded the policy and replaced it with one allowing orders for printed materials by a third party from a publisher or distributor.²

Defendants and Bethel both moved for summary judgment on all claims. Defendants argued that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (1) the policy of banning third-party book orders from unapproved vendors was reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of preventing contraband from entering the prison and preserving prison security; (2) the policy was a reasonable regulation on any interest Bethel had in receiving the books and Bethel failed to allege insufficient post-deprivation remedies; and (3) Bethel had not demonstrated that he had a clearly established right to obtain the books withheld.

In his motion for summary judgment, Bethel argued that (1) Ohio law provided him the right to receive publications that do not pose a security threat to the prison and come from a publisher or distributor, and Defendants’ failure to give him notice of the reason for withholding the books and to provide him review of the withholding decisions violated his due process; (2) the policy did not reasonably relate to the legitimate penological interest of preventing contraband from entering the prison; and (3) Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated clearly established state law requiring them to provide Bethel with notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the withheld publications and giving him a right to receive publications that do not pose a security threat.

Based on the recommendation of the magistrate judge, the district court granted summary judgment to Defendants and denied summary judgment to Bethel.³ The district court found that the magistrate judge correctly determined that the "publisher only" policy was neutral and supported by the legitimate penological interest of preventing the entry of contraband into the prison, and there were reasonable alternative means for Bethel to acquire these books. The district court also found that the magistrate judge correctly determined that Bethel received sufficient process following the withholding of his books through written notice, the prison grievance procedure, and the ability to send back the book to the third party. Finally, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities because they did not violate Bethel's clearly established rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

"This Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo ." Moran v. Al Basit LLC , 788 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2015). This includes a district court's determination of qualified immunity. See Daugherty v. Campbell , 935 F.2d 780, 783 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Whether qualified immunity is applicable to an official's actions is a question of law."). Summary judgment will be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit," and a genuine dispute exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

"The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact exist." Rafferty v. Trumbull County , 915 F.3d 1087, 1093 (6th Cir. 2019). Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," although the evidence need not be "in a form that would be admissible at trial."...