Bethel v. Porterfield

• Decision Date: 19 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. CV102-005.,CV102-005.
• Citation: 293 F.Supp.2d 1307
• Parties: Diane BETHEL, Plaintiff, v. Earl PORTERFIELD, individually and in his official capacity as the Burke County EMA Director or Chief of Burke County EMA; and Burke County, Georgia, through Jimmy Dixon, in his official capacity as Chair of the Burke County Board of Commissioners, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

Page 1307

293 F.Supp.2d 1307

Diane BETHEL, Plaintiff, v. Earl PORTERFIELD, individually and in his official capacity as the Burke County EMA Director or Chief of Burke County EMA; and Burke County, Georgia, through Jimmy Dixon, in his official capacity as Chair of the Burke County Board of Commissioners, Defendants.

No. CV102-005.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division.

December 19, 2003.

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John Paul Batson, Augusta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Mary Anne Ackourey, William H. Buechner, Jr., Freeman, Mathis & Gary, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

BOWEN, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff filed the captioned case asserting claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e—2000e-17, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. (Doc. Nos.1, 4.) Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. (Doc. No. 24.) For reasons stated more fully below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a former employee of the Burke County Emergency Management Agency ("BEMA"), where she worked as an emergency medical technician ("EMT") a firefighter, and a paramedic. (Def. St. Mat. Facts ¶ 1.) Defendant Earl Porterfield ("Porterfield") is the former Chief of BEMA; he served as Chief from January 1987 to May 2002. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was a captain at all relevant times until her demotion in August 1999.¹

This is the second employment discrimination lawsuit Plaintiff has brought against Porterfield. Plaintiff previously filed suit against Porterfield and BEMA in 1999 asserting claims of racial and gender discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. (Id. ¶ 134; Bethel v. Porterfield, CV198-256 (Nov. 8, 1999).)² This Court dismissed BEMA and granted summary judgment in favor of Porterfield on all claims in that suit. (Id. ¶ 135.) The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed the decision in October 2000. (Id. ¶ 136.) The majority of Plaintiff's present allegations arise from events that occurred after Bethel I, but like her previous allegations, Plaintiff again claims that she was the victim of discrimination. Defendants contend, however, that any adverse employment actions Plaintiff suffered were a result of her unsatisfactory behavior and work performance, not discrimination.

A. Events occurring prior to Bethel I

Plaintiff was hired by the Burke County EMS in 1984 and in 1987 began working for BEMA as a firefighter/paramedic. (Id. ¶ 1.) BEMA requires all full time employees who perform firefighting duties to take and pass a Physical Performance Assessment Test ("PPA") once a year.³ (Id. ¶ 85.) Plaintiff had a history of difficulty with the test⁴ and has consistently expressed her opinion that the PPA is not an accurate reflection of fitness for duty. (Pl. St. Mat. Facts ¶ 85.) Plaintiff's experience with the PPA became a focal point of Bethel I. However, because the PPA is also at issue in this case, I will briefly recount some facts related to Plaintiff's history with the test.

In March 1998, Plaintiff filed a grievance with Porterfield expressing concerns about the PPA. (Def. St. Mat. Facts ¶ 127.) In response, Porterfield formed a committee to look into the effectiveness of the wellness program and make recommendations regarding the PPA. (Id.) Unsatisfied with this response, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Burke County Board of Commissioners in April 1998.⁵ (Def. St. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 128, 130.) Then, in May and June 1998, Plaintiff and three other female employees filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that elements of the PPA constituted gender discrimination. Plaintiff claims that Porterfield was angered by her complaints and EEOC charge. She further contends that this became one of many factors that motivated the adverse employment actions taken against her at issue in this case. (Pl. St. Mat. Facts ¶ 131.)

As a result of the grievance filed in March, the schedule for administering the PPA was changed. Prior to 1998, firefighters were required to take the PPA according to a predetermined schedule. (Def. St. Mat. Facts ¶ 87.) Beginning in September 1998, firefighters were randomly selected to perform the PPA through a computer program.⁶ (Id. ¶ 88). Plaintiff alleges that not all employees required to take the PPA did so, and that the names of those taking the test were not selected at random. (Pl. St. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 86, 89-90.)

If an employee failed the PPA, they could retake it within the next two weeks. (Def. St. Mat. Facts ¶ 94.) If the employee did not pass the PPA the second time, he or she would be taken off duty, without pay, for a maximum of thirty days. (Id.) If the employee did not pass the PPA during the thirty day period, he or she would be placed on unpaid leave for a maximum of six months unless there was a suitable position not requiring active firefighting available. (Id.) Defendants claim that to be placed in one of these PPA-exempt positions, the employee had to apply for or notify Porterfield of his or her interest in it. (Id. ¶ 95.) Plaintiff, however, alleges that if an employee was on a leave of absence and a position became available, BEMA was obligated to offer the position to that employee. (Pl. St. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 94, 95.)

Plaintiff was selected to take the PPA in September 1998 and failed it.⁷ (Def. St. Mat. Facts ¶ 96.) Plaintiff told Battalion Chief Clarence Belger and Porterfield that she did not want to retake the PPA (id. ¶¶ 96-97), and she expressed an interest in a position that did not require active firefighting (Pl. St. Mat. Facts ¶ 98). Plaintiff contends that Porterfield did not offer to give her the necessary training that would enable her to move to a position exempt from the PPA, but that he had offered similar training to males. (Id. ¶ 97.) She also contends that Porterfield knew of positions available at that time but did not tell her about them.⁸ (Id. Despite her initial response, Plaintiff retook and passed the PPA a few days later. (Def. St. Mat. Facts ¶ 100.)

Aside from articulating her disdain for the PPA, Plaintiff also has a history of expressing her opinion about other elements of BEMA. One such issue of contention involved a volunteer unit called the Tactical Medical Team ("TMT"), which Porterfield created sometime in 1998. A focal point of Bethel I, the TMT was designed to aid "SWAT" teams in neighboring counties. Plaintiff felt that she and other female employees were not considered for placement on the TMT because of their gender. On November 17, 1998 Plaintiff wrote a letter to the editor of a local newspaper opposing the team. (Id. ¶ 125.) Afterwards, Plaintiff began to feel that she was being retaliated against for publicly expressing her disdain for the TMT (Pl. St. Mat. Facts ¶ 125); and she filed another complaint with the EEOC in December 1998. She then filed her first suit against Porterfield and BEMA in January 1999.

In April 1999, Assistant Chief Rusty Sanders ("Sanders") sent Porterfield a memorandum notifying him of problems Sanders was allegedly experiencing with Plaintiff and recommending that Plaintiff be terminated. (Def. St. Mat. Facts 63, 69.) According to Sanders, Plaintiff accused Lieutenant Dave Willard and Lieutenant Jim White of being involved in a "conspiracy" against her and had "began a defamation ... campaign" against Willard and White that included making derogatory comments about them to others at the station and issuing improper written warnings. (Id. ¶¶ 64-66, 71.) Plaintiff contends that the alleged conspiracy against her was retaliation for filing her discrimination suit and she denies that the alleged incidents reported in Sanders' memorandum occurred. (Pl. St. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 63-67.) The unrest at the station, primarily between Plaintiff and Willard, continued into July 1999; and each issued the other several written warnings during this time. (Def. St. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 72-80.) Although Plaintiff contends that all of her warnings were legitimate and necessary (Pl. St. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 69-80), she acknowledges that she and Willard were engaged in a "nitpicking little war back and forth" (id. ¶ 81). Porterfield concluded that the warnings were a result of a petty personality conflict (Def. St. Mat. Facts ¶ 82), and as a result, did not place the warnings in Plaintiff's or Willard's personnel files and did not consider them when deciding whether Plaintiff or Willard would receive a merit pay increase that became available in late 1999. (Id.)

B. Events occurring after Bethel I

In July 1999, during discovery and depositions for Bethel I, Porterfield learned that Plaintiff allegedly allowed the consumption of alcohol at her station more than once in 1998.⁹ (Id. ¶¶ 8-25.) BEMA prohibits the use and consumption of alcohol on BEMA and Burke County premises (id. ¶ 5), and it is BEMA policy that a supervisor's failure to enforce BEMA rules will result in disciplinary action (id. ¶¶ 5, 6). Although she admits that others consumed alcohol on BEMA premises while in her presence, Plaintiff disputes the factual recollections of Campbell and denies that she allowed alcohol to be consumed on BEMA premises. (Pl. St. Mat. Facts ¶¶ 8-25.)

Through interviews and an investigation, Porterfield attempted to ascertain the accuracy of Campbell's statements and concluded that they were correct. (Def. St. Mat. Facts ¶ 26.) He instructed Plaintiff to meet with him on August 16, 1999 to discuss the allegations and present her version of what happened. (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff's former attorney advised her not to discuss any deposition testimony and to reschedule the meeting so that he could attend. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff sent Porterfield a letter to this effect on August 14 and did not come to work on August 16. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.) Porterfield sent Plaintiff a letter on the 17th instructing her to meet with him on August 24. (Id. ¶ 31.) In that letter, he informed Plaintiff...