Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield
| Decision Date | 20 November 1961 |
| Citation | 178 N.E.2d 10,343 Mass. 223 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | Alfred W. BETTIGOLE and others v. ASSESSORS OF SPRINGFIELD and others. * Henry I. HERCHOVITZ and others v. ASSESSORS OF SPRINGFIELD and others. ** |
Lewis H. Weinstein and Laurence S. Fordham, Boston, for petitioners.
S. Thomas Martinelli, City Sol., John J. O'Connor, Associate City Sol., and Cosmo M. Ansara, Asst. City Sol., Springfield, for respondents.
Before WILKINS, C. J., and WILLIAMS, WHITTEMORE, CUTTER and SPIEGEL, JJ.
These two bills in equity present questions about the validity of the proposed 1961 assessment of property taxes in Springfield. They have been argued together.
The Bettigole case is brought by individual, fiduciary, and corporate owners of multi-family dwellings, commercial real estate, and other property in Springfield which it is alleged 'will be in 1961 and subsequent years * * * deliberately * * * over-valued and over-assessed both in relation to other classes of taxable real estate for which assessed valuations have been established at lower percentages of fair cash value and in relation to the general average or ratio of valuations to fair cash value of taxable real estate in' Springfield. It is alleged that the board of assessors (the board) has for many years established assessed valuations for different classes of real estate in the city at widely differing percentages of the full fair cash value of such real estate and plans to do so for 1961. The bill seeks a declaration as to the 'lawfulness under the Constitution and laws of [t]he Commonwealth of the policy and practice' just described, and also injunctive relief (a) against continuance of this assessment practice by the assessors, and (b) against action to send out bills for, and to collect, the taxes so assessed. The Attorney General has been notified of the proceeding and afforded an opportunity to be heard.
The second case (the Herchovitz case) is a bill by sixteen taxable inhabitants under G.L. c. 40, § 53, 1 to restrain the raising and collection of money by real estate taxation in the manner alleged now to be intended. The allegations closely resemble those in the Bettigole case. Similar injunctive relief is sought and, in the prayer for general relief, a determination under G.L. c. 231A, § 6, is also requested.
Each case was presented in the Superior Court upon a statement of agreed facts, which (apart from paragraphs relating to the procedural aspects of the particular case) is closely similar to the other. Each case was reported without decision upon the pleadings and the statement of agreed facts. The facts are set out below as they appear in the statements of agreed facts.
By August 1, 1961, the board 'had determined the sound value [a term used by the board as equivalent to fair cash value] of each parcel of taxable real estate in the [c]ity as of January 1, 1961, and the fair cash value of the personal property owned by each [taxable] person.' The board had also classified all parcels of real estate into six categories, set out below, and a majority 2 had voted on September 8 and 15, 1961, 'to establish * * * [1961] assessed valuations of all taxable property in the [c]ity by applying the following * * * percentages to the sound value determined by the * * * [board] for the following classes of property,' respectively, viz., (1) single family residences--50%; (2) two family residences--60%; (3) three family residences--65%; (4) four or more family residences--70%; (5) property of public utilities and commercial and industrial properties--85%; (6) farms, vacant land, and other real estate--70%. Personal property subject to local taxation was to be assessed at 85% of the fair cash value thereof previously determined by the board.
ANNEX 'A'
1961
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
% Taxes Taxes based
Applied Based on on 100% of
Sound by Assessed Assessments Sound Value
Class Parcels Value Board Value (at $64.00) (at $42.15)
1 Family 22,005 $266,285,568 50% $133,142,792 $ 8,601,024 $11,223,937
2 Family 6,980 $ 70,700,535 60% $ 42,420,461 $ 2,740,361 $ 2,980,028
3 Family 1,339 $ 13,770,109 65% $ 8,952,735 $ 578,352 $ 580,410
4 or more
Family 1,177 $ 34,999,607 70% $ 24,500,071 $ 1,582,703 $ 1,475,233
------- ------------ ------------ ----------- -----------
Sub-Total 31,501 $385,755,819 $209,016,059 $13,502,440 $16,259,608
------- ------------ ------------ ----------- -----------
Public Utilities
Commercial and
Industrial 2,521 $174,870,514 85% $148,641,060 $ 9,602,217 $ 7,370,792
------- ------------ ------------ ----------- -----------
Farms, Vacant
Land and
Other Real
Estate 8,089 $ 18,058,125 70% $ 12,642,662 $ 816,737 $ 761,150
------- ------------ ------------ ----------- -----------
Total 42,111 $578,684,458 64% $370,299,781 $23,921,394 $24,391,550
------- ------------ ------------ ----------- -----------
Personal (bills)
Property 5,000 $ 36,893,760 85% $ 31,359,700 $ 2,025,836 $ 1,555,072
------- ------------ ------------ ----------- -----------
Grand
Total 47,111 $615,578,218 65.25% $401,659,481 $25,947,230 $25,946,622
------- ------------ ------- ------------ ----------- -----------
'The [b]oard determined assessed valuations for 1960 in substantially the same manner as it intends to use in 1961 and 1962' and the board's 'practice of applying varying percentages of sound or fair cash value of different classes of property in arriving at assessed valuations was deliberate and intentional.' A table (Annex A), made a part of each statement of agreed facts, is reproduced above. It shows, for example, that the fair cash (sound) value of 22,005 parcels of single family residence property was $266,285,568 (col. 3), but that these parcels were assessed at an aggregate of $133,142,792 (col. 5) for only 50% (col. 4) of their fair cash (sound) value. The table indicates that, if all taxable property in the city had been assessed at 100% of fair cash value, these 22,005 parcels would have been subjected to aggregate taxes of $11,223,937 (col. 7) at a tax rate of $42.15 per $1,000 of valuation, whereas they were in fact taxed only $8,601,024 (col. 6) under a tax rate of $64.60. The table also shows that 2,521 parcels of public utility, commercial and industrial properties, assessed at 85% of fair cash value (col. 4), were in fact taxed $9,602,217 (col. 6), whereas, if all taxable property in the city had been assessed at 100% of fair cash value, the aggregate tax on these 2,521 parcels would have been only $7,370,792 (col. 7). This is the most striking comparison revealed by Annex A, and (although this is not done in the statements of agreed facts) its effect can be shown in tabular form (by a simple mathematical calculation from Annex A) as follows:
(A) (B)
Approximate percentage Approximate percentage
of total fair cash of all property
value of all taxable taxes assessed on
property non-uniform basis
22,005 single family
residence parcels 43% 33%
2,521 public utility
commercial and
industrial parcels 28% 37%
It thus appears that 43% of the total fair cash value of taxable property in Springfield is paying only 33% of the property taxes, whereas 28% of the total is paying 37% of the property taxes. The somewhat lesser disparity, produced by the board's assessment method, among various other classes of property is equally susceptible of mathematical demonstration.
By the use of electronic and other machines, the city auditor is able to produce a 'valuation card,' an assessed value and tax card, and a tax bill for (a) each real estate parcel, and (b) the personal property of each owner. On September 19, 1961, the 'valuation cards' based on the sound values of each property had been 'completed' by the application of the percentages (already listed) to the fair cash (sound) values as determined by the board for each class of property, and apparently also for each parcel in each category.
On September 20, 1961, the board announced a 1961 tax rate at $64.60 per thousand. The assessed value and tax cards had not then been produced and the tax list had not been submitted to the board and the board had not committed its tax list or warrant to the collector of taxes. We were told at the arguments on November 6, 1961, that the board had not then committed its warrant to the collector and that no tax bills had then been mailed. The board concedes that it 'intends for 1961, and if the members * * * are in office for 1962, to establish assessed valuations for taxable property * * * by applying the foregoing or similar varying percentages to the sound [fair cash] value of such property as determined by the [b]oard' and that tax bills based upon such assessed valuations and the tax rate announced or to be announced are to be sent out by the collector and collected.
The plaintiffs are owners of properties within the classes of four and more family residences, commercial and industrial properties, and farms, vacant land and other real estate, listed in detail in annexes to the bills. Because 'they own such property * * * [each of the plaintiffs will] pay substantially more in taxes for 1961 if the [board's assessing] practice described * * * [earlier in this opinion] is followed than if the...
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