Betts v. Kempers
| Decision Date | 17 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86CA0920,86CA0920 |
| Citation | 745 P.2d 283 |
| Parties | Lyle E. BETTS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Les KEMPERS, Defendant-Appellee. . III |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Richard L. Kalamaya, P.C., Richard L. Kalamaya, Longmont, for plaintiff-appellant.
Anderson, Campbell and Laugesen, P.C., Robert L. McGahey, Jr., Denver, for defendant-appellee.
Plaintiff, Lyle E. Betts, appeals the summary judgment entered against him in his suit against defendant for personal injuries incurred while he was engaged in construction work on premises owned by defendant. The trial court concluded that plaintiff's suit was barred by the provisions of Colorado's Workmen's Compensation Act (the Act). We agree and affirm.
Defendant owned real property upon which he desired to build a residence for himself. Rather than engaging a general contractor to construct the residence, defendant contracted directly with various firms which, if there had been a general contractor, would have been considered to be subcontractors. One of these firms, which was engaged by defendant to install drywall in the residence, employed plaintiff as a part of its regular work force.
Plaintiff was injured while working on defendant's premises and collected workmen's compensation benefits from his employer. Defendant's homeowner insurance policy also contained provisions insuring defendant against any workmen's compensation liability for which he might become "legally obligated" to pay, but no payment under that coverage was made to plaintiff because defendant's contractor provided such coverage.
After plaintiff instituted this suit against defendant, the district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because it concluded, inter alia, that defendant was plaintiff's statutory employer under § 8-48-102, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 3B) and, thus, was immune from suit by reason of § 8-42-102, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 3B).
Section 8-42-102 provides that an employer who has complied with the provisions of the Act shall not be subject to "any other liability for the death of or personal injury to any employee." This statute, however, does not set forth any tests for determining whether a party is an employer under the Act; it merely applies to a party that, under other provisions of the Act, has "attained the status of an employer." See Great Western Sugar Co. v. Erbes, 148 Colo. 566, 367 P.2d 329 (1961).
There are at least two categories of "statutory employers" that the Act recognizes. One of these classes of statutory employers is created by § 8-48-102(1), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 3B), which provides that an owner of real property, who contracts to have "any work done on and to said property," is to be considered the employer of the contractor and of his employees. However, exempted from this provision is:
"the owner of a private home who contracts out any work done to or about said home...." (emphasis supplied)
Thus, if the work being performed at the time of plaintiff's injuries is considered as being done "to or about" a "private home," defendant fell within this exception to § 8-48-102(1), and he would not be considered to be a statutory employer. If, on the other hand, the structure cannot be considered to be a private home, defendant must be deemed to have been plaintiff's statutory employer and immune from suit under § 8-42-102. We conclude that the uncompleted structure was not a private home under the statute.
At the same time that § 8-48-102 was amended to create the exemption of the...
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Klinker v. Furdiga
...for which the property owners are serving as general contractors but where they do not yet reside. Defendants point to Betts v. Kempers, 745 P.2d 283 (Colo.App.1987), for the proposition that a court must examine the nature of the project at issue to determine whether private homeowners act......
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Colorado AFL-CIO v. Donlon, AFL-CIO
...at the time of the injury; the structure was not considered to be a "private home" during the period of its construction. Betts v. Kempers, 745 P.2d 283 (Colo.App.1987). One of the 1991 amendments to the Act, § 8-41-402(1), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.), changed the term "private home" to "reside......
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English v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of State of Colo., 87CA1864
...not persuaded by claimant's argument that the property was not a private home because it was still under construction. In Betts v. Kempers, 745 P.2d 283 (Colo.App.1987), we held that "private home," within the purview of § 8-48-102(1), means a residential structure which is inhabited or cap......
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Organ v. Jorgensen, 93CE0011
...This court interpreted the term "private home" to connote a structure that was inhabited or capable of inhabitance. Betts v. Kempers, 745 P.2d 283 (Colo.App.1987). Thus, a substantially uncompleted house which was not capable of habitation was excluded from the definition of "private home" ......