Beverly v. Ruth's Chris Steak House

• Decision Date: 19 April 1996
• Citation: 682 So.2d 1360
• Parties: Gregory A. BEVERLY v. RUTH'S CHRIS STEAK HOUSE and State Claims Adjusters, Inc. 2950028.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 1360

682 So.2d 1360

Gregory A. BEVERLY v. RUTH'S CHRIS STEAK HOUSE and State Claims Adjusters, Inc.

2950028.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 19, 1996.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 4, 1996.

Roger K. Fuston of Pate, Lewis, Lloyd & Fuston, Birmingham, for appellant.

Fredrick L. Fohrell and Joel R. Hamner of Wilmer & Shepard, P.A., Huntsville, for appellees.

YATES, Judge.

Gregory A. Beverly appeals from a summary judgment in favor of Ruth's Chris Steak House (hereinafter "Ruth's Chris") and State Claims Adjusters, Inc. (hereinafter "State Claims"), the workers' compensation insurer for Ruth's Chris; the trial court ruled as a matter of law that Beverly was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits.

Beverly worked for Ruth's Chris as a side cook in the kitchen. On July 21, 1994, Beverly was peeling and deveining platters of shrimp for the day's lunch and dinner orders. A co-worker, Quinton Flood, approached Beverly and tried to take some of the shrimp so that he could give them to a relative who worked next door. Beverly testified in a deposition that it was against company rules for the employees to eat any of the shrimp and that Flood was "stealing [the shrimp] and he was trying to give it away." Beverly refused to let Flood have any of the shrimp; Beverly then left the kitchen for a minute, and when he returned some of the shrimp were missing.

Beverly walked to the back of the kitchen to see if Flood had taken the shrimp; he found Flood seasoning the shrimp and preparing to cook them. Beverly took the shrimp away from Flood and began walking to the front of the kitchen. Flood followed Beverly, calling him names, touching him, and finally "jumped up in his face." Beverly pushed Flood away and Flood fell to the floor. Co-workers separated the two men and Beverly went outside and smoked a cigarette to "cool off." Beverly then came back inside and resumed working; he and Flood did not speak further. However, within minutes of Beverly's return, Flood came up behind Beverly and poured three gallons of boiling water over him, severely burning Beverly's shoulder, chest, and arm. Beverly incurred medical bills of $25,877 and was permanently scarred as a result of his injury.

On September 8, 1994, after an investigation, State Claims sent a letter to Beverly, informing him that his claim for workers' compensation benefits had been denied and stating: "You initiated the physical contact which resulted in your injury. The contact/argument was not in the scope of your employment." Janet Williams, an adjuster for State Claims, testified in a deposition as to why the claim was denied:

"Just based upon our investigation from what I can tell, it appears that the first physical contact leading up to the resulting injury was made by [Beverly]. And second of all, it does not appear that it was in the course and scope of his employment. He's not required in his job duties to fight, argue, and that kind of manner."

As a result of his injury, Beverly was unable to return to work at Ruth's Chris until October 1994.

On December 6, 1994, Beverly sued Ruth's Chris and State Claims for workers' compensation benefits, also alleging the tort of outrage regarding State Claims' refusal to provide coverage for his injuries. The court granted a motion by Ruth's Chris and State Claims for separate trials of Beverly's two claims.

On August 3, 1995, Ruth's Chris and State Claims both moved for a summary judgment, attaching to the motions deposition testimony of Beverly and Williams. After a hearing, the court entered a summary judgment in favor Ruth's Chris and State Claims on September 7, 1995. Beverly appeals, contending that the court erred in ruling that he was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits; Beverly also contends that he had submitted substantial evidence to support his claim of outrage and thereby precluded a summary judgment.

Because Beverly's injury occurred after August 1, 1992, his case falls under the new Workers' Compensation Act. This court's standard of review under the new act is as follows: we will view the facts of the case in the light most favorable to the findings of the trial court. The court's judgment will not be reversed unless it is clear that the court's findings are manifestly contrary to the evidence as contained in the record as a whole or unless it is clear that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment would adopt a contrary conclusion. Whitsett v. BAMSI, 652 So.2d 287 (Ala.Civ.App.1994).

After reviewing the record and deposition testimony, as well as surveying the applicable case law, we conclude that the trial court's holding that Beverly is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits is manifestly contrary to the evidence contained in the record as a whole, and we reverse its judgment.

It is settled that a willful assault by a coemployee may be considered an accident compensable under the Alabama workers' compensation statute. However, the fact of a willful assault alone does not conclusively establish that the assault arose out of the course of the employee's employment. That conclusion must be drawn from the circumstances of the case. McGaughy v. Allied Products Co., 412 So.2d 803 (Ala.Civ.App.1982). An assault that is based solely upon personal ill will, hatred, or anger does not arise out of and in the course of the employment. Thompson v. Anserall, Inc., 522 So.2d 284 (Ala.Civ.App.1988). To justify workers' compensation for injuries caused by an assault by a coemployee, the rational mind must be able to trace the resultant personal injury to a proximate cause set in motion by the employment, and not by some other agency. Tiger Motor Co. v. Winslett, 278 Ala. 108, ...