Patrick v. Mako Lawn Care, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 July 2021
• Docket Number: 2200239
• Parties: Kevin PATRICK v. MAKO LAWN CARE, INC.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

346 So.3d 1001

Kevin PATRICK

v.MAKO LAWN CARE, INC.

2200239

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

July 30, 2021

Bart Siniard of Siniard, Timberlake & League, P.C., Huntsville, for appellant.

John C. Webb and Aaron D. Ashcraft of Lloyd, Gray, Whitehead & Monroe, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.

MOORE, Judge.

Kevin Patrick appeals from a judgment entered by the Madison Circuit Court ("the trial court") denying his claim for workers’ compensation benefits. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Procedural History

On August 5, 2019, Patrick filed a complaint seeking workers’ compensation benefits from Mako Lawn Care, Inc. ("the employer"), pursuant to the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act ("the Act"), Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1 et seq. The employer answered the complaint on September 5, 2019. On November 25, 2020, the trial court entered a judgment providing:

"On October 26, 2020, the parties agreed that this matter be presented to this Court on submitted trial briefs, and the parties stipulated to the admission of [certain] exhibits ....

"....

"The parties submitted trial briefs to this Court on November 5, 2020.

"The Court, having considered the evidence and admitted exhibits, determines the following Findings of Fact support the Conclusions of Law as set forth below.

"FINDINGS OF FACT

"The injury alleged by [Patrick] arose from an altercation with [Patrick's] co-worker, Landon McAnally[,] which occurred on May 8, 2019. The altercation arose out of a feud between [Patrick], Landon McAnally and his brother, Dylan McAnally. The feud began when ‘Lofty[,]’ a member of Landon and Dylan's work crew, took [Patrick's] designated mower home over the weekend for his personal use. ...

"The next week, [Patrick] retaliated by taking the mower assigned to Landon and Dylan for his use during the day. ... He was aware that using their mower would upset the McAnally brothers. ...

"On the day of the altercation, May 8, 20[19], [Patrick] walked by Dylan McAnally and Dylan said to him, ‘The next time you take our mower, something bad is going to happen to you.’ ...

"The video of the incident shows, after that initial confrontation, Landon standing up and walking toward [Patrick]. ... [Patrick] then took several steps towards Landon before they met for the confrontation. The confrontation was initially verbal, until [Patrick] initiated physical contact by pushing Landon. Landon then struck [Patrick] in the temple, resulting in the alleged injuries.

"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

"Alabama law holds that an active participant or aggressor in an altercation cannot recover benefits for injuries that arise from the altercation. See [,] e.g. [,] Martin v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 216 Ala. 500, 113 So. 578 (1927) (Finding that ... decedent's injuries, which occurred after the decedent renewed a quarrel by taunting his co-worker, were not compensable under the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act)[;] Stockham Pipe Fittings Co. v. Williams, 245 Ala. 570, 18 So. 2d 93, 94 (1943) (finding that decedent's injuries, which occurred after he was cutting off the flow of water from a co-worker and the co-worker, after growing frustrated, retaliated by throwing a bar of soap, were not compensable). This Court finds that [Patrick] was both an active participant and the aggressor in the confrontation that led to his injuries.

"Although the initial dispute related to Landon and Dylan's work crew taking [Patrick's] assigned lawn mower, [Patrick] chose to retaliate by taking a mower assigned to Landon and Dylan. This Court finds that no benefit flowed to [the employer] in this escalation. [Patrick] escalated the situation again when he initiated the physical contact by pushing Landon, with no apparent physical provocation. [The employer] was again not benefited by [Patrick's] action in escalating a verbal conflict into a physical one. The injuries sustained by [Patrick] were the direct result of these decisions to escalate the conflict with Landon McAnally. As [Patrick's] duties with [the] employer did not include feuding and fighting with his co-workers, his injuries did not arise out of his employment with [the employer].

"JUDGMENT ENTRY

"Therefore, it is CONSIDERED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED [that] the [employer] is entitled to a judgment in its favor as [Patrick] was an active participant and the aggressor in the altercation that led to his injuries. Costs are taxed to [Patrick]."

(Capitalization in original.) Patrick filed his notice of appeal on December 29, 2020.

Standard of Review

Although some caselaw indicates that this court may review a workers’ compensation judgment de novo when a trial court does not receive ore tenus evidence, see, e.g., Holy Family Catholic Sch. v. Boley, 847 So. 2d 371, 374 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), our standard of review is, in fact, governed by Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-81(e), an integral part of the substantive rights established in the Act, see United States Steel Min. Co. v. Riddle, 627 So. 2d 455, 458 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993), which provides:

"(1) In reviewing the standard of proof set forth herein and other legal issues, review by the Court of Civil Appeals shall be without a presumption of correctness.

"(2) In reviewing pure findings of fact, the finding of the circuit court shall not be reversed if that finding is supported by substantial evidence."

"Substantial evidence" is " ‘evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ " Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc., 680 So. 2d 262, 268 (Ala. 1996) (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989) ).

Applying the appropriate standard of review, we conclude that all the findings of fact made by the trial court are supported by substantial evidence. Thus, our disposition of this appeal centers on whether the law, as applied to those facts, supports the judgment of the trial court concluding that the altercation and Patrick's resulting injuries did not arise out of and in the course of Patrick's employment with the employer.

Discussion

Section 25-5-51, Ala. Code 1975, which is a part of the Act, basically provides that an employee who is injured as the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment is entitled to compensation for the injuries caused by the accident. Section 25-5-77, Ala. Code 1975, which is also a part of the Act, basically provides that the employee may also obtain medical benefits for the injuries received as the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his or her employment. An accidental injury arises out of the employment when the employment, and not some other agency, sets in motion the proximate cause of the injury, see Tiger Motor Co. v. Winslett, 278 Ala. 108, 176 So.2d 39 (1965), so that the injury may be considered a result of an employment hazard. See City of Birmingham v. Jenkins, 328 So.3d 889 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020). An accidental injury arises in the course of the employment when an injury occurs within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while the employee is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his or her employment or is engaged in doing something incidental to the employment. See United States Steel Corp. v. Martin, 267 Ala. 634, 104 So. 2d 475 (1958).

A willful assault upon an employee by a coemployee may be considered an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. See Beverly v. Ruth's Chris Steak House, 682 So. 2d 1360 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). However, "the fact of a willful assault alone does not conclusively establish that the assault arose out of the course of the employee's employment. That conclusion must be drawn from the circumstances of the case." Id. at 1362. As noted, we are bound by the findings of the trial court as to the circumstances leading to the assault in the present case. The question thus becomes whether the circumstances as determined by the trial court support the judgment denying compensation on the ground that the assault did not arise out of and in the course of Patrick's employment.

In Martin v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 216 Ala. 500, 113 So. 578 (1927), one of the cases cited by the trial court in its judgment, the Jefferson Circuit Court determined that Will Martin had initiated a quarrel with and had cursed Henry Anderson, a fellow employee over whom Martin had no superintendence, over the manner in which Anderson was performing his work. After the quarrel had ended and both Martin and Anderson had completed their immediate duties, Martin proceeded to enter the area where Anderson worked during a rest break and started abusing and cursing Anderson, inviting Anderson several times to physically strike him until, finally, Anderson, who initially had indicated that he did not want any trouble, picked up an iron pin and hit Martin in the head, killing him instantly. The Jefferson Circuit Court determined that Martin's death had not arisen out of and in the course of the employment but, instead, had resulted from "the act of a fellow employee [i.e., Anderson] intended to injure [Martin] because of reasons personal to [Anderson] and not directed against [Martin] as an employee, or because of [Martin's] employment." 216 Ala. at 501, 113 So. at 579 (statement of Somerville, J.). On certiorari review, our supreme court affirmed the Jefferson Circuit Court's judgment, stating, among other things:

"Counsel for appellant takes a view of the evidence quite different from that of the trial court, and naturally reaches a different conclusion. His view is that the quarrel between [Martin] and his slayer, Henry Anderson, from its inception to its final termination, was one continuous transaction, begun and continued by [Martin] on account of and in the prosecution of his employment, and hence [the appellant's] conclusion that [Martin's] death was an accident arising out of and in the

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