Bevil v. State, 20997.

• Decision Date: 08 May 1940
• Docket Number: No. 20997.,20997.
• Citation: 141 S.W.2d 362
• Parties: BEVIL v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

141 S.W.2d 362

BEVIL v. STATE.

No. 20997.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 8, 1940.

Rehearing Denied June 26, 1940.

Commissioners' Decision.

Appeal from Criminal District Court, Tarrant County; Willis M. McGregor, Judge.

Johnnie Stanley Bevil was convicted of failing to stop and render aid, and he appeals.

Judgment reformed, and, as reformed, affirmed.

Myres & Myres and Horace E. Moore, all of Fort Worth, for appellant.

Marvin H. Brown, Jr., Crim. Dist. Atty., and Austin F. Anderson, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty., both of Fort Worth, and Lloyd W. Davidson, State's Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is failing to stop and render aid; the punishment, confinement in the penitentiary for two years.

During the evening of July 4, 1939, appellant, while driving his car at a high rate of speed, collided with an automobile occupied by several young ladies, among them being Elizabeth Shackelford. Miss Shackelford received a mortal injury. The other young ladies were severely hurt. After striking the car appellant failed to stop and render aid.

Testifying in his own behalf, appellant admitted that he struck the car occupied by the young ladies. Touching the circumstances of the collision, he said: "I think Ben Crowe was in front with me. We were all talking and laughing, like four or five will get together and do. We were all looking at Ben, then at one of them in the back, and Ben said `Watch the car', or something like that. I looked around just in time to see the back of a car. We were already on it. I cut my wheels as hard as I could to miss it, and thought I had just clipped the bumper on it. I kept going, and could see in my rear view mirror a car behind me. I thought it was the same one, and I didn't think it was hurt in the least. In my rear view mirror I couldn't see the whole street or anything, so I just thought it was behind me, and to save argument or anything else, I just kept going until we heard those ambulances. Then that scared Elizabeth, and she went out of the car, and Wart was with her, and he got out with her."

An examination of appellant's car shortly after the collision disclosed that the front end was badly damaged. Touching the condition of the car, one of the witnesses testified as follows: "I will state to this jury the condition we found that car in, the right front end on it was mashed up, the right front tire was chewed all to pieces. By chewed I mean the fabric of the tire was torn to pieces. The tire was just shreds. It was hard to tell whether it was a tire, or what it was, all the way around. The right front fender was mashed back."

Appellant's car struck the rear of the car in which the young ladies were riding. It turned their car into the side of the viaduct and threw it against an iron post, completely wrecking the car.

The court instructed the jury, in part, as follows: "You are further instructed that even tho you may find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was driving an automobile on the occasion in question, and that said automobile collided with an automobile containing the said Elizabeth Shackelford, yet if you find from the evidence that the defendant did not know at the time of said collision that he had collided with said automobile, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, then you will acquit the defendant."

Appellant excepted to the charge of the court as follows: "Defendant objects and excepts to the Court's Main Charge for the reason that it wholly fails to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense offered by the defendant in this case, that is to say, that the defendant did not know that a collision had been occasioned which resulted in any injury to any occupant of the car."

Also, appellant submitted to the court the following requested instruction: "You are instructed that before you could convict the defendant in this case, you must find and believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knowingly left the scene of the collision, and that he knew that persons had been injured, particularly Elizabeth Shackelford, in the automobile with which his car collided, and, in case you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant...