Bewley v. Turpin

• Decision Date: 27 June 2022
• Docket Number: 1:20-cv-00386-TWP-DML
• Parties: JERRY BEWLEY, and DEBORAH BEWLEY, Plaintiffs, v. MATTHEW TURPIN, SPEEDWAY POLICE DEPARTMENT, and TOWN OF SPEEDWAY, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

JERRY BEWLEY, and DEBORAH BEWLEY, Plaintiffs,
v.
MATTHEW TURPIN, SPEEDWAY POLICE DEPARTMENT, and TOWN OF SPEEDWAY, Defendants.

No. 1:20-cv-00386-TWP-DML

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

June 27, 2022

John F. Kautzman RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS DUNCAN & MERCHANT, LLP

Edward J. Merchant RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS DUNCAN & MERCHANT, LLP

Katherine Anne Piscione Waldron Tate Bowen Funk Spandau LLC

Pamela G. Schneeman STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER

Jess M. Smith, III TOM SCOTT & ASSOCIATES, PC

James S. Stephenson, STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER

Brandon Eric Tate Waldron Tate Bowen Funk Spandau LLC

Stacy J. Vasilak QUERREY & HARROW

Ann Marie Waldron Waldron Tate Bowen Funk Spandau LLC Marion Superior Court

Robert V. Clutter TAYLOR, CHADD, MINNETTE, SCHNEIDER & CLUTTER, P.C.

Andrew R. Duncan RUCKELSHAUS KAUTZMAN BLACKWELL BEMIS DUNCAN & MERCHANT, LLP

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SURREPLY AND SUPPLEMENTAL DESIGNATION OF EVIDENCE

Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 by Defendants Matthew Turpin ("Officer Turpin"), the Speedway Police Department ("SPD"), and the Town of Speedway ("Speedway") (collectively, "Defendants") (Filing No. 46). Plaintiffs Jerry Bewley ("Mr. Bewley") and Deborah Bewley (collectively, "the Bewley's") raise claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") for excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law negligence claims. Filing No. 1-1 at 13-16). Also pending is Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Surreply and Supplemental Designation of Evidence ("Motion for Leave to File Surreply and Supplemental Designation of Evidence (Filing No. 74). For the following reasons, the Bewleys' Motion for Leave to File Surreply is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part as to all federal claims against all Defendants and all state law claims against SPD and Officer Turpin, and denied in part as to all state law claims against Speedway. The Court further concludes that the remaining state law claims against Speedway should be remanded to state court.

1

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are not necessarily objectively true, but as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the facts are presented in the light most favorable to the Bewleys as the nonmoving parties. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009).

On the evening of March 1, 2019, SPD received a call from a concerned citizen reporting "suspicious activity" by unknown individuals and fearing a possible burglary (Filing No. 47-2 at 1, ¶ 2). SPD dispatched several officers in response to the call, including Officer Turpin, who was accompanied by his SPD police dog, Tom ("Tom"). Id. Tom had been Officer Turpin's canine partner and SPD's only police dog since 2013 (Filing No. 48 at 3).

Around 7:30 p.m., just as it was getting dark, Officer Turpin identified what he described as a "suspicious vehicle," which suddenly drove off (Filing No. 47-2 at 1, ¶ 3). Officer Turpin pursued the vehicle. During this pursuit, he learned from SPD dispatch that the vehicle had been reported as stolen. Id. Vehicular theft is a Level 6 felony under Indiana law. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1); Fed.R.Evid. 702.

That same evening, Mr. Bewley was working as a part-time delivery driver for a local restaurant (Filing No. 63 at 1). While Officer Turpin was pursuing the suspect, Mr. Bewley was nearby, making a delivery to a customer at 6127 Meadowood Drive ("6127 Meadowood"), in Speedway, Indiana. Id.; (Filing No. 47-1 at 8; Filing No. 47-2 at 2, ¶ 4). Mr. Bewley was at the customer's door completing the transaction when he heard police sirens. (Filing No. 48 at 1-2; Filing No. 63 at 1-2.) He then saw the suspect's vehicle driving south down Meadowood Drive, toward the customer's house. Id. The vehicle crashed into a parked car just down the street, north of 6127 Meadowood, and the vehicle's occupants got out and began running. Id. Mr. Bewley- fearing police might shoot at the suspects running toward him and that he would be caught in the

2

line of fire-crouched on the south side of a Jeep parked in the customer's driveway. (Filing No. 47-1 at 14; Filing No. 48 at 2; Filing No. 63 at 2.) Although the customer offered to let Mr. Bewley come inside, Mr. Bewley felt uncomfortable entering a customer's home, so he stayed crouched behind the Jeep. (Filing No. 48 at 2; Filing No. 47-1 at 10.) Mr. Bewley was wearing a dark jacket but was illuminated by a streetlight near 6127 Meadowood. (Filing No. 48 at 2.)

When he lifted his head to see what was happening, Mr. Bewley saw one of the suspects run east in between 6127 Meadowood and the neighboring house directly north, located at 6121 Meadowood Drive ("6121 Meadowood"). Id. at 2. A few seconds later, Mr. Bewley saw Officer Turpin's patrol car pull up to 6127 Meadowood, with its lights on but siren off (Filing No. 47-1 at 12). By then, the suspects had fled down the path between the two homes and out of view. Id. at 14.^[1] When he saw the patrol car, Mr. Bewley stopped crouching and stood at full height, believing that because the suspects were now out of sight, there was no longer any risk police would shoot at them, and that he was safe. Id. at 14.

Officer Turpin had seen the suspects flee in between 6127 and 6121 Meadowood, so he parked on the street just south of 6127 Meadowood's driveway (Filing No. 47-2 at 2, ¶ 5; Filing No. 47-1 at 13). Officer Turpin quickly exited his patrol car, immediately went to the back driver's side door, and, without looking for bystanders and without giving a warning, released Tom (Filing No. 63 at 2). Tom had been trained to and had demonstrated an ability to pursue specific individuals on command. (Filing No. 47-2 at 3.) Before March 1, 2019, Tom had bitten only

3

people Officer Turpin directed Tom to pursue and apprehend. (Filing No. 48 at 3.) But Officer Turpin did not issue any commands to Tom when he released him, and instead of pursuing the suspect, Tom ran straight toward Mr. Bewley. Id. at 3.^[2]

When Mr. Bewley saw Tom running toward him, he panicked and tried to climb onto the hood of the Jeep for safety (Filing No. 63 at 2). Officer Turpin did not see Mr. Bewley until Tom started running toward him (Filing No. 48 at 2). Before Mr. Bewley could climb completely on the hood of the Jeep, Tom bit Mr. Bewley's right leg and held the bite for several seconds (Filing No. 63 at 2). Officer Turpin verbally commanded Tom to release Mr. Bewley, but Tom did not respond and needed to be pulled off of Mr. Bewley (Filing No. 47-1 at 8, 14). Officer Turpin ceased his pursuit of the suspects to assist Mr. Bewley^[3] (Filing No. 48 at 3). Paramedics arrived and transported Mr. Bewley to the hospital. He was discharged later that evening (Filing No. 471 at 9).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

4

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 489-90 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews "the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante, 555 F.3d at 584 (citation omitted). "However, inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion." Dorsey v. Morgan Stanley, 507 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial." Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490 (citation omitted). "The opposing party cannot meet this burden with conclusory statements or speculation but only with appropriate citations to relevant admissible evidence." Sink v. Knox County Hosp., 900 F.Supp. 1065, 1072 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citations omitted).

"In much the same way that a court is not required to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment, nor is it permitted to conduct a paper trial on the merits of [the] claim." Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). "[N]either the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

On January 20, 2020, Plaintiffs filed this action in state court alleging claims of excessive force under Section 1983, as well as state law negligence claims against Defendants (Filing No. 12). Defendants removed the case to federal court on February 4, 2020 (Filing No. 1-1). In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that SPD is not a proper party to this action and

5

all claims against it should be dismissed. Defendants also argue that the Section 1983 claims against Officer Turpin and Speedway should be dismissed because Mr. Bewley was not seized under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, that Officer Turpin in entitled to qualified immunity, and that Speedway is not liable for Officer Turpin's conduct under Monell v....