Bexar County v. Linden

• Citation: 220 S.W. 761
• Decision Date: 14 April 1920
• Docket Number: (No. 3213.)
• Parties: BEXAR COUNTY v. LINDEN.
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Page 761

220 S.W. 761

BEXAR COUNTY v. LINDEN.

(No. 3213.)

Supreme Court of Texas.

April 14, 1920.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Fourth Supreme Judicial District.

Action by W. C. Linden against Bexar County. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed (205 S. W. 478), and defendant brings error. Judgments of the Court of Civil Appeals and trial court reversed, and cause remanded.

Lewright & Douglas, of San Antonio, for plaintiff in error.

W. C. Linden and J. H. H. Graham, both of San Antonio, for defendant in error.

PHILLIPS, C. J.

The case concerns the constitutionality of the statute (Article 3889 — Section 11, Act of 1897, as amended) requiring District Attorneys to pay into the county treasury what are termed the excess fees of their office.

The suit was one by W. C. Linden to recover an amount of such fees paid by him as District Attorney into the county treasury of Bexar County, and in which, by cross-action, Bexar County sought recovery against him for an amount claimed by it to be still due upon such account. Mr. Linden prevailed in the trial court. Upon Bexar County's appeal, the honorable Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourth District held the statute unconstitutional as amounting to a grant of public money to counties of the State as municipal corporations, within the inhibition of Section 51 of Article 3 of the Constitution. Under this holding the judgment, after being reformed in some particulars, was affirmed.

It was within the Legislature's power, in our opinion, to provide for the disposition of the excess fees of District Attorneys as is done by the statute. We do not regard the disposition made as in any sense a grant of public money. The statute is in our view, therefore, a valid enactment.

This holding is based upon the relation which the counties of the State bear to the sovereignty of the State; upon their character as mere political subdivisions of the State; created for the convenience of the people and for the purposes of local government, but for the exercise of essentially State powers as distinguished from municipal powers; and, with their conferred powers having the nature of duties rather than privileges, existing as but agencies of the State for the effective discharge through local officers of the governmental obligations of the State.

The use of the counties of the State as a means of government is a use by the State and for the State as a sovereignty. The effect of the statute, in association with other provisions of law is to set apart the excess fees of District Attorneys and other officials as State funds for the governmental purposes of the State with whose execution the counties, as instrumentalities of the State, are charged. Such a dedication is in no true sense a grant of public money. It is but an appropriation of funds of the State for the uses of the State. It is therefore a constitutional use, having no character of a bounty or gratuity.

No feature of the Constitution is more marked than its vigilance for the protection of the public funds and the public credit against misuse. This is exemplified by numerous provisions in the instrument. In general, where the inhibitions of these provisions are found with respect to municipal corporations in terms, they are laid in language so broad as to include all classes of public or political corporations and therefore equally apply to counties.

For illustration, Section 50 of Article 3 denies to the Legislature any power to give or lend, or to authorize the giving or lending, of the credit of the State in aid of or to any person, association "or corporation, whether municipal or other," or to pledge the credit of the State in any manner whatsoever for the payment of the liabilities, present or prospective, of any individual, association of individuals, "municipal or other corporation whatsoever."

Section 52 of the same article prohibits the Legislature from authorizing "any county, city, town or other political corporation or subdivision of the State" to lend its credit or to grant public money or thing of value in aid of or to any individual, association or corporation whatsoever, etc., except for the certain public improvements to which the proviso of the section relates and as in that part of the section provided.

Section 53 of the same article restrains the Legislature from authorizing "any county or municipal authority" to grant any extra compensation, fee or allowance to a public officer, agent, servant or contractor, after service has been rendered, or a contract has been entered into and performed in whole or in part; and from paying or authorizing the payment of any claims created against "any county or municipality" of the State, under any agreement or contract made without authority of law.

Section 55 of the same article declares that the Legislature shall have no power to release or extinguish, or to authorize the releasing or extinguishing, in whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability or obligation of any corporation or individual to the State, or to "any county or other municipal corporation" in the State.

Section 3 of Article 11 denies to any "county, city or other municipal corporation" the power to become subscribers to the capital of any private corporation or association, or to make any appropriation or donation thereto, or in anywise loan its credit — excepting obligations undertaken pursuant to law prior to the Constitution's adoption.

Section 51 of article 3, — except for aiding, as stipulated in its proviso, indigent and disabled Confederate soldiers and sailors; indigent and disabled soldiers who served under special laws of the State in organizations for the protection of the frontier during the war between the States, or in the State militia during that war; their widows; and for the establishment of a home for such soldiers and sailors, their wives and widows and women who aided in the Confederacy, — prohibits the Legislature from making any grant or authorizing the making of any grant of public money to any individual, association of individuals, "municipal or other corporation whatsoever."

This section recognizes only soldiers and sailors of the Confederacy, their wives and widows, and women who aided in the Confederacy, as having any claim upon the bounty of the State. Its evident purpose is to deny to the Legislature any power to grant or to authorize the grant of public money to all others, absolutely.

The giving away of public money, its application to other than strictly governmental purposes, is what the provision is intended to guard against. The prohibition is a positive and absolute one except as to a distinctive class to whom the State is under a sacred obligation. Not only are individuals, associations of individuals and private corporations within its spirit, but all kinds of public or political corporations, as well, whether strictly municipal or not. It therefore applies to counties, whether considered as public corporations or only quasi corporations. The similar restraints upon the use of public funds and the public credit applied to counties by these other provisions of the Constitution practically demonstrate this to be true.

If, therefore, the effect of the statute is to bestow funds of the State upon counties of the State as a gratuity, or for uses not related to the State's governmental duties, it would be invalid. On the other hand, if its effect is to but apply such funds to the uses of the State as a government, there can be no reason for holding it void.

It is accordingly important to consider the nature of counties under our form...