Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Counties Water Control and Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Medina Lake Protection Ass'n, BEXAR-MEDINA-ATASCOSA

• Decision Date: 29 September 1982
• Docket Number: No. 16691,BEXAR-MEDINA-ATASCOSA,16691
• Citation: 640 S.W.2d 778
• Parties: COUNTIES WATER CONTROL AND IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 1, Appellant, v. MEDINA LAKE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 778

640 S.W.2d 778

BEXAR-MEDINA-ATASCOSA COUNTIES WATER CONTROL AND IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 1, Appellant, v. MEDINA LAKE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, Appellee.

No. 16691.

Court of Appeals of Texas San Antonio.

Sept. 29, 1982.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 1982.

Robert Wilson and Marc Knisely, McGinnis, Lochridge & Kilgore, Austin, for appellant.

Seagal V. Wheatley, Oppenheimer, Rosenberg, Kelleher & Wheatley, Inc., San Antonio, for appellee.

Before ESQUIVEL, CANTU and BASKIN, JJ.

OPINION

BASKIN, Justice.

Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Counties Water Control and Improvement District number one (District) appeals from a judgment in favor of Medina Lake Protection Association and enumerated individuals in which the trial court entered a declaratory judgment stating that District had no authority to enforce its regulations outside of its boundaries, except over property owned by District or in which it had an easement or other property right. Finding that none of the plaintiffs resided on such land, the trial court held that District's regulations were not applicable to the plaintiffs. Based on this decision, the court additionally issued a permanent injunction in favor of appellees, enjoining District from enforcing its regulations except within its boundaries and over property owned by District or in which it had an easement or other property right. The injunction specifically precluded regulation in the waters of Medina Lake, except where appellant possessed such an interest.

Appellees had originally alleged two additional causes of action against District. One of these causes was severed from the instant cause of action and the other was dismissed. On appeal we are concerned only with the declaratory judgment and permanent injunction described above.

Appellant is a municipal water corporation and its rules and regulations are considered similar to valid penal ordinances of a city. Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Counties Water Improvement District No. 1 v. State, 21 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1929, writ ref'd); Tex.Water Code Ann. § 55.244 (Vernon 1972). The regulations sought to be enforced deal with control and regulatory authority over Medina Lake, its dam and spillway, and over all lands "located within the Medina Lake Reservoir basin below the 1084 foot elevation." The regulations govern such activities as boating, sanitation and sewage disposal, construction and use of docking facilities and general use of the lake for recreational purposes.

District contends in its first point of error that the trial court erred in rendering an injunction against it on the ground that there was no evidence to support the granting of a permanent injunction. By its second point of error, District asserts that the trial court erred in granting such relief because appellees never established the requisite threat of, or actual proof of, irreparable harm or the absence of an adequate remedy at law. We shall first examine the validity of the declaratory judgment as raised in appellant's points of error three and four.

The purpose of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is to provide a procedural device whereby litigants can obtain a judicial determination of a controversy. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 2524-1 (Vernon 1965); Crawford v. City of Houston, 600 S.W.2d 891 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); Marshall v. City of Lubbock, 520 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1975, no writ). If a justiciable controversy exists, the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the declaratory action, and declaratory relief subsequently granted is not merely advisory. Sub-Surface Construction Co. v. Bryant-Curington, Inc., 533 S.W.2d 452 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Anderson v. McRae, 495 S.W.2d 351 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1973, no writ). To constitute a justiciable controversy, there must exist a real and substantial controversy involving genuine conflict of tangible interests and not merely a theoretical dispute. Sub-Surface Construction Co. v. Bryant-Curington, Inc., supra, at 456; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bivins, 423 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Finally, the entry of such a judgment rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Crawford v. City of Houston, supra; Anderson v. McRae, supra.

With the foregoing standards in mind, our examination of the entire record reveals that a justiciable controversy existed between these litigants as regards the enforcement against appellees of District's regulations. The declaratory judgment relating to this dispute is dispositive of the issues of contention between the parties. Thus, such a remedy was appropriate.

During the course of the trial, the trial court inquired about the plaintiffs involved in this case. Counsel for the District represented to the court:

Mr. Wilson: "Your Honor, with respect to those folks (appellees), with the Court's rulings, none of those lands are in the district, so if your ruling on the regulation is correct, which I submit to the court it is not, ... there is no reason to try any part of the regulation question."

Court: "Well, that goes out."

Counsel further stated:

Mr. Wilson: "Yeah, there are no plaintiffs in this case, Your Honor, who are inside the boundaries of the district affected by these rules and regulations."

Relying upon these assurances the court entered the declaratory judgment in favor of appellees. District now argues that its own representations did not constitute any evidence, that appellees offered no evidence to support their position, and that the entry of the declaratory relief was erroneous. We disagree.

"When the essential elements of a cause of action are specifically admitted by an adversary in open court, they need no evidence to substantiate them." Traders & General Insurance Co. v. Rockey, 278 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Further, a court having jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment has the power to determine issues of fact. United Services Life Insurance Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.1965). We hold that the representations by District's counsel factually support the entry of the declaratory judgment. Appellees have the right to relief from "uncertainty and insecurity" with respect to their status as regards these regulations. See City of Nassau Bay v. Winograd, 582 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ), Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 2524-1, § 12 (Vernon 1965). The court, having a justiciable controversy before it, did not abuse its discretion and properly entered the declaratory judgment in favor of appellees.

Finally, by holding that appellees resided outside of District's regulatory area, the trial court...