Bhaduri v. Middlesex County Sheriff's Dept., 20012696F
| Decision Date | 28 March 2007 |
| Docket Number | 20012696F |
| Citation | 2007 MBAR 145 |
| Parties | Rajkumar Bhaduri v. Middlesex County Sheriff's Department et al.[1] |
| Court | Massachusetts Superior Court |
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): MacLeod-Mancuso, Bonnie H., J.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants,' Middlesex County Sheriff's Department (Department), Paul Tierney (Tierney), Horace Coward (Coward), David Ellison (Ellison) and Terry McCarthy (McCarthy), motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for remittitur of punitive damages against Plaintiff Rajkumar Bhaduri (Bhaduri). Bhaduri opposes Defendants' motion urging the Court not to vacate the judgment, and in the alternative, has moved for a mistrial and a new trial on all the issues.
In March 2006, a jury heard Bhaduri's case, in which he alleged discrimination by the Department based on his national origin or race pursuant to G.L.c. 151B, §4(1) (count one); retaliation by the Department pursuant to G.L.c. 151B, §4(4) (count two); intimidation, coercion, threats, interference, and aiding and abetting by all Defendants pursuant to G.L.c. 151B, §§4(4A), 4(5) (count three); and intentional interference with advantageous contractual relations against all Defendants (count four).[2] On March 8, 2006, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Bhaduri and against the Department only on count three, awarding Bhaduri $25,000 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is DENIED, and Bhaduri's motion for a new trial is ALLOWED with respect to count three only.
On June 25, 2001, Bhaduri filed an action against the Department, and supervisory personnel within the Department: Tierney, Coward Ellison, and McCarthy. Bhaduri's complaint alleged that the Department discriminated against him because of his national origin or race, the Department engaged in retaliatory conduct, all Defendants threatened him because of his national origin or race, and that the individually named supervisory Defendants interfered with his contractual relations.
Bhaduri presented evidence at trial that his coworkers harassed him because he was Indian.[3] Bhaduri submitted evidence such as a personal journal, medical records, and his own testimony to demonstrate that the harassment by his coworkers was severe and pervasive.[4] Bhaduri also testified that he reported the harassment to Marie Morando, the Secretary to the Middlesex County Sheriff, who discussed the issue with Martin Gabriella, who then spoke with Kiernan Lennon, who conducted an investigation.[5] Bhaduri testified that he complained of the harassment to McCarthy, and to Edward Dyment, a shift commander, but neither supervisor took any action to remedy the problem. Further, Bhaduri pointed to sections of Tierney's deposition which allegedly showed that Tierney knew, or should have known that Bhaduri was subjected to discrimination and/or retaliation. McCarthy testified that Bhaduri discussed the harassment with him first, at which point McCarthy spoke with Coward.
The Defendants presented evidence that neither the supervisors named nor the Department knew or should have known of any discrimination or retaliation against Bhaduri by correctional officers. Coward contradicted McCarthy's testimony and stated that he never spoke with Bhaduri or with McCarthy concerning any harassment.
On March 6, 2006, Defendants brought a motion for a directed verdict. In pertinent part, Defendants asserted that Bhaduri failed to present evidence that he feared retaliation. Defendants argued that the Department had a policy against discriminatory or retaliatory conduct and had a workable procedure for complaints. As a consequence, it was incumbent on Bhaduri to show that his complaint would not be taken seriously. Defendants argued that because there was an effective policy in place, as demonstrated by Bhaduri's invocation of the policy in August 1997, Bhaduri's failure to use the policy to complain of the acts which took place in 1999 and 2000 compelled the Court to grant a directed verdict in favor of the Defendants. The Court allowed the motion for directed verdict only as to count four, intentional interference with contractual relations, with respect to Tierney.
On March 7, 2006, after closing statements, the Court provided the jury with a special verdict slip, which consisted of four questions.[6] The Court's instructions included language explaining the law as to the liability relationship between the Department, the named supervisors (Defendants Tierney, Coward, Ellison, and McCarthy) and unnamed supervisors (Dyment, Roebuck, and Moore) and correctional officers within the Department.[7] Neither party objected to the Court's instructions after the Court charged the jury.
Approximately two and one-half hours after the jury began deliberations, it returned with a question for the Court. The jury question stated: The Court and the parties discussed whether the evidence presented addressed the Department's liability with respect to supervisors and/or coworkers. Defendants objected to the Court's inclusion of coworker liability in its response to the jury because "the evidence in this case as [sic] directed entirely to supervisors and not to the C.O.'s my understanding was the supervisors and their failure to supervise that was at issue here, and... it was never explicit that the C.O.'s were involved here as to liability." R. 7-107, 7-108, 7-111. Bhaduri argued that he did not abandon the C.O. aiding and abetting claim as evidenced by the complaint, depositions, and the evidence presented at trial. R. 7-120, 7-121, 7-122. In particular, Bhaduri presented evidence that C.O.'s McBride, Nionakis, and Carvello continuously harassed Bhaduri and created an environment that was severe and pervasive.
At this point in the discussion, the Court recognized that neither party presented a specific instruction on special verdict slip Question 3. The Court became concerned with its failure to define the terms contained in Question 3, namely "aiding and abetting and coercing," and questioned whether Bhaduri presented sufficient evidence for count three to go to the jury. R. 7-112.
The Court responded to the jury by stating:
Let me answer your question backwards. The latter part of your question is: "Can we say 'yes' to the department and 'no' to the individual defendants, and vice versa?"
And the answer to that is yes. It's not mutually exclusive. You could find some, or all of the individual defendants. You could say yes or no, depending obviously just as to them, you could decide one had, one hadn't, none had, some had, all had. You can do likewise with the department: You could find that the department had engaged in the same activity and not find that the individuals had, and vice versa, just so you know. And then you would just go on to the issues of damages...
But then we go back to the earlier part of the question which is: "Does the Middlesex County Sheriff's Department include whom?" And that I think is a good question - the C.O.'s, upper management. And I know why this question is asked because in the first two questions we're talking about "supervisory personnel." And I did read for you a definition of "supervisory personnel" as being anyone in a position to supervise, discipline, or control the plaintiff in his employment activities. So that would not just include the three defendants named here, but various lieutenants or others who you may have heard evidence about but supervisors.
So then we get to this question, and we don't limit it to supervisors. And there's a reason for that... it encompasses I guess everyone within the work environment. That is, for example, co-employees would not be in a position to engage in activity that has been alleged, if it happened, but for the fact they were employees and just, ergo, employed by the Sheriff's Department.
So the answer to your question is: That it includes individuals employed by the department who interacted with Mr. Bhaduri regardless of their status. R. 7-127, 7-128, 7-129.
After the Court sent the jury back out to deliberate, Defendants renewed their objection to the inclusion of coworker liability as part of the Court's instruction to the jury. R. 7-129, 7-130.
On March 8, 2006, the Court again met with the parties to discuss the propriety of the jury instructions. The Court questioned whether it was appropriate to impose vicarious liability on the Department for the actions of its coworkers.[8] The Court reiterated its concern that absent from the instructions related to Question 3 was any explanatory language of the statutory terms. The Court stated that it should have included:
very very definitive instructions on what all those words mean [under 151B, §§4(A) and (4)(5)]. And we never - it wasn't presented either in argument when I gave a description of the case to the jury, as the case proceeded, and as the case went to trial, as the case was finally instructed to the jury... And the problem I have is that the language that was put in the question says: "By intimidation, coercion, threats."... I think my larger problem is no instructions were given to...
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