Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.
| Decision Date | 17 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 16 C 2730,16 C 2730 |
| Citation | 237 F.Supp.3d 762 |
| Parties | BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS AND TRAINMEN (General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region), et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Michael Paul Persoon, Thomas Howard Geoghegan, Sean Morales Doyle, Despres, Schwartz & Geoghegan, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Donald J. Munro, Jones Day, Washington, DC, Alice V. Brathwaite, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
Three divisions of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, a union of trade engineers, brought this action against Union Pacific Railroad for violations of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. R. 4, Compl.1 The Brotherhood claims that Union Pacific, which employs Brotherhood members, violated the Act when the railroad implemented a new disciplinary policy—one that allegedly conflicts with the parties' collective bargaining agreements—without first bargaining to impasse. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. The Brotherhood also claims that Union Pacific violated the Act's prohibition on direct dealing by soliciting employee input before implementing the new policy. Id. ¶¶ 7, 45.
The parties have filed dueling motions: the Brotherhood seeks a preliminary injunction against the implementation of the new disciplinary policy, R. 24, Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., and Union Pacific seeks dismissal of the Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and also asks for judgment on the pleadings, R. 16, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to dismiss is granted (though not on all the grounds sought by the railroad) and the motion for preliminary injunction is denied.
For the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the Complaint are accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). Union Pacific is a Class I Rail Carrier, Compl. ¶ 9, and is subject to the Railway Labor Act, see 45 U.S.C. § 151. It employs locomotive engineers who are unionized under various divisions of the Brotherhood. Compl. ¶ 8. The Brotherhood and Union Pacific (or their various predecessors-in-interest) have entered into a number of collective bargaining agreements over the years. Id. ¶¶ 12, 27; R. 17–1, Phillips Aff. ¶¶ 4–6; see also R. 4–2, Compl. at Exh. B, 1996 Sys. Agmt.; R. 17–21, Phillips Aff. at Exh. T, S. Pac. W. Lines Agmt.
One of those agreements, the Southern Pacific Western Lines Agreement,2 contains a provision that addresses how long employee-disciplinary information can be kept in employee files:
Information concerning discipline more than five (5) years old contained in personal records will be expunged with the exception of suspension or dismissal involving violations of [Federal Railroad Administration] regulations or Safety Rules, which were upheld in arbitration.
S. Pac. W. Lines Agmt. at 191 (). As its text says, Article 18 sets a general ban on keeping disciplinary records for longer than five years, but with an exception for violations of Federal Railroad Administration regulations and safety rules.
In September 2015, Union Pacific issued a policy entitled Managing Agreement Professionals for Success (known by its acronym, "MAPS"). Compl. ¶ 16; R. 4–1, Compl. at Exh. A, MAPS Policy. Before issuing the policy, the railroad had polled its engineers on their preferred changes to existing discipline rules. Compl. ¶ 45. MAPS covers a number of human-resources-related topics, but this lawsuit centers around Section 3.2.1, a disciplinary rule that adopts a "three-strikes" approach for Federal Railroad Administration decertifications:
3.2.1. Multiple FRA Revocations: If an employee violates a decertification rule and there are two prior FRA license revocations on the employee's work history ... the employee may be charged with violation of Rule 1.6 [governing prohibited conduct] under MAPS after evaluation of the employee's work history by the Superintendent and the Regional Vice President.
MAPS Policy at 4. In a nutshell, when an engineer picks up a third Federal Railroad Administration license revocation, he or she is also subject to being fired. Compl. ¶ 28.
MAPS went into effect without any negotiation between Union Pacific and the Brotherhood. Compl. ¶ 30. The Brotherhood quickly protested, but Union Pacific asserted its right to implement MAPS without consulting the Brotherhood first. Id. ¶¶ 31–33. This lawsuit followed.
Union Pacific brings its motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(c). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion tests whether the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction, Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7 , 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009) ; Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp. , 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999), while a Rule 12(c) motion tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim for relief based on the pleadings, Hayes v. City of Chi. , 670 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2012). When reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Ezekiel v. Michel , 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1995) ; Hayes , 670 F.3d at 813. A party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Hayes , 670 F.3d at 813. Judgment on the pleadings is proper if it appears beyond doubt that the non-moving party cannot prove any set of facts sufficient to support his claim for relief. Id. In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court considers the pleadings alone, which consist of the complaint, the answer, and any documents attached as exhibits. N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend , 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998).
In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff must establish that the district court has jurisdiction over an action. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co. , 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Minn–Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc. , 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012). "If subject matter jurisdiction is not evident on the face of the complaint, [then] the ... Rule 12(b)(1) [motion is] analyzed [like] any other motion to dismiss, by assuming for the purposes of the motion that the allegations in the complaint are true." United Phosphorus , 322 F.3d at 946. But "if the complaint is formally sufficient but the contention is that there is in fact no subject matter jurisdiction, [then] the movant may use affidavits and other material to support the motion." Id. (emphasis in original).
If Union Pacific's motion to dismiss is a winner, then by definition the Brotherhood's preliminary-injunction motion must fail, so the Court will consider the dismissal motion first. To do that, some background on the Railway Labor Act's analytical framework is needed. The Act governs railway-labor relations and requires carriers to "exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain [collective bargaining] agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions." 45 U.S.C. § 152 ¶ First. When a dispute arises between carrier and labor, courts must first figure out whether the dispute is "major" or "minor" (those are terms of art under the case law interpreting the Act). Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n , 491 U.S. 299, 302, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989) (citation omitted). The resulting categorization determines whether the district court has jurisdiction over the dispute: yes if major, no if minor.3
Major disputes are those that involve the formation of collective bargaining agreements or efforts to change existing agreements. Consol. Rail , 491 U.S. at 302, 109 S.Ct. 2477 (citing Elgin, J. & E.R. Co. v. Burley , 325 U.S. 711, 723, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945) ); see also 45 U.S.C. § 152 ¶ Seventh. One way to think about major disputes is that "[t]hey look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the past." Id. If a collective bargaining agreement is already in place, then carriers cannot "change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions ... embodied in [the] agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or" through the negotiation and mediation procedures set forth in the Act. Id. "The district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to enjoin a violation of the status quo pending completion of the required procedures...." Consol. Rail , 491 U.S. at 303, 109 S.Ct. 2477 (citations omitted).
In contrast, district courts do not have jurisdiction over minor disputes, which must be worked out in "arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, or before an adjustment board established by the employer and the unions representing the employees." Consol. Rail , 491 U.S. at 303, 109 S.Ct. 2477 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 153 ). Minor disputes are those that "grow ... out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application" of existing collective bargaining agreements. Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152 ¶ Sixth). Unlike in major disputes, the carrier does not have a statutory obligation to maintain the status quo while a minor dispute is before the arbitral panel; it is generally free to act in accordance with its understanding of its rights under the agreement unless and until the arbitral board decides otherwise. Consol. Rail , 491 U.S. at 304, 109 S.Ct. 2477 (citations omitted).
So, in order to decide the parties' dueling motions here, the Court must classify the parties' dispute as either a major or minor one. There is an overall preference for arbitral...
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