Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employes Div./IBT v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
| Decision Date | 16 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Case No. 20-00844 (RJL) |
| Parties | BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES DIVISION/IBT, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
[Dkt. #4, #8]
This case presents a labor dispute over the right to perform certain safety-related work along railroad tracks. Plaintiff Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division/IBT ("BMWED") seeks a declaratory judgment against defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") stating that Amtrak violates the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh, by allowing outside contractors to perform certain "flagging" work, which, BMWED asserts, is reserved to "BMWED-represented Amtrak employees" under the parties' collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). See Compl. [Dkt. #1] at 1, 6-7. Amtrak disagrees with BMWED's interpretation of the CBA but moves to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that regardless of the correct contract interpretation, this is a "minor dispute" subject to compulsory arbitration under the RLA. See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s MTD") [Dkt. #4-1] at 6.
Presently before the Court are Amtrak's Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) [Dkt. #4] and BMWED's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #8]. Because I agree with Amtrak that its interpretation of the CBA is at least "arguably justified," I have concluded this is a minor dispute under the RLA and must therefore be submitted to arbitration. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 307 (1989) (hereinafter "Conrail"). Accordingly, for the following reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED.
Amtrak is a government-subsidized passenger rail carrier subject to the RLA. Compl. ¶ 2. BMWED is a labor union representing Amtrak maintenance of way employees, who are generally responsible for constructing, repairing, and maintaining Amtrak's track as well as bridges, tunnels, and related structures. Id. ¶ 1.
Ex. A to Decl. of Aaron Buck ("Buck Decl.") [Dkt. #4-2] at 11.
The CBA further provides that "[i]n the event [Amtrak] plans to contract out work within the scope [of maintenance of way work]," it must notify BMWED. Id. The CBA then details certain additional restrictions on, and procedures for, contracting out such work. Id. at 11-12.
A side letter to the CBA ("the Side Letter"), dated January 22, 1987, states that "it is the Carrier's intent to preserve work of the scope and magnitude historically performed by members of the BMWE for the Carrier as of January 1, 1987, or prior thereto."1 Compl. ¶ 9; Def.'s MTD at 3.
The present dispute arises out of BMWED's concern that Amtrak will allow outside contractors to perform certain "flagging" work along the NEC. Generally speaking, flagging work involves the "protection of workers and equipment on the tracks and in the railroad right of way . . . from oncoming trains and other equipment." Decl. of Anthony Sessa ("Sessa Decl.") [Dkt. #8-3] ¶ 8.
This work is necessary for the protection of workers and is required in order to comply with federal regulations. See generally 49 C.F.R. Part 214, Subpart C. As particularly relevant here, Federal Railroad Administration regulations require that when work is done on or near live tracks, a Roadway Worker in Charge ("RWIC") must be present and undertake various responsibilities designed to ensure the safety of theworkers involved. See Sessa Decl. ¶ 8; see also 49 C.F.R. § 214.321. The RWIC must be qualified in railway worker protection and, among other things, verify that workers are aware of applicable safety rules, coordinate with train dispatchers, and ensure people and equipment are in a safe position prior to the passage of any train. See Sessa Decl. ¶ 8; Buck Decl. ¶ 6-7.
In February and March 2020, BMWED learned that Amtrak was training employees of an outside contractor, RailPros, on track protection rules and procedures so that RailPros employees could act as RWICs. Compl. ¶ 12. According to Amtrak's Senior Director Labor Relations, RailPros sought this training because it hoped to provide flagging protection to third parties when those entities performed work on or near Amtrak tracks such that compliance with the federal safety regulations is required. Id. ¶ 14. After receiving training, RailPros began advertising positions described as "Roadway Worker In Charge" at several locations along the NEC. Id. ¶ 12.
BMWED took issue with an outside contractor such as RailPros performing work it viewed as reserved to its members. Accordingly, it wrote to Amtrak, stating that "under the CBA, performance of all on-track protection on Amtrak's property, and performance of such work for third party projects and for third parties engaged in non-railroad work near Amtrak's track structure such that Amtrak operating and roadway worker rules apply, is reserved to BMWED forces." Id. ¶ 15. It further asserted that "this work has been performed exclusively by BMWED members since the inception of Amtrak" and that if Amtrak permitted anyone other than BMWED-represented Amtrak employees to perform such flagging work, it would "constitute a unilateral change of the
CBA."2 Id.
Amtrak responded with a letter contesting BMWED's interpretation. To Amtrak, at least where the underlying work for which flagging was required was "not controlled or instigated by Amtrak" and was "not for the exclusive benefit of the railroad," and where Amtrak was not hiring the vendor providing the flagging work, any flagging work fell outside the scope of the CBA. See Ex. D to Buck Decl. Amtrak also contested BMWED's allegation of a "unilateral change," arguing instead that the dispute was "a matter of contract interpretation . . . and so must be resolved through arbitration under Section 153 of the RLA." Id.
BMWED subsequently filed the instant complaint alleging that "by allowing a contractor and contractor forces to perform flagging work on or near Amtrak property where Amtrak operating and roadway worker rules apply, and to access to [sic] Amtrak property to provide on track protection where Amtrak operating and roadway worker rules apply, Amtrak is effectively rejecting, abrogating, and changing its agreements with BMWED . . . in violation of Section 2, Seventh of the RLA." Compl. ¶ 22. Amtrak moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in light of the mandatory arbitration provisions of the RLA, see 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i). Def.'s MTD at 1. BMWED then moved for summary judgment on the basis that it had definitively shown that the CBA reserves flagging work—including work performed for third parties that neither inures to Amtrak's benefit or is performed under Amtrak's control—for itsmembers. See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Def.'s MTD, and in Support of Pl.'s Mot. for Sum. Judgment ("Pl.'s MSJ") [Dkt. #8-2] at 1-2. Both motions are now ripe and resolved herein.
Federal courts possess only limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When, as here, a party moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the Court must "determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction in the first instance." Taylor v. Clark, 821 F. Supp. 2d 370, 372 (D.D.C. 2011). Where the Court lacks jurisdiction, it is powerless to provide plaintiff any relief. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employes Div./IBT v. Nat. R.R. Passenger Corp., 217 F. Supp. 3d 249, 256 (D.D.C. 2016) (hereinafter "BMWED").
Under Rule 12(b)(1), plaintiff bears the burden of proving the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172, 176 (D.D.C. 2004). The Court must accept as true all well pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Am. Farm Bureau v. E.P.A., 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2000). But "the Court may give the plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny" than it would in assessing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), and the Court may consider materials outside of the pleadings. Logan v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 357 F. Supp. 2d 149, 153 (D.D.C. 2004).
Congress has restricted the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal district courts tohear claims under the RLA. See, e.g., 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (establishing the National Railroad Adjustment Board (the "Board") and channeling disputes over the interpretation and application of railway labor agreements to arbitration before it). District courts retain jurisdiction over so-called "major disputes" but lack the ability to hear "minor disputes" in the first instance. BMWED, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 255. Thus, the principal question before the Court is whether the parties' contract dispute is "major" or "minor."
The Supreme Court has adopted the major/minor distinction as a "shorthand method [for] describing two classes of controvers[ies]." Conrail, 491 U.S. at 302. Major disputes arise under Section 2 Seventh and Section 6 of the RLA. See 45 U.S.C § 152 Seventh and § 156. These involve "disputes over the formation...
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