Bi-State Development Agency v. Whelan Sec. Co.
| Citation | 679 S.W.2d 332 |
| Decision Date | 21 August 1984 |
| Docket Number | BI-STATE,No. 47116,47116 |
| Parties | DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WHELAN SECURITY COMPANY and Sentinel Security Service Co., Inc., Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Russell F. Watters, Bryan L. Hettenbach, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.
Frank N. Gundlach, St. Louis, for defendants-respondents.
This appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis presents the question whether the appellant, Bi-State Development Agency, is collaterally estopped from pursuing its claim against the respondents, Whelan Security Company and Sentinel Security Service Co., Inc., for damages.
Appellant filed a two count petition in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis seeking $1,500,000.00 damages it sustained when a fire occurred at the Bi-State Parks Airport on August 13, 1978. In Count I, it alleged that the defendants had agreed to provide a guard service at the Airport to tour and secure the premises, inspect for fire hazards, and investigate for and prevent the entry of unauthorized persons, but that on the date of the fire the defendants breached the security service agreement and allowed an unknown trespasser to set fire to the premises.
Count II of the petition alleged that the defendants had undertaken to provide security service to plaintiff and to the public at plaintiff's airport, but that defendants had on the date of the fire negligently failed to provide a guard to tour the premises, had failed to inspect and secure the premises, failed to check the identification of persons entering the premises, and had failed to prevent a certain unknown trespasser from entering and setting fire to the premises.
Defendants filed a general denial and raised several affirmative defenses. As the case proceeded through its pre-trial course defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The grounds for this motion were that a jury in Division No. 11 of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis had on February 25, 1982, returned a verdict in favor of Bi-State (as appellant shall hereinafter be identified) in Cause No. 792-1773, C. Tom Foster, et al. v. Bi-State and the defendants in this present cause; that the verdict was on the merits and determined that the absence of the defendants' security guard on the night of the fire, was not the proximate cause of the loss sustained by plaintiffs in the Foster case; and that Bi-State's claim for property damages arising from the same fire and based upon the same allegations of negligence, was barred by the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel. The trial court denied this motion.
Subsequently on September 13, 1982, leave was granted defendants to refile their Motion for Summary Judgment "on issue preclusion," and defendants refiled their Motion for Summary Judgment, contending that Bi-States' claim in this action was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The trial court sustained defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on February 25, 1983. This appeal followed.
The Foster case involved a claim against Bi-State by Foster, as a tenant of Bi-State at Bi-State Parks Airport in Cahokia, Illinois, for damages sustained when the fire, which is the basis for this lawsuit, totally destroyed aircraft Hangar IV and its contents, including equipment and thirteen helicopters stored therein; and a claim by Fostaire Harbor, Inc., for destruction of some office equipment, shop equipment, tools, stored repair parts and equipment for helicopters stored in the hangars in this fire. Both Foster and Fostaire Harbor, Inc., also sought damages for disruption of business. A third plaintiff in the Foster case was Aviation General Insurance Company which provided insurance coverage of $381,500.00 on the helicopters lost in the fire and which amount was paid to Foster in exchange for subrogation rights, and it sought a judgment against Bi-State for the monies it had paid Foster.
Foster charged Bi-State: (1) negligently failed to provide security service and that no security guard was present on the night of the fire; (2) was negligent in contracting for only one guard to secure the entire airport; (3) negligently failed to provide watch clocks and timing devices so as to provide an adequate record of the presence and activities of guards and others at the airport; (4) leased premises to plaintiff which were inherently dangerous in that the electrical wiring system was faulty; and (5) leased to plaintiff premises which were inherently dangerous in that there was inoperable, insufficient, and ineffective fire fighting equipment.
Bi-State filed a third party petition joining the respondents as third party defendants wherein the security service agreement with the respondents was pled, and wherein it was further alleged that if the plaintiffs in the Foster case recovered for their losses from Bi-State, then Bi-State should been titled to indemnification from respondents because of breach of their security agreement with Bi-State. Foster and its co-plaintiffs did not amend their petitions to join the third-party defendants as defendants in their claims.
While both the Foster case and this case were pending in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis, Bi-State's defense counsel filed a motion to consolidate both actions. However, counsel for Bi-State in this case opposed the motion. The motion for consolidation was never called up for argument nor ruled on.
The Foster case went to trial and during opening statement Bi-State's trial counsel told the jury that "the negligence of the guard, if there be any, was not the proximate cause of the fire or the subsequent destruction of Mr. Foster's and his allied company's property." In their Motion for Summary Judgment defendants stated that Bi-State's Airport Manager testified in the Foster trial that it would be pure speculation as to whether a guard or anybody else could have seen the fire that night between 12:20 and 12:56 a.m.; that it all depended upon where the guard was.
Plaintiffs in the Foster case submitted verdict-directors against Bi-State in the disjunctive on three theories of negligence: (1) failure to provide a security guard to inspect the door of the hangar where the tenant's property was located; (2) failure to provide a security guard especially watchful for fires; or (3) that Bi-State knew or could have known that the particular part of the airport leased to the plaintiff-tenants was equipped with faulty electrical wiring.
With respect to it's third-party claim against the defendants in this case, Bi-State submitted that if Foster, et al., recovered against Bi-State, then Bi-State should be indemnified if the jury found that Whelan and Sentinel breached their security contract with Bi-State and that breach of contract caused Foster's damages.
The jury returned a general verdict against Foster, et al., and in favor of Bi-State on all counts. The verdict form on Bi-State's third party claim, signed by one juror, was in favor of Whelan and Sentinel. 1
The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action including a party to the first cause. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).
The nature of collateral estoppel is such that a fact appropriately determined in one law suit is given effect in another case involving different issues. Hudson v. Carr, 668 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo. banc 1984). The objective of the preclusion doctrine is to relieve the parties from the cost and vexation of multiple litigations, to conserve judicial resources, and to encourage reliance on adjudication by avoidance of inconsistent decisions. Shaffer v. Terrydale Management Corporation, 648 S.W.2d 595, 608 (Mo.App.1983).
In determining whether to apply collateral estoppel a court should consider: (1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; and (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. Mos...
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