Bianco v. Lay
| Decision Date | 31 March 1943 |
| Parties | LOUIS D. BIANCO v. ANN LAY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
November 9, 1942.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., QUA, DOLAN COX, & RONAN, JJ.
Deed, Acceptance. Fraudulent Conveyance. Land Court, Decision. Value. Words "Fair equivalent."
Although there was no manual delivery to the grantee of a deed conveying the interest of a tenant in common to his cotenant and the grantee knew nothing about the conveyance before it was made a conclusion that he had accepted it before a time more than two years after it was made was warranted where it appeared that the grantor executed the deed and handed it to an attorney for recording with a purpose to satisfy a debt owed by the grantor to the grantee, the grantee testified that he understood the conveyance had been made for that purpose, and it was admitted that the grantee had "been in possession of said . . . interest . . . since said conveyance."
A decision by a judge of the Land Court that an outright conveyance made by an insolvent person in satisfaction of an antecedent debt was not a fraudulent conveyance within G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 109A although based by the judge on the ground that fair consideration was given by the grantee-creditor within the inapplicable definition thereof in subdivision (b) of Section 3 of the statute, should be affirmed on appeal where the facts found showed that fair consideration was given by him within the applicable definition thereof in subdivision (a) of
In a writ of entry based in substance on the ground that a conveyance by an insolvent person to the tenant of an undivided one-third interest in common in a farm and a tract of pasture land was a fraudulent conveyance within G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 109A, a conclusion was proper that satisfaction of an antecedent debt of $3,000 owed by the insolvent grantor to the tenant was "a fair equivalent" and "fair consideration" for the conveyance within Sections 3 (a), 4, of the statute although the demandant and the tenant were both of opinion that the value of the interest so conveyed was $4,000.
In the circumstances, an agreement by the parties that the value of an interest in property was a specified amount was to be treated as an expression of their opinions of its value and did not preclude the judge from considering other factors bearing on its value in deciding whether fair consideration was given for a conveyance of the interest within G.
L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 109A, Sections 4, 3.
WRIT OF ENTRY in the Land Court dated April 3, 1940. The case was heard by Fenton, J.
I. Gelin, for the demandant, submitted a brief. No argument nor brief for the tenant.
This is a writ of entry to recover possession of certain parcels of land situated in East Longmeadow. The case was heard by the judge upon certain admitted and agreed facts and upon other evidence. The judge filed a decision in which he ordered that judgment be entered for the tenant. The demandant appealed from the decision and filed a bill of exceptions which was allowed by the judge.
Material facts found by the judge or admitted by the tenant follow: The demandant recovered a judgment against William Lay, a son of the tenant, on September 30, 1932, for $6,000 and costs, and on March 10, 1939, in an action on that judgment, obtained judgment against him for $8,330.20 and $12.75 costs. On March 21, 1939, a deputy sheriff, by virtue of execution issued upon that judgment, seized whatever right, title and interest William had in the demanded premises, and later sold them at public auction to the demandant, who was the highest bidder. The deed to the demandant is dated May 2, 1939, and was recorded on July 7, 1939. By deed dated October 26, 1936, William had conveyed all his right, title and interest in the demanded premises to the tenant, who has since been in possession thereof. The tenant is ninety years old. Her husband, Charles H. Lay, died intestate on August 22, 1936, leaving as his heirs the tenant and two sons, John and William to whom the demanded premises descended. They consist of two tracts making up the farm known as the home place, and a tract of pasture land, about one half mile above the other two tracts. The son William had been in the real estate business for many years, and having lost all his money returned to the farm about "fifteen years ago." He had received some $6,000 through various advances made to him by his father on the oral understanding that he would repay the sums advanced. His father would give him orders on his savings account and William "went to the bank and received and used the money." The tenant had no bank account in her own name but from time to time from 1924 on she gave William moneys of her own totalling approximately $3,000. He paid no board during all the years he stayed at the home place. Two or three days before he died, Charles Lay (the father) had a conversation with William in the presence of the tenant. He asked William what he was going to do about what he owed, and about his interest in the place, and William said, "I'll do what is right." His father then said, "are you going to take care of your mother if anything happens to me," and William again said, "I'll do what is right." It was in pursuance of this talk and "because of the money he owed his mother [that] . . . [William] transferred his interest in the demanded premises to her" on October 26, 1936. He had no conversation with the tenant concerning that matter prior to this transfer to her and she knew nothing about it before it was made. The deed was prepared by a lawyer in his office in Springfield. The tenant was not then present. After the deed had been executed by William he gave it to the lawyer to record. The then value of William's interest in the property was agreed to be $4,000. The tenant testified that she understood that William's interest was transferred to her "to pay her for what she had given him and what his father had given him." At the time of the conveyance, William had no assets other than his interest in the demanded premises and owed approximately $4,500,000, principally on account of deficiency judgments obtained against him on notes secured by mortgages on real estate which he had owned at various times. He was hopelessly insolvent. The judge also found that there "was no evidence in the instant case of any agreement or understanding either open or secret whereby William Lay was to profit by the transaction"; that he conveyed his interest "to his mother, the tenant . . . in good faith and for a fair consideration which was an antecedent debt not disproportionately small as compared with the value of the property obtained by her"; that the tenant did not participate in any fraud, but "accepted the conveyance in good faith for an antecedent debt"; and he ruled that the interest of William in the demanded premises "was not fraudulently conveyed within the meaning of the `Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Law', G. L. (Ter. Ed.) Chapter 109A."
The demandant puts forward two questions as those presented for determination:
With respect to these matters the demandant contends that the conclusions of the judge that the tenant accepted the conveyance and that the tenant gave fair consideration therefor are inconsistent with the subsidiary facts found by the judge. The findings of fact of the judge cannot be revised and must be accepted as true, and if upon all the facts thus disclosed and the reasonable inferences of which they are susceptible the ultimate findings are justified as matter of law they must stand. Burke v. Commonwealth, 283 Mass. 63 . Horowitz v. Peoples Savings Bank, 307 Mass. 222, 224. Franklin v. Metcalfe, 307 Mass. 386 , 390.
It is true, as argued by the demandant, that the recording of a deed without the knowledge or consent of the grantee is not effective to pass title, and that the deed will not become effective until the date of its acceptance. Harrison v. Phillips Academy, 12 Mass. 455, 461. Samson v. Thornton, 3 Met. 275, 281. Meigs v. Dexter, 172 Mass. 217, 218. In the instant case there is no finding of a manual delivery of the deed to the tenant, but it is settled that "manual delivery of a recorded deed is not required to work a transfer, and that acts of the grantee when coupled with a purpose of the grantor to treat the deed as delivered are sufficient to pass the title." Sullivan v. Hudgins, 303 Mass. 442, 446, 447, 448, and cases cited. See Gragg v. Learned, 109 Mass. 167 , 169. In the present case the record shows that the judge has found a purpose on the part of the grantor William to convey his interest in the premises to the tenant in payment of sums advanced to him by her, that is, in payment of an antecedent debt, and that, shortly following the death of his father, William executed the deed in question in pursuance of that purpose; that the tenant testified that she understood that he had transferred his interest in the property to her "to pay her for what she had given him and what his father had given him"; and that the tenant admitted in response to the "Demandant's Demand For Admission Of Facts," in his own words, that she "has been in possession of said right, title and interest described in said deed dated October 26, 1936, since said conveyance to her by him" (William). In the light of these facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom we think it cannot be said properly that any error of law is apparent on the record with respect to the conclusion of the judge that the tenant accepted the conveyance, and we think that they also support a...
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Bianco v. Lay
...313 Mass. 44448 N.E.2d 36BIANCOv.LAY.Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.March 31, Writ of entry by Louis D. Bianco against Ann Lay to recover possession of certain parcels of realty. The trial judge ordered that judgment be entered for tenant, and demandant appeals from the de......