Bibiloni Del Valle v. Puerto Rico

• Decision Date: 14 October 2009
• Docket Number: Civil No. 07-1362 (RLA).
• Parties: Edgardo L. BIBILONI DEL VALLE, Plaintiff, v. The Commonwealth of PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

661 F.Supp.2d 155

Edgardo L. BIBILONI DEL VALLE, Plaintiff, v. The Commonwealth of PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 07-1362 (RLA).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

October 14, 2009.

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Glenn Carl James-Hernandez, James Law Offices, Guaynabo, PR, for Plaintiff.

Jose J. Gueits-Ortiz, Wandymar Burgos-Vargas, Department of Justice of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

ORDER IN THE MATTER OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RAYMOND L. ACOSTA, District Judge.

The COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO ("COMMONWEALTH"), the P.R. POLICE DEPARTMENT ("PR-PD"), ANGEL RIVERA and GALO SEGARRA—the remaining defendants in these proceedings—have moved the court to enter summary judgment in their favor and to dismiss the claims asserted against them in this action. The court having reviewed the arguments presented by the parties as well as the evidence submitted in support thereof hereby disposes of the motion as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

This action was instituted by EDGARDO BIBILONI against the local government and the two aforementioned individually-named defendants in their personal capacity asserting federal causes of action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-3(a) (Title VII), as well as under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for breach of the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution.

Additionally, plaintiff claims violation of the Puerto Rico anti-discrimination statutes, Act No. 17 of April 22, 1988, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 155 (2002) (Law 17) and Law 69 of July 6, 1985, as amended, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 1321-1341 (2002) (Law 69) as well as the local tort provisions, arts. 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141 and 5142 (1990) under our supplemental jurisdiction.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) Fed. R. Civ. P., which sets forth the standard for ruling on summary judgment motions, in pertinent part provides that they shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660-61 (1st Cir.2000); Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.1999). The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in the record. DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997). A genuine issue exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual disputes to require a trial. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of a lawsuit under the governing law. Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1995).

"In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view `the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.'" Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 361 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Barbour v. Dynamics Research Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir.1995)). "In marshaling the facts for this purpose we must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. That does not mean, however, that we ought to draw unreasonable inferences or credit bald assertions, empty conclusions, rank conjecture, or vitriolic invective." Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2007) (internal citation omitted, italics in original).

Credibility issues fall outside the scope of summary judgment. "`Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). See also, Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 432 (1st Cir.2000) ("court should not engage in credibility assessments"); Simas v. First Citizens' Fed. Credit Union, 170 F.3d 37, 49 (1st Cir.1999) ("credibility determinations are for the factfinder at trial, not for the court at summary judgment"); Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp., 137 F.3d 50 54 (1st Cir.1998) (credibility issues not proper on summary judgment); Molina Quintero v. Caribe G.E. Power Breakers, Inc., 234 F.Supp.2d 108, 113 (D.P.R.2002) "There is no room for credibility the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails, and no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood. In fact, only if the record, viewed in this manner and without regard to credibility determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact may the court enter summary judgment." Cruz-Baez v. Negron-Irizarry, 360 F.Supp.2d 326, 332 (D.P.R. 2005) (internal citations, brackets and quotation marks omitted).

In cases where the non-movant party bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite and competent evidence to rebut a motion for summary judgment, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256-257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202; Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir.2001); Grant's Dairy v. Comm'r of Maine Dep't of Agric., 232 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.2000), and cannot rely upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation". Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 412 (1st Cir.2000); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994); Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).

Any testimony used in support of discriminatory motive in a motion for summary judgment setting must be admissible in evidence, i.e., based on personal knowledge and otherwise not contravening evidentiary principles. Rule 56(e) specifically mandates that affidavits submitted in conjunction with the summary judgment mechanism must "be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Hoffman v. Applicators Sales and Serv., Inc., 439 F.3d 9 16 (1st Cir.2006); Nieves-Luciano v. Hernandez-Torres, 397 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2005); Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 131 (1st Cir.2000). See also, Quiñones v. Houser Buick, 436 F.3d 284, 290 (1st Cir.2006) (affidavit inadmissible given plaintiff's failure to cite "supporting evidence to which he could testify in court"). Additionally, the document "must concern facts as opposed to conclusions, assumptions, or surmise", Perez v. Volvo Car Corp., 247 F.3d 303, 316 (1st Cir.2001), not conclusory allegations Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d at 414.

"To the extent that affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment merely reiterate allegations made in the complaint, without providing specific factual information made on the basis of personal knowledge, they are insufficient. However, a party's own affidavit, containing relevant information of which he has firsthand knowledge, may be self-serving, but it is nonetheless competent to support or defeat summary judgment." Santiago v. Centennial, 217 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

"A court is not obliged to accept as true or to deem as a disputed material fact each and every unsupported, subjective, conclusory, or imaginative statement made to the Court by a party." Garcia v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 535 F.3d 23, 31 n. 5 (1st Cir.2008) (internal citation, brackets and quotation marks omitted).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

According to plaintiff, while employed as a janitor with the PR-PD he was the object of inappropriate touching and sexual harassment by a fellow janitor which situation was known to and instigated by GALO SEGARRA, his supervisor, who failed to take any corrective action. Plaintiff contends that he was subjected to retaliatory harassment and eventual termination from employment for having complained of the sexually charged environment.

The evidence in record shows that plaintiff worked as a "Técnico de Mantenimiento" or janitor, in the General Services Division of the PR-PD.

GALO SEGARRA, Director of the General Services Division, was plaintiff's supervisor at all relevant times.

Domestic Violence Incident

Plaintiff was involved in a domestic violence incident with his former wife, JOHANNA TORRES BURGOS, on February 2, 1999.

In a sworn statement taken on February 16, 2000, by an investigating officer ascribed to the PR-PD Division of Domestic Violence and Sexual Harassment, JOHANNA TORRES BURGOS indicated that she was again living with plaintiff within six months after the event; his conduct had changed significantly; she had no interest in pursuing the matter any further and refused to answer any questions on the subject at that time.

Plaintiff claims that a second Letter of Resolution of Charges recommending his termination based on this incident was issued on June 22, 2006, that is, more than seven years after the event.

Elevator Incident

According to a memorandum dated October 5, 2005, subscribed by MIGUEL RIVERA CLAUDIO, Investigative Agent for the PR-PD Confidential Investigations Division, on September 30, 2005, he received an anonymous telephone call regarding an incident involving plaintiff and MARGARITA FIGUEROA CARRASQUILLO.

The memorandum indicates that at...