Molina Quintero v. Caribe G.E. Power Breakers

• Decision Date: 09 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. CIV.99-1028 RLA.,CIV.99-1028 RLA.
• Citation: 234 F.Supp.2d 108
• Parties: Olga M. MOLINA QUINTERO, Plaintiff, v. CARIBE G.E. POWER BREAKERS, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Page 108

234 F.Supp.2d 108

Olga M. MOLINA QUINTERO, Plaintiff, v. CARIBE G.E. POWER BREAKERS, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.99-1028 RLA.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

December 9, 2002.

Juan A. Hernandez-Rivera, San Juan, PR, Federico R. Ducoudray-Acevedo, San Juan, PR, Raymond Rivera-Esteves, Bayamon, PR, for plaintiff.

Rafael Escalera-Rodriguez, Ineabelle Santiago-Camacho, Reichard & Escalera, San Juan, PR, for Caribe GE Power Brakers, Inc., defendant.

Rafael Colon, Vega Baja, PR, pro se.

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ACOSTA, District Judge.

Plaintiff and defendants have filed cross-motions for summary judgment which are hereby disposed of as follows.

BACKGROUND

This action was instituted by plaintiff, OLGA M. MOLINA QUINTERO, ("plaintiff") against CARIBE G.E. POWER BREAKERS, INC. ("G.E."), her former employer, as well as RAFAEL COLON MALDONADO ("COLON") individually, alleging sexual discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and various local discrimination statutes. Plaintiff also requests relief under the Puerto Rico torts provision.

Both G.E. and COLON have moved for summary judgment on the discrimination and supplemental jurisdiction claims. Plaintiff responded thereto and submitted a cross-motion for summary judgment on her behalf.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the standard for ruling on summary judgment motions. See Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660-61 (1st Cir.2000). Federal courts will grant summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law". Rule 56(c) Fed.R.Civ.P. The First Circuit Court of Appeals has reiterated that the function of summary judgment is "to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required." Cortés-Irizarry v. Corporación Insular, 111 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir.1997) (citing Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.1992)); Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R.T.C., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir.1997).

The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in the record. DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997). "To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of a trialworthy issue as to some material fact." Cortés-Irizarry, 111 F.3d at 187.

A genuine issue exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual disputes to require a trial. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994). See also Basic Controlex Corp. v. Klockner Moeller Corp., 202 F.3d 450, 453 (1st Cir.2000) ("A genuine issue of fact exists only if a reasonable jury could resolve it in favor of either party.").

A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of a lawsuit under the governing law. Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1995). "A fact is `material' if it potentially could affect the suit's outcome ... [and is] `genuine' if a reasonable factfinder, examining the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences helpful to the party resisting summary judgment, could resolve the dispute in that party's favor." Cortés-Irizarry, 111 F.3d at 187 (citations omitted).

The court is required to "constru[e] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolving all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 131 (1st Cir.2000); Cortés-Irizarry, 111 F.3d at 187.

A party moving for summary judgment must not only show that there is "no genuine issue of material facts", but also that he is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Vega-Rodríguez, 110 F.3d. at 178.

HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

The protection against discrimination in employment based on sex provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) has been expanded to areas beyond strictly "economic" and "tangible discrimination" to situations where "sexual harassment is so severe or pervasive as to alter the condition of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (citations, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986).

Ascertaining which particular conduct falls within the "severe or pervasive" realm in order to trigger Title VII protection is no easy task. However, "in order to be actionable under the statute, a sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275. The court will examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the degree of the hostile or abusive environment the employee is subjected to is intense enough to fit within Title VII protection. Id.

[W]hether the environment is objectively hostile or abusive must be answered by reference to all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.

Marrero v. Goya de P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 18-19 (1st Cir.2002) (citing Harris) (internal citations omitted); Gorski v. New Hampshire Dep't of Corrections, 290 F.3d 466, 472 (1st Cir.2002); Conto v. Concord Hosp., Inc., 265 F.3d 79, 82 (1st Cir.2001); O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 729 (1stCir.2001).

In O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 728 the Court summarized the elements plaintiff must prove in order to succeed in her hostile work environment claim as set forth by the Supreme Court. These are:

(1) that she... is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upon sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment; (5) that sexually objectionable conduct was both objectively and subjectively offensive, such that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and the victim in fact did perceive it to be so; and (6) that some basis for employer liability has been established.

A hostile work environment may result from "sexual remarks, innuendoes, ridicule and intimidation ... disgusting comments" Goya, 304 F.3d at 19 (citations and internal quotations omitted) "unwelcome sexual advances or demands for sexual favors" Gorski, 290 F.3d at 472 (citations and internal quotations omitted) which are "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 728 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

It is plaintiff's burden to establish the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment sufficient to alter the conditions of her employment. Conto, 265 F.3d at 82. This determination is "fact-specific". Id. at 81.

Ordinarily "it is for the jury to weigh those factors and decide whether the harassment was of a kind or to a degree that a reasonable person would have felt that it affected the conditions of her employment." Goya, 304 F.3d at 19.

Employer's Liability

The employer's liability in this type of litigation will vary depending on whether the alleged harasser is the victim's co-worker or supervisor.

If a co-worker, an employer will be held accountable "if it `knew or should have known of the charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action.'" White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Corrections, 221 F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir.2000) (citing Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir.1997)).

In situations where a supervisor is charged with the inappropriate conduct his employer may defend to harassment claims provided no tangible employment action has been taken. "No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment." Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998).

If the offender is a supervisor and no tangible employment action has been taken the employer carries the burden of establishing the following facts as an affirmative defense to the claims: "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. 742, 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633.

Plaintiff has specifically acknowledged that codefendant COLON was not her supervisor.¹ She argues instead that "Mr. Colón's actions against plaintiff combined with G.E.'s inaction to her complaints of sexual harassment resulted in a tangible employment action against plaintiff. That tangible employment action was plaintiff's induced resignation." Plaintiffs' Opposition (docket No. 94 at 15).

In other words, plaintiff contends that she was forced to resign because the situation at work became intolerable due to COLON's unbridled sexually...