Bidar v. AMFAC, Inc.

• Citation: 669 P.2d 154,66 Haw. 547
• Decision Date: 16 September 1983
• Docket Number: No. 8587,8587
• Court: Supreme Court of Hawai'i
• Parties: Alta E. BIDAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMFAC, INC., a Hawaii corporation, John Does 1-5, Roe Corporations 1-3, Defendants-Appellees.

Page 154

669 P.2d 154

66 Haw. 547

Alta E. BIDAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMFAC, INC., a Hawaii corporation, John Does 1-5, Roe Corporations 1-3, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 8587.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Sept. 16, 1983.

Syllabus by the Court

1. It is fundamental that a negligence action lies only where there is a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. The existence of a duty, that is, whether such a relation exists between the parties that the community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other--or, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant, is entirely a question of law.

2. An occupier of land who operates a hotel has a duty to use reasonable care for the safety of all persons reasonably anticipated to be upon the premises.

3. Where a relationship of hotel operator and guest exists, there unquestionably is a duty owed by the hotel operator to maintain a bathroom adjoining a hotel room in a reasonably safe condition for the use of the guest.

4. Whether the obligation to exercise reasonable care was breached is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact to determine. For under the prevailing rule the duty to use due care is bounded by the foreseeable range of danger, and reasonable foreseeability of harm is the very prototype of the question a jury must pass upon in particularizing the standard of conduct in the case before it.

5. Whether a breach of duty was more likely than not a substantial factor in causing the harm complained of is normally a question for the trier of fact.

6. Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication by the court.

7. Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant clearly demonstrates he should prevail as a matter of law.

8. The review of a summary judgment by an appellate court is governed by the rule that the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

9. Whether it was foreseeable that a hotel guest would grab a towel bar within easy reach for support in rising from a toilet seat in the bathroom adjoining her hotel room is a genuine issue of material fact that ought to be left for jury consideration.

10. Whether the damages sought to be recovered by the plaintiff were caused in whole or in part by her negligence and whether it exceeded that of the defendant or not are questions that should be put before a jury.

11. The rule of strict liability in tort is a rule of products liability.

12. A person who sells or leases a defective product which is dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the defective product to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller or lessor is engaged in the business of selling or leasing such product, and (b) the product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in its condition after it is sold or leased.

13. A prefabricated building that must be assembled is a product where the seller-manufacturer may be found strictly liable for injuries caused by a defective component part.

14. An allegation that "a portion of the leased or rented premises proved defective" does not serve to invoke the rule of strict liability in tort because such an allegation does not identify a defective product.

James Krueger, Wailuku (Virgil James Wilson, III, Wailuku, with him on briefs, Kevin W. Geer, Wailuku, with them on opening brief; James Krueger, A Law Corporation, Wailuku, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Roy A. Vitousek, III, Honolulu (David Schulmeister, Honolulu, with him on brief, Cades Schutte Fleming & Wright, Honolulu, of counsel), for defendant-appellee Amfac, Inc.

Before LUM, C.J., NAKAMURA, PADGETT, and HAYASHI, JJ., and Circuit Judge SPENCER assigned by reason of vacancy.

NAKAMURA, Justice.

The question for decision is whether the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit erred in awarding Amfac, Inc. (Amfac), a hotel owner and operator, summary judgment in an action brought by Alta Bidar (Mrs. Bidar or the plaintiff) to recover damages for injuries sustained in a fall that occurred while she was a guest at an Amfac hotel in Lahaina, Maui. Although we see no error in the grant of judgment in Amfac's favor on Mrs. Bidar's product liability claim, we conclude the presence of disputed factual issues precluded the summary disposition of her negligence claim. We therefore reverse the circuit court in part and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.

The plaintiff, a sixty-seven year old visitor from Madison, Wisconsin, checked into the Kaanapali Beach Hotel on June 4, 1977 with a tour group composed of senior citizens. On June 7, 1977, fifteen minutes before the group's scheduled departure from Lahaina, she decided to go to the bathroom of the hotel room she had been occupying for three days. In rising from her sitting position after using the toilet, she grabbed a towel bar affixed to an adjacent wall and attempted to pull herself up. But the bar tore loose from the wall before she was able to bring herself to a full upright position. This caused her to lose her balance, fall, and become wedged between the toilet and the bathtub. As a result, she sustained a fractured hip and a fractured wrist.

Mrs. Bidar's suit for damages which was filed on May 31, 1979 averred that Amfac and other unnamed defendants "negligently maintained ... [the hotel] premises" and "failed to advise users ... that the [premises] were in a dangerous and defective condition," though they "knew or should have known of the negligently maintained condition." The foregoing conduct, she claimed, "constituted an intentional, wilful and wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights, was grossly negligent, and thereby subject[ed] defendants ... to the imposition of punitive damages." The complaint also charged defendants were "strictly liable to plaintiff for the damages sustained by her."

Amfac responded by denying any negligent or intentional conduct causing plaintiff harm and further alleging "that the damages sought to be recovered ... were caused by the negligence or fault of the Plaintiff, which negligence was the sole cause of said damage[s], or greater than the negligence or fault, if any, of AMFAC." It then moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law since it clearly had no "duty to design, construct and maintain a towel rack so that it would support the weight of a 220-pound individual" and Mrs. Bidar's reliance on the rack for support in rising from the toilet seat was neither an ordinary nor a reasonably foreseeable use of the fixture.

The plaintiff countered with arguments that the "theories of recovery" articulated in her complaint "all f[e]ll within the parameters of the doctrine of product liability" and that "defendant had a duty to provide a room and accoutrements therein which were not dangerous or defective even if a foreseeable misuse thereof might occur." The "defendant's use of the towel rack for an unintended purpose, not the hotel room itself," was the purported basis of liability under plaintiff's product liability theory. And she maintained there was a factual dispute on "whether plaintiff's use of the towel rack for the purpose of arising from the toilet, under the circumstances, given the proximity of the towel rack to the toilet, was a foreseeable misuse of the towel rack."

The circuit court awarded Amfac summary judgment on "all portions of Plaintiff's Complaint which purport[ed] to state claims for products liability, intentional injury, or strict liability." But summary judgment on those "portions of Plaintiff's Complaint which purport[ed] to state a claim based upon the alleged negligence of Defendant AMFAC, INC. with respect to the location and maintenance of the towel rack" was denied. The plaintiff was given leave to amend her pleading and Amfac was granted permission to submit a new response if plaintiff elected to plead anew or to file an amended answer if she chose not to amend the complaint. Plaintiff, however, did not amend her complaint; and Amfac filed an amended answer within the time allowed by the court, averring inter alia that the action was "barred by the applicable statute of limitations."

Undaunted by the court's partial rejection of the plea for summary disposition of the case, Amfac submitted a second motion for summary judgment. This time, it relied primarily on Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-8 which then provided immunity from negligence actions premised on allegedly faulty construction of buildings for landowners, contractors, and others after a lapse of six years following construction. ¹ The plaintiff contended in opposition that the pertinent cause of action was "one sounding in negligent maintenance and repair of the premises" rather than faulty construction and that disputed issues of fact barred summary judgment. She also raised an entirely new argument, that Amfac had breached "the implied covenant of safe accom[m]odation, habitability, et cetera." ²

The circuit court, after listening to counsel and considering the memoranda in support of or in opposition to the second motion as well as those submitted earlier when the first motion was heard, concluded the defendant was "entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law." Amfac, therefore, was awarded summary judgment and the complaint was dismissed with prejudice. Following the denial of her motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff perfected a timely appeal to this court.

II.

As we noted at the outset, the issue here is whether summary judgment was proper. Because of Mrs. Bidar's primary reliance on Amfac's purported negligence in maintaining its premises as a basis for recovery...