Biederman v. State

Decision Date14 January 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-819,80-819
Citation392 So.2d 982
PartiesNorman BIEDERMAN and David Tupper, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Harlan Street and William S. Isenberg of Law Offices of Harlan Street, P. A., North Miami, for appellants.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Ondina Felipe, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

BERANEK, Judge.

Norman Biederman and David Tupper appeal from their respective judgments and sentences, contending the trial court erroneously denied their motions to dismiss an indictment. We agree and reverse.

Biederman, indicted for two violations of Section 812.021(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), the grand larceny statute, moved to dismiss counts I and II 1 on grounds that the indictment was so vague and indistinct as to mislead and embarrass him in the preparation of his defense. The court denied the motion.

Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(o ), an indictment should not be dismissed

unless the court shall be of the opinion that the indictment or information is so vague, indistinct and indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass him in the preparation of his defense or expose him after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same offense.

Explaining count I at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the Assistant State Attorney stated: "What the State is alleging is that Evrocin Incorporated sold merchandise it had bought on credit, to Mr. Melnick; that Mr. Melnick gave cash to an agent of the Defendant, that cash never was placed into the corporate account so that the creditors could be paid. The monies, therefore, which were actually owed to Evrocin, Inc., were misappropriated ... the money never made its way into the company, because the agent and the Defendant, ..., misappropriated." None of this information can be gleaned from the indictment which reflects neither Melnick's status nor Biederman's relationship to Evrocin, Inc. We find the count vague and confusing. Consequently, we hold the indictment failed to adequately apprise Biederman of the offense charged in count I. Count II suffers from the same defects and both counts should have been dismissed.

Biederman and Tupper both moved to dismiss counts III through XX, 2 Although not called upon to do so, we observe without deciding that there are various other sections of the statutes which these defendants might have been charged with violating. See Waterman v. State, 317 So.2d 469 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).

alleging that the indictment failed to charge a crime because the false representations in question pertained to promises to do something in the future. The trial court denied the motions "because it was the common scheme, ... the intent existed at the time of the purchase, to defraud and to refuse to pay." We reverse. Under present Florida law, a promise to do something in the future, even though defendant never intended to perform the promise when he made it, will not support a conviction for larceny by false pretenses. A false representation of a past or existing fact is essential to charge this particular crime. Scarlett v. State, 25 Fla. 717, 6 So. 767 (1889); Martin v. State, 379 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Dhonau v. State, 276 So.2d 503 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Youngker v. State, 215 So.2d 318 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968). The State conceded that the alleged false representations herein referred to promises to perform future acts. The trial court, therefore, erred in denying Biederman's and Tupper's motions to dismiss counts III through XX.

Accordingly, the judgments and sentences appealed from are reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

LETTS, C. J., and HERSEY, J., concur.

COUNT I

NORMAN BIEDERMAN Between the 1st day of April, A.D. 1977, and the 31st day of July, inclusively, in the year of our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-seven, in the County of Broward, State of Florida, then and there, while having in his constructive possession, custody or control, the property of Evrocin Company, Inc., a Florida corporation, to-wit: money, obtained from William Melnick,...

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3 cases
  • Kaufman v. State, 79-307
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • June 24, 1981
    ...the appellant with selling securities in violation of the provisions of Section 517.12, Florida Statutes (1973). Cf. Biederman v. State, 392 So.2d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). We believe there was sufficient proof to implicate and hold appellant responsible for the sale of securities in violati......
  • Weaver v. State, 4D06-4364.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 2, 2008
    ...See Youngker v. State, 215 So.2d 318 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Martin v. State, 379 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Biederman v. State, 392 So.2d 982, 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The Youngker defendant constructed improvements on his property. The state charged him with the theft of labor or materia......
  • Kahlenberg v. State, 79-2560
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • October 21, 1981
    ...the defendant under the embezzlement section nor alleged his relationship to the corporate owner. See generally Biederman v. State, 392 So.2d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). After a review of all the evidence, we conclude that the State simply failed to prove the essential elements of larceny or e......

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