Bielecki v. United Trucking Serv., Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 September 1929
• Docket Number: No. 108.,108.
• Citation: 247 Mich. 661,226 N.W. 675
• Parties: BIELECKI v. UNITED TRUCKING SERVICE, Inc., et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

247 Mich. 661

226 N.W. 675

BIELECKI

v.UNITED TRUCKING SERVICE, Inc., et al.

No. 108.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 4, 1929.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Clair County, in Law; Eugene F. Law, Judge.

Suit by Peter Bielecki, administrator of the estate of Mary Bielecki, deceased, against the United Trucking Service, Inc., and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before the Entire Bench.Isaac S. Hughes, of Port Huron, and Abbott & Coulter, of Detroit, for appellant.

Stewart & Black, of Port Huron (Dean W. Kelley, of Lansing, of counsel), for appellees.

WIEST, J.

Mary Bielecki was killed while riding in a Ford truck driven by her son, Peter. The accident happened near midnight, upon a paved highway, and was occasioned by the truck colliding with the end of a large iron beam upon another truck and trailer. The truck and trailer belonged to defendant company, and defendant Green was the driver. The truck and trailer carried two iron beams about 50 feet in length, each weighing between 3 1/2 and 4 tons, and several smaller girders, and the whole load of beams and girders weighed about 14 tons. The two large beams rested upon the truck and trailer, with the ends thereof projecting several feet over the rear of the trailer. The night was dark and stormy. The Ford truck collided with the projecting end of one of the large beams, forced it through the windshield and against the breast of Mrs. Bielecki, and caused her death within a few moments. The impact also drove the large iron beam forward on the large truck, and against the cab thereof, with such force that the driver had to break the windshield to get out.

Claiming that the truck and trailer were stopped in the highway, with the end of one of the beams near the center of the pavement and without warning light, this suit was brought to recover damages in behalf of the estate of the deceased. Upon hearing the proofs, the circuit judge directed a verdict for defendants on the ground of the contributory negligence of Peter Bielecki, the driver, and imputable to Mary Bielecki, the passenger. Plaintiff reviews by writ of error, and insists that the issues should have been left to the jury, and invokes the provision found in Act No. 318, Public Acts 1927, later quoted and considered.

Was Peter guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law? The light on his truck were in poor condition, as the reflectors were rusted, and the outside right brake was absent. Accepting the claim that the lanterns hanging upon the ends of the projecting iron beams were unlighted, yet the beams were of such size as to be clearly visible, had the lights of the Ford truck been properly serviceable. Peter did not discover the loaded truck and trailer until within ten feet of the ends of the large beams. He was driving about 15 miles per hour, at night, in a storm, with lights disclosing a view of not more than 10 feet. He was guilty of contributory negligence, barring recovery in this case. Lett v. Summerfield & Hecht, 239 Mich. 699, 214 N. W. 939.

But, even so, it is claimed that, in case of a collision of vehicles, the court may no longer direct a verdict on such ground, for the Legislature has taken away the power, and made the issue of right of recovery one of fact and not of law. Attorneys for plaintiff claim there was a collision, within the meaning of section 5(a), title 3, Act No. 318, Public Acts 1927, and the court could not direct a verdict. The part of the section so invoked reads:

‘That in the event of damages occurring to person or property on account of a collision of vehicles or of vehicles with other objects, in which both parties were violating any laws of the state pertaining to the operation of vehicles, than [then] the question of who shall be held for damages shall be a question of fact.’

This provision in the statute appears to have been an interloper, as it came unannounced by the title, is quite unfitted to the company where found, uncertain in meaning, substitutes fact for law, and is a disturber of long-settled principles, if given the scope urged by the attorneys for plaintiff. The provision is not a legislative adopted of the rule of comparative negligence, for it lacks every essential element of such a rule. It is a newcomer in the field of jurisprudence, and its scope and applicability must be measured before its validity can be determined. What does it mean? It only applies in case both parties violate the law of the road. It does not require, by its terms, that the violation by either or both be the proximate cause of a collision.

Under our holdings violations of the law of the road by a plaintiff, unless contributing to an injury, do not bar right of recovery. Gleason v. Lowe, 232 Mich. 300, 205 N. W. 199. Does it abrogate the rule of...