Hopkins v. Kurn
| Decision Date | 06 April 1943 |
| Docket Number | No. 38347.,38347. |
| Citation | 171 S.W.2d 625 |
| Parties | BEULAH HOPKINS v. J.M. KURN and JOHN G. LONSDALE, Trustees of ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Douglas Circuit Court. — Hon. Robert L. Gideon, Judge.
REVERSED.
E.G. Nahler and Mann & Mann for appellants.
(1) Section 6, Article 23 of the Constitution of Oklahoma, providing that the defense of contributory negligence shall, in all cases, be a question of fact for the jury, is not binding upon the courts of Missouri in this case. It is no part of the substantive law giving the cause of action. It affects the remedy only, and, therefore, has no extraterritorial effect. 5 R.C.L., sec. 134, p. 1043; Menard v. Goltra, 40 S.W. (2d) 1053; Buchholz v. Standard Oil Co., 211 Mo. App. 397, 244 S.W. 973; State of Kansas v. United States F. & G. Co., 14 S.W. (2d) 576; Rastede v. Railroad, 212 N.W. 751; Jones v. Chicago, etc., Railroad, 80 Minn. 488, 83 N.W. 446; Lewis v. Bush, 30 Minn. 244, 15 N.W. 133; Jones v. Railroad, 243 S.W. 976; Johnson v. Railroad, 91 Iowa, 248, 59 N.W. 66; Smith v. Railroad, 141 Ind. 92, 40 N.E. 270; Heaton v. Eldridge, 46 N.E. 638; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard, 94 Va. 146, 26 S.W. 421; Stock v. Detour Lbr. & Cedar Co., 151 Mich. 21, 114 N.W. 876; Geoghegan v. Atlas S.S. Co., 22 N.Y. Supp. 749; Richmond & D.R. Co. v. Mitchell, 92 Ga. 77, 18 S.E. 290; New Orleans & N.E.R. Co. v. Harris, 247 U.S. 1, 62 L. Ed. 1167; Pennsylvania v. McCann, 54 Ohio St. 10, 42 N.E. 768; Hilton v. Railroad, 97 Ala. 275, 12 So. 276; Sec. 642, Chap. 12, American Law Institute's Restatement of Law of Conflicts of Laws (not yet published); 41 Harvard Law Rev. 254; 29 Michigan Law Rev. 1080; 10 Texas Law Rev. 103; 12 Minnesota Law Rev. 263; Colucci v. Lehigh V.R. Co., 202 N.Y. Supp. 717. (2) The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has construed this constitutional provision to be procedural and not substantive law. Independent Cotton D. Co. v. Beacham, 120 Pac. 969; Muskogee V.B. Co. v. Napier, 126 Pac. 792; Coats v. Riley, 7 Pac. (2d) 644; In re Smith's Estate, 269 Pac. 259; St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co. v. Rushing, 120 Pac. 973; Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. Dawson, 124 Pac. 10; Midland V.R. Co. v. Larson, 138 Pac. 173. (3) The construction put upon a constitutional or statutory provision by the courts of the State of its enactment becomes in effect a part and parcel thereof and is binding upon the courts of this State. Mosely v. Empire G. & F. Co., 313 Mo. 225, 281 S.W. 762; Ramey v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 21 S.W. (2d) 873; Hiatt v. St. Louis-S.F.R. Co., 308 Mo. 77, 271 S.W. 806. (4) The doctrine of comity "in a legal sense is complaisance, courtesy, the granting of a privilege, not of right but of good will." This doctrine does not require the courts to follow or apply a foreign statute which is in direct conflict with the policy of the law of the forum. Carey v. Schmeltz, 221 Mo. 132; Woodard v. Bush, 282 Mo. 163, 220 S.W. 839; Hudson v. Von Hamm, 259 Pac. 374. (5) If this constitutional provision is held to be substantive law becoming a part of the right and not merely effecting the remedy, the courts of this State will nevertheless refuse to enforce or apply it for the reason that it is contrary to the public policy of this State. To permit it to be invoked here is to deny and take from the courts of Missouri an inherent judicial power, namely, the right of the court to pass upon whether a given state of facts presents a question for the jury. It is a right which our own Legislature could not deny to our courts. In re Richards, 63 S.W. (2d) 672; State ex rel. Columbia T. Co. v. Atkinson, 271 Mo. 28, 195 S.W. 741; O'Donnell v. Wells, 21 S.W. (2d) 762; State ex inf. Crow v. Ballins, 140 Mo. 523; State ex rel. York v. Locker, 266 Mo. 384; State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205; State ex rel. Haughey v. Ryan, 182 Mo. 349; Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Gildersleeve, 219 Mo. 170; State v. Hopper, 71 Mo. 425; Ex parte LeMond, 295 Mo. 586; Thoe v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co., 181 Wis. 456, 195 N.W. 407; Bielecki v. United T.S., Inc., 226 N.W. 675; People v. McMurchy, 228 N.W. 723; Harker v. Bushhouse, 236 N.W. 222; Steinfeld v. Neilsen, 139 Pac. 879; Andrade v. Andrade, 128 Pac. 813. (6) The deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Hines, Director General, v. Dean, 220 Pac. 860; St. Louis-S.F.R. Co. v. Tyler, 232 Pac. 414; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Merritt, 230 Pac. 513; Oklahoma City R. Co. v. Barkett, 118 Pac. 350; Oklahoma City R. Co. v. Diab, 118 Pac. 351; Thrasher v. St. Louis-S.F.R. Co., 206 Pac. 212; Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Bratcher, 225 Pac. 941. (7) Where, by looking, the deceased could have seen the train, he is conclusively held to have seen it. Dyrcz v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 238 Mo. 33; Sullivan v. Gideon & N.I.R. Co., 308 Mo. 48, 271 S.W. 983; Huggart v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 134 Mo. 673; Kelsay v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 129 Mo. 362; Monroe v. Chicago & Alton R. Co., 297 Mo. 633, 249 S.W. 644; Alexander v. St. Louis-S.F.R. Co., 327 Mo. 1012, 38 S.W. (2d) 1023; Woods v. Moore, 48 S.W. (2d) 202; Scott v. Kurn, 126 S.W. (2d) 185.
Gardner & Gardner for respondent.
(1) In Oklahoma where a private crossing has been for many years maintained and kept in repair by the railroad company and where the employees had established the custom and practice of signalling for the approach of trains at such crossing and same was recognized, by such employees as a public crossing, then a failure to give such warning constitutes negligence. Midland Valley R. Co. v. Shores, 136 Pac. 157; St. L., I.M. & S.R. Co. v. O'Conner, 142 Pac. 1111. (2) Appellants having undertaken to signal for this crossing created a duty to do so. Siegrist v. Arnot, 10 Mo. App. l.c. 200; Rick Furniture Co. v. Smith, 202 S.W. 99; 45 C.J. 646. (3) Contributory negligence in Oklahoma is a jury question. Section 6 "diminishes" defendant's chance to prevail in a trial on this issue and abolishes contributory negligence, as a matter of law, entirely. Jackson v. Railroad, 31 S.W. (2d) 250; Railroad v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 40 S. Ct. 68, 64 L. Ed. 133. (4) By vesting this power in a jury, the Constitution thereby denies it to the court. In re Richards, 63 S.W. (2d) l.c. 675; Railroad v. Gildersleeve, 219 Mo. 170; Railroad v. Cole, supra. (5) This specific provision of the Constitution amounts to an express limitation upon the rights of courts. Bookhout v. State, 28 N.W. 179; 15 C.J. 857-8; State v. Locker, 266 Mo. 384, 181 S.W. 1001; State v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S.W. 1028; State v. Nast, 209 Mo. 708, 108 S.W. 563; State ex rel. v. Woodson, 161 Mo. l.c. 454, 61 S.W. 252. (6) It is not permissible to establish plaintiff's cause of action by the laws of Oklahoma and then defeat it by the rule of contributory negligence in Missouri. Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co., 169 N.E. 112, 68 A.L.R. 801; L. & N.R. Co. v. Keiffer, 113 S.W. 433; I.C.R. Co. v. Jordan, 177 Ky. 512, 78 S.W. 426; L. & N.R. Co. v. Melton, 105 S.W. 366, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 51. (7) This court must apply the law of Oklahoma as a whole because it affects the substantial rights of the parties. The question of contributory negligence must therefore be determined by the lex loci. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 74 L. Ed. 926, 74 A.L.R. 701; Chandler v. St. L. & S.F.R. Co., 106 S.W. 553; Kinkley v. Grieck, 90 Atl. 1108; 5 R.C.L., sec. 135. (8) The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has never held that Section 6 is procedural. That section, however, has been held to be substantive law, and the courts are prohibited from telling a jury what acts shall or shall not constitute negligence. C., R.I. & P. Ry. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 55, 64 L. Ed. 133; Herron v. Southern Pac., 283 U.S. 91, 75 L. Ed. 857; Railroad Co. v. Stanton, 189 Pac. 754; Hines v. Dean, 220 Pac. l.c. 862. (9) The right of trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution is a substantial right. 35 C.J. 147; Kansas City v. Smith, 238 Mo. 323, 141 S.W. 1103; Hickox v. McKinley, 311 Mo. 234, 278 S.W. 671; Renshaw v. Reynolds, 317 Mo. 484, 297 S.W. 374. (10) Plaintiff's "right of action" and defendant's "liability" cannot be determined independent of the defense of contributory negligence. Gersman v. Railroad Co., 229 S.W. 167; Riley v. Railroad Co., 265 Mo. 596, 165 S.W. 1043; Woodard v. Bush, 282 Mo. 163, 220 S.W. 839; Cook v. Hines, 235 S.W. 156; Morris v. Railroad Co., 251 S.W. 763; Levy v. Steiger, 124 N.E. 477; 39 C.J. 824; St. L. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 181 S.W. l.c. 573; Railroad Co. v. Whitlow's Admr., 43 S.W. 711, 41 L.R.A. 614; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 58 L. Ed. 1458; Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 24 S. Ct. 692, 48 L. Ed. 1067; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 34 S. Ct. 955, 58 L. Ed. 1457; Lauria v. De Nemours & Co., 241 Fed. 687; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 110, 120 N.E. 198; L. & N.R. Co. v. Whitlow's Admr., 105 Ky. 1, 43 S.W. 711, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1931, 41 L.R.A. 614, note 91, Am. Rep. 726; Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 452, 48 L. Ed. 1067; Lauria v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 241 Fed. 687; 32 A.L.R. l.c. 797; Keane Wonder Mining Co. v. Cunningham, 222 Fed. 821; Gray v. Gray, 178 Atl. 508, 94 A.L.R. 1404; Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159, 76 L. Ed. 1026. (11) No question of public policy is presented in this case. Missouri has a similar constitutional provision in libel cases. The enforcement of Section 6 in this State is not contrary to pure morals or abstract justice and would work no evil example or harm to our own citizens. Herrick v. Railroad, 16 N.W. 413; Bradford El. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 161, 76 L. Ed. 1026; 12 C.J. 452; Caine v. St. L. & S.F.R. Co., 32 A.L.R. 796; Morrisette v. Canadian P.R. Co., 76 Vt. 267, 56 Atl. 1102; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ihlenberg, 75 Fed. 873; Railroad Co. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190, 38 L. Ed. 958; Johnson v. Chicago-Great Western...
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