Biery v. United States
| Decision Date | 27 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 07-675L,No. 07-693L,07-693L,07-675L |
| Parties | DOROTHY L. BIERY, et al., and JERRAMY and ERIN PANKRATZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CONSOLIDATED
Pending before the court are the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the proper methodology for determining the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in this Rails to Trails case arising from the creation of recreational trails in Butler and Reno Counties, Kansas. The court previously ruled that the plaintiffs are entitled to "just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment because the trail use authorized by the federal government deprived them of a property interest. See Biery v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 565, 580 (2011). Under the terms of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and RealProperty Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4654(c) (2006) ("URA"),1 the plaintiffs are also entitled to reimbursement of reasonable attorneys' fees. The parties agree that the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees should be set based on the lodestar method, which multiplies the attorneys' reasonable hourly rates by their reasonable hours expended on the litigation. The plaintiffs argue that in setting the reasonable hourly rate under the lodestar, the court should use the "forum rate." More specifically, they contend that the court should use their firm's "national" hourly rates or, alternately, their firm's Washington, D.C. rates, on the grounds that the case was filed in the United States Court of Federal Claims in Washington, D.C. The defendant ("United States" or "government") agrees that the court should employ the lodestar method but urges the court to reject the plaintiffs' proposed forum rates and instead to apply an hourly rate based on the prevailing attorneys' fee rate in St. Louis, Missouri.2 The government argues that an exception to the forum rate should be applied because the plaintiffs' attorneys performed the bulk of their work in St. Louis where the prevailing attorneys' fee rates are significantly lower than those in Washington, D.C. The government alsoargues that the court should authorize further reductions, if applicable, to the St. Louis rate. Finally, the government argues that in calculating the plaintiffs' rates, the court should use the rates that prevailed during the course of the litigation rather than those current at the end of the case. The plaintiffs take a contrary view on both of these issues.
On September 20, 2011, the court entered an order instructing the plaintiffs to file a motion for partial summary judgment to determine the method by which to calculate attorneys' fees and costs under the URA if the parties could not otherwise agree on the appropriate method under that statute. See Order, Sept. 20, 2011, ECF No. 112. The purpose of this order was to separate the issue of fees and costs into two sub-issues: 1) the methodology by which to calculate attorneys' fees and costs and 2) the ultimate amount of attorneys' fees and costs due to the plaintiffs' counsel from the United States. See Joint Status Rep. 4-6, Sept. 19, 2011, ECF No. 111. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the first issue along with associated responses. See Pls.' Cross-Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 126; Def.'s Cross-Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 149; Pls.' Resp., ECF No. 158; Def.'s Reply, ECF No. 164.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." RCFC 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49 (1986). The moving party carries the burden of establishing that there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A "genuine"dispute is one that "may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. at 248. In considering the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, a court must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). If no rational trier of fact could find for the non-moving party, a genuine issue of material fact does not exist and the motion for summary judgment may be granted. Id. With respect to cross-motions for summary judgment, each motion is evaluated on its own merits and reasonable inferences are resolved against the party whose motion is being considered. Marriot Intern. Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 586 F.3d 962, 969-70 (Fed. Cir. 2009). "The fact that both parties have moved for summary judgment does not mean that the court must grant judgment as a matter of law for one side or the other; summary judgment in favor of either party is not proper if disputes remain as to material facts." Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Summary judgment is particularly appropriate where the issue decided is fundamentally a legal issue. Huskey v. Trujillo, 302 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ().
A. The Lodestar Method Serves as the Analytical Framework for Determining Attorneys' Fees under the URA.
It is well settled in the Federal Circuit that the lodestar method is the preferred means for calculating attorneys' fees under fee-shifting statutes such as the URA. See, e.g., Bywaters v. United States, 670 F.3d 1221, 1228-29 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (); Avera v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (). As the Supreme Court has recently explained, the lodestar method is "readily administrable" and "objective," producing "reasonably predictable results." Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1672 (2010); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (). At its heart, the lodestar is a simple calculation wherein the court determines attorneys' fees by multiplying the attorneys' reasonable number of hours expended on the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate charged. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984). The hourly rates are to be calculated "according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Id. at 895. The rates should be in line with those of other attorneys in the "relevant community" offering similar services with "reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Id. at 896 n.11.
For purposes of determining the "relevant community," the Federal Circuit has adopted the "forum rule."3 See Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348 (). Under the "forum rule," the region in which the trial court is located typically defines the "relevant community" for purposes of identifying reasonable hourly rates under the lodestar method. Bywaters, 670 F.3d at 1233 () (citing Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348); Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 251-52 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (). The Federal Circuit has recognized, however, that there may be situations in which the "relevant community," for purposes of determining reasonable hourly rates, is where the attorney practices rather than the forum in which the court sits. Specifically, in Avera, 515 F.3d at 1350, the Federal Circuit adopted and applied an exception to the forum rule recognized by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery Special Service District v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 169 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In Davis County, the D.C. Circuit held that wherethe bulk of the attorney's work is done outside of Washington, D.C. and in a locality where there is a substantially lower prevailing rate as compared to the prevailing rate in Washington, D.C., the attorney's local rate, and not the forum rate, should be used. 169 F.3d at 758. The Federal Circuit has applied the Davis County exception in several attorneys' fees cases arising under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 et seq. (2006) ("Vaccine Act"). See Hall v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 640 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Masias v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 634 F.3d 1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Federal Circuit has also recognized the possible application of the Davis County exception when calculating fees under the URA in a Rails to Trails case. Bywaters v. United States, 670 F.3d 1221, 1233-34 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
While, as noted above, both parties agree that the court should follow the lodestar approach, they disagree as to how the court should determine the "relevant community" for purposes of setting fees. The plaintiffs contend that the court should simply apply the Federal Circuit's "forum rule" and acknowledge that attorneys' fees in this case should be calculated using the rates Arent Fox, the plaintiffs' attorneys' law firm, charges in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere as a "national" firm.4 The plaintiffs contend that ArentFox's "national" firm rates fall within the range of rates typically charged by Washington, D.C. firms with comparable...
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